Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of science support claims in the philosophy of science?

A common method for warranting the historical adequacy of philosophical claims is that of relying on historical case studies. This paper addresses the question as to what evidential support historical case studies can provide to philosophical claims and doctrines. It argues that in order to assess the evidential functions of historical case studies, we first need to understand the methodology involved in producing them. To this end, an account of historical reconstruction that emphasizes the narrative character of historical accounts and the theory-laden character of historical facts is introduced. The main conclusion of this paper is that historical case studies are able to provide philosophical claims with some evidential support, but that, due to theory-ladenness, their evidential import is restricted.     

Conventionalism,structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science

Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré׳s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré׳s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré׳s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes epistemic access to mind-independent structures.     

Atomism and ‘subtlety’ in Francis Bacon's philosophy

Francis Bacon's reflections on atomism have generally been misunderstood because they have never been systematically studied in relation to the speculative chemical philosophy which he developed in the interval between about 1592 and his death in 1626. This philosophy, in many respects unknown to historians until quite recently, was the only body of positive science which Bacon ever accepted. The speculative philosophy was, on the whole, chemical and non-mechanical, and consequently not consistent with atomist doctrines. In fact, Bacon never at any time accepted the principal atomist tenets. It is therefore necessary to explain why he was interested in atomism at all. Of the several reasons for his interest one (hitherto unrecognised) is especially important—namely, his belief that the speculative and atomic philosophies had affinities. In particular, he believed that of all the ancient philosophies atomism alone approached the ideals associated with the key notion of ‘subtlety’—ideals represented in their highest form (as he imagined) in the speculative philosophy.     

History of science and science combined: solving a historical problem in optics—the case of Galileo and his telescope

Archive for History of Exact Sciences - The claim that Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) transformed the spyglass into an astronomical instrument has never been disputed and is considered a...     

Grasping the spirit in nature: Anschauung in Ørsted's epistemology of science and beauty

The intersection between art, poetry, philosophy and science was the leitmotif which guided the lives and careers of romantic natural philosophers including that of the Danish natural philosopher, H. C. Ørsted. A simple model of Ørsted’s career would be one in which it was framed by two periods of philosophical speculation: the youth’s curious and idealistic interest in new attractive thoughts and the experienced man’s mature reflections at the end of his life. We suggest that a closer look at the epistemological aspects of his works on the theory of beauty reveals a connection between this late work and his early philosophical work including experimental philosophy, but also with the work in teaching and textbook writing, that lies in between. The latter includes Ørsted’s view on the application of mathematics in natural philosophy as well as his failed attempt at a genetic presentation of elementary geometry.     

“Exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science

This essay utilizes the concept “exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science. The essay traces the emergence of the historiographical concept “exploratory experimentation” in the late 1990s. The reconstruction of the early discussions about exploratory experimentation shows that the introduction of the concept had unintended consequences: Initially designed to debunk philosophical ideas about theory testing, the concept “exploratory experimentation” quickly exposed the poverty of our conceptual tools for the analysis of experimental practice. Looking back at a number of detailed analyses of experimental research, we can now appreciate that the concept of exploratory experimentation is too vague and too elusive to fill the desideratum whose existence it revealed.     

Albrecht von Haller on academies and the advancement of science: the case of Göttingen

This article approaches eighteenth-century views on scientific academies by examining Haller's utterances, public and private, especially those occasioned by the founding of the Göttingen Society. It deals in turn with his understanding of the distinctive purpose of academies, with his explanation of the chief ways in which they realized this end, with his thoughts on their broader usefulness, and finally with his various reasons for considering close ties with the state to be essential to their productive and harmonious operations.     

Into the ‘regions of physical and metaphysical chaos’: Maxwell’s scientific metaphysics and natural philosophy of action (agency,determinacy and necessity from theology,moral philosophy and history to mathematics,theory and experiment)

Maxwell’s writings exhibit an enduring preoccupation with the role of metaphysics in the advancement of science, especially the progress of physics. I examine the question of the distinction and the proper relation between physics and metaphysics and the way in which the question relies on key notions that bring together much of Maxwell’s natural philosophy, theoretical and experimental. Previous discussions of his attention to metaphysics have been confined to specific issues and polemics such as conceptions of matter and the problem of free will. I suggest a unifying pattern based on a generalized philosophical perspective and varying expressions, although never a systematic or articulated philosophical doctrine, but at least a theme of action and active powers, natural and human, intellectual and material, with sources and grounds in theology, moral philosophy and historical argument. While science was developing in the direction of professional specialization and alongside the rise of materialism, Maxwell held on to conservative intellectual outlook, but one that included a rich scientific life and held science as part of a rich intellectual, cultural and material life. His philosophical outlook integrated his science with and captured the new Victorian culture of construction and work, political, economic, artistic and engineering.     

