社会突现论对社会因果的研究

社会突现论是基于系统论与心灵哲学等学科而发展起来的关于社会本质与社会现象解释的方法的一种新型整体主义理论。社会突现论认为,社会一方面由个体聚集突现而成,前者具有后者所不具有的特殊属性;另一方面,社会与个体属于不同的层次,前者不能化归为后者。社会突现论视域中的社会因果研究是以个体主义与整体主义之争为背景,对于社会层次是否具有因果效力的研究。社会突现论所关注的社会因果问题是某个社会事件是否能够作为不以个体意志为转移的因素对另一社会事件或社会中的个体产生影响。社会突现论认为,某个社会事件能够作为一个"独立"的因素影响其他的社会事件或社会中的个体。社会因果既与个体密切相关又不可化归为个体的属性。     

因果关系与因果排他性问题——论对金在权“因果排他性论证”的消解

金在权的因果排他性论证在当代心灵哲学领域对心理因果性问题的讨论中具有重要影响,本文力图通过对这一论证过程的详尽分析,探讨消解这一论证的可能途径,并通过对它的两个基本前提(物理世界的因果闭合原则和因果排他性原则)的分析,最终表明问题的症结在于排他性原则背后预设了一种不恰当的因果观念,从而达到对这一论证的消解。     

Reduction and Understanding

Reductionism, in the sense of the doctrine that theories on different levels of reality should exhibit strict and general relations of deducibility, faces well-known difficulties. Nevertheless, the idea that deeper layers of reality are responsible for what happens at higher levels is well-entrenched in scientific practice. We argue that the intuition behind this idea is adequately captured by the notion of supervenience: the physical state of the fundamental physical layers fixes the states of the higher levels. Supervenience is weaker than traditional reductionism, but it is not a metaphysical doctrine: one can empirically support the existence of a supervenience relation by exhibiting concrete relations between the levels. Much actual scientific research is directed towards finding such inter-level relations. It seems to be quite generally held that the importance of such relations between different levels is that they are explanatory and give understanding: deeper levels provide deeper understanding, and this justifies the search for ever deeper levels. We shall argue, however, that although achieving understanding is an important aim of science, its correct analysis is not in terms of relations between higher and lower levels. Connections with deeper layers of reality do not generally provide for deeper understanding. Accordingly, the motivation for seeking deeper levels of reality does not come from the desire to find deeper understanding of phenomena, but should be seen as a consequence of the goal to formulate ever better, in the sense of more accurate and more-encompassing, empirical theories. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

自主体-因果力:“自由意志危机”的一种化解

李贝特的"迟半秒"实验以及魏格纳的副现象论直接威胁了自由意志的本体论地位,引起了"自由意志危机",但国内外许多著名学者通过新的解读认为这些并不能证明自由意志不存在,其中蒂莫西.奥康纳的自主体—因果力理论则是独树一帜的。他关注的是行动的整个因果链及其解释,从本体论的角度讨论了自主体的原因作用和理由的解释相关性,认为自主体具有基于突现属性的自主体—因果力,是行动产生的原因。但该力具有概率性的结构化倾向,理由则从因果上构造了自主体—因果力并为该力发挥选择作用限定了范围。该理论对因果关系的形而上学问题、心灵的动力学问题以及行动哲学中的行动解释问题有所启示,不失为解决自由意志危机的一种系统而有深度的方案。     

论因果传递性原则

因果关系通常被视为一种传递关系。近年来,哲学家们提出了两类典型的反例来挑战因果传递性原则。当前有代表性的三种解决方案,即相称性方案、面向性方案、对比主义方案,均能够恰当应对第一类反例,但却难以应对第二类反例。通过区分事件系统演化的缺省状态与偏离状态,可以构造一种新的解决方案。在此方案下,因果陈述中所隐含的对系统演化状态的索引化指称得以明晰化,从而可以看到,在两类反例中要么事实上存在因果传递性,要么表面的传递性失败其实源于对案例的不恰当表征。继而因果传递性原则得以捍卫。     

Tropes As Mechanisms

This paper is an attempt to further our understanding of mechanisms conceived of as ontologically separable from laws. What opportunities are there for a mechanistic perspective to be independent of, or even more fundamental than, a law perspective? Advocates of the mechanistic view often play with the possibility of internal and external reliability, or with the paralleling possibilities of enforcing, counteracting, redirecting, etc., the mechanisms’ power to produce To further this discussion I adopt a trope ontology. It is independent of the notion of law, and can easily be adapted to account for such characteristics of mechanisms. The idea of tropes as mechanisms is worked out in some detail. According to the resulting picture, there is still an opportunity to link mechanisms and laws. But while the predominant law view conceives of mechanistic approaches as special kinds of law accounts, this study indicates that the converse may be true. Law accounts are special cases of mechanistic accounts, and they work only in those worlds where the mechanisms are of the right kind     

A Defense Of A Unificationist Theory Of Explanation

This paper defends a unificationist theory of explanation. I first explore the notion of understanding entrenched by the unificationist. Then I present an overview of various kinds of causal statements and explanations. It is claimed that only genuine causal law statements have explanatory power. Finally, I attempt to fit causal explanations into the unificationist theory of explanation. In this way, I try to provide an account of how causal explanations provide understanding of the phenomena that they explain.     

