Historicity and explanation

Some scientific explanations are distinctively historical. The aim of this paper is to say what gives such explanations their historical character. A secondary aim is to describe what makes an explanation a stronger or weaker historical explanation. We begin with a critical discussion of John Beatty's and Eric Desjardins' work on historicity and historical narrative. We then offer an alternative account of historical explanation that draws on the work of earlier philosophers (Gallie, Danto, Mink, and Hull). In that alternative account, we highlight four features of narrative explanation that Beatty and Desjardins underemphasize: central subjects; historical trajectories; the idea that historical narratives are known retrospectively; and criteria for determining what is a stronger or weaker historical narrative.     

Collaborative explanation and biological mechanisms

This paper motivates and outlines a new account of scientific explanation, which I term ‘collaborative explanation.’ My approach is pluralist: I do not claim that all scientific explanations are collaborative, but only that some important scientific explanations are—notably those of complex organic processes like development. Collaborative explanation is closely related to what philosophers of biology term ‘mechanistic explanation’ (e.g., Machamer et al., Craver, 2007). I begin with minimal conditions for mechanisms: complexity, causality, and multilevel structure. Different accounts of mechanistic explanation interpret and prioritize these conditions in different ways. This framework reveals two distinct varieties of mechanistic explanation: causal and constitutive. The two have heretofore been conflated, with philosophical discussion focusing on the former. This paper addresses the imbalance, using a case study of modeling practices in Systems Biology to reveals key features of constitutive mechanistic explanation. I then propose an analysis of this variety of mechanistic explanation, in terms of collaborative concepts, and sketch the outlines of a general theory of collaborative explanation. I conclude with some reflections on the connection between this variety of explanation and social aspects of scientific practice.     

Essentially narrative explanations

This essay argues that narrative explanations prove uniquely suited to answering certain explanatory questions, and offers reasons why recognizing a type of statement that requires narrative explanations crucially informs on their assessment. My explication of narrative explanation begins by identifying two interrelated sources of philosophical unhappiness with them. The first I term the problem of logical formlessness and the second the problem of evaluative intractability. With regard to the first, narratives simply do not appear to instantiate any logical form recognized as inference licensing. But absent a means of identifying inferential links, what justifies connecting explanans and explanandum? Evaluative intractability, the second problem, thus seems a direct consequence. This essay shows exactly why these complaints prove unfounded by explicating narrative explanations in the process of answering three interrelated questions. First, what determines that an explanation has in some critical or essential respect a narrative form? Second, how does a narrative in such cases come to constitute a plausible explanation? Third, how do the first two considerations yield a basis for evaluating an explanation offered as a narrative? Answers to each of these questions include illustrations of actual narrative explanations and also function to underline attendant dimensions of evaluation.     

In defence of story-telling

We argue that narratives are central to the success of historical reconstruction. Narrative explanation involves tracing causal trajectories across time. The construction of narrative, then, often involves postulating relatively speculative causal connections between comparatively well-established events. But speculation is not always idle or harmful: it also aids in overcoming local underdetermination by forming scaffolds from which new evidence becomes relevant. Moreover, as our understanding of the past's causal milieus become richer, the constraints on narrative plausibility become increasingly strict: a narrative's admissibility does not turn on mere logical consistency with background data. Finally, narrative explanation and explanation generated by simple, formal models complement one another. Where models often achieve isolation and precision at the cost of simplification and abstraction, narratives can track complex changes in a trajectory over time at the cost of simplicity and precision. In combination both allow us to understand and explain highly complex historical sequences.     

Distinctively mathematical explanation and the problem of directionality: A quasi-erotetic solution

The increasing preponderance of opinion that some natural phenomena can be explained mathematically has inspired a search for a viable account of distinctively mathematical explanation. Among the desiderata for an adequate account is that it should solve the problem of directionality —the reversals of distinctively mathematical explanations should not count as members among the explanatory fold but any solution must also avoid the exclusion of genuine explanations. In what follows, I introduce and defend what I refer to as a quasi-erotetic solution which provides a remedy to the problem in the form of an additional necessary condition on explanation.     

Narrative ordering and explanation

This paper investigates the important role of narrative in social science case-based research. The focus is on the use of narrative in creating a productive ordering of the materials within such cases, and on how such ordering functions in relation to ‘narrative explanation’. It argues that narrative ordering based on juxtaposition - using an analogy to certain genres of visual representation - is associated with creating and resolving puzzles in the research field. Analysis of several examples shows how the use of conceptual or theoretical resources within the narrative ordering of ingredients enables the narrative explanation of the case to be resituated at other sites, demonstrating how such explanations can attain scope without implying full generality.     

A pragmatic account of mechanistic artifact explanation

A mechanistic artifact explanation is an explanation that accounts for an artifact behavior by describing the underlying mechanism. The article shows that there are different kinds of mechanistic artifact explanation: top-down and bottom-up explanation, and I also distinguish between less and more inclusive top-down explanations. To illustrate these different kinds of explanation, the behavior of a simple, fictional artifact is explained in different ways. I defend that which explanation is ideal, depends on pragmatic factors (e.g., the background knowledge of the explainee and the specific goal for which the explanation will be used). For each kind of explanation, the situations, goals and interests for which it is most appropriate are specified, resulting in a pragmatic theory of mechanistic artifact explanation. This theory is compared to Jeroen de Ridder’s account of the pragmatics of mechanistic artifact explanation.     

Realizability and the varieties of explanation

What realization is has been convincingly presented in relation to the way we determine what counts as the realizers of realized properties. The way we explain a fact of realization includes a reference to what realization should be; therefore it informs in turn our understanding of the nature of realization. Conceptions of explanation are thereby included in the views of realization as a metaphysical property.Recently, several major views of realization such as Polger and Shapiro's or Gillett and Aizawa's, however competing, have relied on the neo-mechanicist theory of explanations (e.g,. Darden and Caver 2013), currently popular among philosophers of science. However, it has also been increasingly argued that some explanations are not mechanistic (e.g., Batterman 2009).Using an account given in Huneman (2017), I argue that within those explanations the fact that some mathematical properties are instantiated is explanatory, and that this defines a specific explanatory type called “structural explanation”, whose subtypes could be: optimality explanations (usually found in economics), topological explanations, etc. This paper thereby argues that all subtypes of structural explanation define several kinds of realizability, which are not equivalent to the usual notion of realization tied to mechanistic explanations, onto which many of the philosophical investigations are focused. Then it draws some consequences concerning the notion of multiple realizability.     

The silence of the norms: The missing historiography of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

History has been disparaged since the late 19th century for not conforming to norms of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact a work of history upends the regnant philosophical conception of science in the second part of the 20th century. Yet despite its impact, Kuhn’s Structure has failed to motivate philosophers to ponder why works of history should be capable of exerting rational influence on an understanding of philosophy of science. But all this constitutes a great irony and a mystery. The mystery consists of the persistence of a complete lack of interest in efforts to theorize historical explanation. Fundamental questions regarding why an historical account could have any rational influence remain not merely unanswered, but unasked. The irony arises from the fact that analytic philosophy of history went into an eclipse where it remains until this day just around the time that the influence of Kuhn’s great work began to make itself felt. This paper highlights puzzles long ignored regarding the challenges a work of history managed to pose to the epistemic authority of science, and what this might imply generally for the place of philosophy of history vis-à-vis the problems of philosophy.     

Newton’s “satis est”: A new explanatory role for laws

In this paper I argue that Newton’s stance on explanation in physics was enabled by his overall methodology and that it neither committed him to embrace action at a distance nor to set aside philosophical and metaphysical questions. Rather his methodology allowed him to embrace a non-causal, yet non-inferior, kind of explanation. I suggest that Newton holds that the theory developed in the Principia provides a genuine explanation, namely a law-based one, but that we also lack something explanatory, namely a causal account of the explanandum. Finally, I argue that examining what it takes to have law-based explanation in the face of agnosticism about the causal process makes it possible to recast the debate over action at a distance between Leibniz and Newton as empirically and methodologically motivated on both sides.     

What is narrative possibility?

In this paper I offer a new account of narrative possibility that I call the “ecological approach.” I situate it relative to alternative “metaphysical” and “epistemological” approaches, and argue that it has advantages in comparison. It saves some of the important insights from each, but serves the purposes of narrative explanation better than either, specifically because it delimits the explanatory modal space of narrative explanation correctly, whereas the others do not.     