On the Role of Counterfactuals in Inferring Causal Effects

Causal inference in the empiricalsciences is based on counterfactuals. The mostcommon approach utilizes a statistical model ofpotential outcomes to estimate causal effectsof treatments. On the other hand, one leadingapproach to the study of causation inphilosophical logic has been the analysis ofcausation in terms of counterfactualconditionals. This paper discusses and connectsboth approaches to counterfactual causationfrom philosophy and statistics. Specifically, Ipresent the counterfactual account of causationin terms of Lewis's possible-world semantics,and reformulate the statistical potentialoutcome framework using counterfactualconditionals. This procedure highlights variousproperties and mechanisms of the statisticalmodel.     

On Gene’s Action and Reciprocal Causation

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology.     

Ungrounded Dispositions in Quantum Mechanics

General metaphysical arguments have been proposed in favour of the thesis that all dispositions have categorical bases (Armstrong; Prior, Pargetter, Jackson). These arguments have been countered by equally general arguments in support of ungrounded dispositions (Molnar, Mumford). I believe that this controversy cannot be settled purely on the level of abstract metaphysical considerations. Instead, I propose to look for ungrounded dispositions in specific physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. I explain why non-classical properties such as spin are best interpreted as irreducible dispositional properties, and I give reasons why even seemingly classical properties, for instance position or momentum, should receive a similar treatment when interpreted in the quantum realm. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that quantum dispositions should not be limited to probabilistic dispositions (propensities) by showing reasons why even possession of well-defined values of parameters should qualify as a dispositional property. I finally discuss the issue of the actuality of quantum dispositions, arguing that it may be justified to treat them as potentialities whose being has a lesser degree of reality than that of classical categorical properties, due to the incompatibility relations between non-commuting observables.     

“中层性质”的因果力与稳健性论证

"中层性质",例如化学、生物学、生态学等特殊科学关涉的物的性质,是否具有因果力,向来是科学哲学中还原主义与反还原主义争论的焦点问题。在为中层性质拥有自发的、不可还原的因果力辩护的论证当中,基于干预主义因果理论的稳健性论证,相较于传统论证具有一定的优势:中层性质的因果力来自于中层的因果共变的稳健性,因而独立于底层,进而能够回应因果排他问题。但进一步分析稳健性论证所提供的案例表明,事实上,稳健性所依赖的中层性质对底层性质的反馈性约束作用才是中层性质具有因果力的关键理由,然而该反馈性约束作用不普遍适用于所有的中层性质;换言之,并非所有中层性质都具有独特的因果力。     

从Simpson悖论看群体生物学中统计解释和因果解释之争

在理论的群体生物学中,有三种模型都是通过性状适合度(trait fitness)的分布来解释和预见种群结构变化的量和方向。双因子和单因子模型都将性状适合度看成是一种因果属性,而丹尼斯.沃尔什(Denis Walsh)等则指出它们仅仅是一种统计学的属性。笔者通过分析沃尔什的有力论证,尝试表明如果将性状适合度看成是一种因果属性的话,将导致Simpson悖论,因而是不融贯的。所以,关于种群结构变化的统计学解释要优于因果解释。     

突现与下向因果关系的多层级控制

笛根关于复杂系统的突现与下向因果关系的三阶梯观点具有启发意义,但忽略了负反馈的思想。因此,在笛根的正反馈观点的基础上,运用标准的控制论形式提出一个带两个正因果链和三个负反馈环,并向更高反馈环开放的控制图式,可以更好地概括和理解具有多层级控制关系的突现及其下向因果关系。     

A Theory of Scientific Model Construction: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Conceptual Process of Abstraction and Concretisation</Emphasis>

The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application. The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed, how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the nuclear structure.     

论个体性状的完全因果解释

尼安德的"传递论证"中有两个不合理之处:第一,把个体性状出现的遗传学原因扩展为个体性状出现的所有原因,从而把完全因果解释理解成了对个体性状的历史解释;第二,要求对个体性状的解释包括对"原因的原因"的无休止上溯,从而把完全因果解释理解成了终极解释。索伯尔在回应尼安德时只是强调了遗传机制与选择机制属于两种不同的因果路径,没有指出尼安德对科学解释的错误理解,这就不能完全排除选择机制对个体性状的解释作用。     

全球化,科学词汇和生物学的未来

1 Biology for the 21st Century In a recent article in the New York Times (3/23/05), reporting on yet another upset to received views of the ways in which cells make use of their DNA, a prominent geneticist is quoted as remarking, "biologists have gotten used to the unexpected." Indeed, they have, as indeed, they have had to. Over the last few years, our understanding of molecular and developmental genetics has mutated dramatically in response to ever more complex analyses of ever more abundant and more complex data.     

What if Haecceity is not a Property?

In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keränen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on (1) haecceity as an individual essence, (2) haecceity as a property, (3) the classification of properties, and thereby (4) the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus’ point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions.     

关于留美华裔科学家

本文简要介绍了作者在浙江大学求学时，老师中的许多留美科学家和后来成为留美科学家的一些同学；也介绍了在中国科学院工作时期所接触过的大量留美科学家；还介绍了中华人民共和国和美国建交后接触过的许多美籍华裔科学家。最后，本文简要叙述了留美华裔科学家对中国的科学技术、教育、工业、农业、医疗卫生和国防现代化的巨大贡献。     

随附性/排除论证的限度

金在权基于随附性/排除论证排除了自主的心理性质。对随附性/排除论证的3种批评意见——该论证存在不自洽性、否定心理性质的因果效力是不合理的、该论证的普遍化将导致一切宏观性质失去因果效力——或者曲解了金在权的本意,或者超出了物理主义的框架,从而超出了论证的前提。随附性/排除论证能够在物理主义内部形成对自主心理性质的消解,但不能形成对突现论的反驳。