Mechanistic artefact explanation

One thing about technical artefacts that needs to be explained is how their physical make-up, or structure, enables them to fulfil the behaviour associated with their function, or, more colloquially, how they work. In this paper I develop an account of such explanations based on the familiar notion of mechanistic explanation. To accomplish this, I (1) outline two explanatory strategies that provide two different types of insight into an artefact’s functioning, and (2) show how human action inevitably plays a role in artefact explanation. I then use my own account to criticize other recent work on mechanistic explanation and conclude with some general implications for the philosophy of explanation.     

Scientific realism and empirical confirmation: A puzzle

Scientific realism driven by inference to the best explanation (IBE) takes empirically confirmed objects to exist, independent, pace empiricism, of whether those objects are observable or not. This kind of realism, it has been claimed, does not need probabilistic reasoning to justify the claim that these objects exist. But I show that there are scientific contexts in which a non-probabilistic IBE-driven realism leads to a puzzle. Since IBE can be applied in scientific contexts in which empirical confirmation has not yet been reached, realists will in these contexts be committed to the existence of empirically unconfirmed objects. As a consequence of such commitments, because they lack probabilistic features, the possible empirical confirmation of those objects is epistemically redundant with respect to realism.     

A second look at the colors of the dinosaurs

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative.     

Explanation,understanding, and unrealistic models

How can false models be explanatory? And how can they help us to understand the way the world works? Sometimes scientists have little hope of building models that approximate the world they observe. Even in such cases, I argue, the models they build can have explanatory import. The basic idea is that scientists provide causal explanations of why the regularity entailed by an abstract and idealized model fails to obtain. They do so by relaxing some of its unrealistic assumptions. This method of ‘explanation by relaxation’ captures the explanatory import of some important models in economics. I contrast this method with the accounts that Daniel Hausman and Nancy Cartwright have provided of explanation in economics. Their accounts are unsatisfactory because they require that the economic model regularities obtain, which is rarely the case. I go on to argue that counterfactual regularities play a central role in achieving ‘understanding by relaxation.’ This has a surprising implication for the relation between explanation and understanding: Achieving scientific understanding does not require the ability to explain observed regularities.     

No understanding without explanation

Scientific understanding, this paper argues, can be analyzed entirely in terms of a mental act of “grasping” and a notion of explanation. To understand why a phenomenon occurs is to grasp a correct explanation of the phenomenon. To understand a scientific theory is to be able to construct, or at least to grasp, a range of potential explanations in which that theory accounts for other phenomena. There is no route to scientific understanding, then, that does not go by way of scientific explanation.     

Inference to the best explanation and Norton's material theory of induction

I argue that we should consider Norton's material theory of induction as consisting of two largely independent claims. First, there is the claim that material facts license inductions - a claim which I interpret as a type of contextualism about induction. Second, there is the claim that there are no universal rules of induction. While a good case can be made for the first claim, I believe that Norton's arguments for the second claim are lacking. In particular, I spell out Norton's argument against the claim that all induction may be reduced to inference to the best explanation, and argue that it is not persuasive. Rejecting this part of Norton's theory does not however require us to abandon the first claim that material facts license inductions. In this way, I distinguish the parts of the material theory of induction we should happily accept from the parts about which we should be more skeptical.     

Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of science support claims in the philosophy of science?

A common method for warranting the historical adequacy of philosophical claims is that of relying on historical case studies. This paper addresses the question as to what evidential support historical case studies can provide to philosophical claims and doctrines. It argues that in order to assess the evidential functions of historical case studies, we first need to understand the methodology involved in producing them. To this end, an account of historical reconstruction that emphasizes the narrative character of historical accounts and the theory-laden character of historical facts is introduced. The main conclusion of this paper is that historical case studies are able to provide philosophical claims with some evidential support, but that, due to theory-ladenness, their evidential import is restricted.     

Circularity,indispensability, and mathematical explanation in science

In this paper I consider the objection that the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) is circular and hence fails to support mathematical platonism. The objection is that the explanandum in any mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon is itself identified using mathematical concepts. Hence the explanandum is only genuine if the truth of some mathematical theory is already presupposed. I argue that this objection deserves to be taken seriously, that it does sometimes undermine support for EIA, but that there is no reason to think that circularity is an unavoidable feature of mathematical explanation in science.