‘The Great Fiasco’ of the 1948 presidential election polls: status recognition and norms conflict in social science

All three ‘scientific’ pollsters (Crossley, Gallup and Roper) wrongly predicted incumbent President Harry Truman’s defeat in the 1948 presidential election, and thus faced a potentially serious legitimacy crisis. This ‘fiasco’ occurred at a most inopportune time. Social science was embroiled in a policy debate taking place in the halls of Congress. It was fighting a losing battle to be included, along with the natural sciences, in the National Science Foundation, for which legislation was being drafted. Faced with the failure of the polls, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) intervened quickly to prevent social science’s adversaries from using this event to degrade further its status. After all, many social scientists considered the sample survey as the paramount tool of social research, and sampling as one of social science’s greatest innovation. Concurrently, there was an ongoing conflict among polling practitioners themselves—between advocates of probability sampling and users of quotas, like the pollsters. The SSRC committee appointed to evaluate the polling debacle managed to keep this contentious issue of sampling from becoming the centre of attention. Given the inauspicious environment in which this event happened, the SSRC did not wish to advertise the fact that the house of social science was in turmoil.     

Horticulture in Portugal 1850–1900: The role of science and public utility in shaping knowledge

In this paper, we address the emergence of horticultural practice, agents, spaces and institutions in the two urban settings of Lisbon and Porto, in Portugal, during the second half of the nineteenth century. We do so by following the networking activities of two players: the self-made horticulturist and entrepreneur José Marques Loureiro, who created, in Porto, a commercial horticultural establishment and founded the Journal of Practical Horticulture; and the agronomist Francisco Simões Margiochi, head of the gardens and green grounds department of the municipality, who created the first course on gardening and horticulture, and founded the Royal Horticultural Society, both in Lisbon. Their joint activities were aimed at establishing horticulture as an applied science and to cater simultaneously to an extended audience of citizens. They enable us to enrich the narratives on the emergence and development of horticulture in Europe by calling attention to the participation in circulatory extended networks of actors who are often absent from these accounts. Additionally, they allow a comparative assessment of the outcome of their actions at the national level, and to understand their results in terms consonant with recent historiographical trends on the co-construction of centres and peripheries.

Abbreviations: AML – Arquivo Municipal de Lisboa (Municipal Archive of Lisbon).; ANTT – Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (National Archives at Torre do Tombo).; AHCPL – Arquivo Histórico da Casa Pia de Lisboa (Historical Archive of the Casa Pia of Lisbon).; JHP – Jornal de Horticultura Practica (Journal of Practical Horticulture). Online at: http://www.fc.up.pt/fa/?p=nav&;f=html.fbib-Periodico-oa&;item=378; BSNHP - Boletim da Sociedade Nacional de Horticultura de Portugal (Bulletin of the National Society of Horticulture of Portugal).     

An “ecological” view of styles of science and of art: Alois Riegl’s explorations of the style concept

This paper compares the views of styles of science of Alistair Crombie and Ian Hacking with the notion of styles of art, as developed by Alois Riegl at the end of the 19th Century. Important similarities are noted, notably in the conceptualization of the autonomy of styles. Riegl developed in particular the notion of Kunstwollen (“will to art”), which encompasses an implied relation to the world, in both a cognitive and an ethical sense, and a relation to the public of art. The latter aspect will be examined as the “role of the spectator”. Finally, a number of Riegl’s view on art are tentatively applied to styles of science.     

Two problems in Aristarchus’s treatise on the sizes and distances of the sun and moon

The book of Aristarchus of Samos, On the distances and sizes of the sun and moon, is one of the few pre-Ptolemaic astronomical works that have come down to us in complete or nearly complete form. The simplicity and cleverness of the basic ideas behind the calculations are often obscured in the reading of the treatise by the complexity of the calculations and reasoning. Part of the complexity could be explained by the lack of trigonometry and part by the fact that Aristarchus appears unwilling to make some simplifications that could be simply taken for granted. But an important part of the complexities is due to some unnecessary inconsistencies, as recently discovered by Berggren and Sidoli (Arch Hist Exact Sci 61:213–254, 2007). In the first part of this paper, I will try to show that some of these inconsistencies are just apparent. But the complexity of the calculations and reasoning is not the only reason that could disturb a reader of the treatise. The great inaccuracy—even for the measurement methods and instruments available at those times—of one of the three input values of the treatise is really astonishing. In the sixth and last hypothesis, Aristarchus states that the moon’s apparent size is equal to 2 $^{\circ }$ , while the correct value is one-fourth of that. Some attempts have been made in order to explain such a big value, but all of them have problems. In the second part of this paper, I will propose a new speculative but plausible explanation of the origin of this value.     

Isotope effect studies on the dehydrogenation of Δ1-tetrahydrocannabinol in the rat

Summary Isotope effect studies on the metabolic dehydrogenation of ¹-tetrahydrocannabinol in rats are described and its is shown that this process is confined to a very short period following i.v. administration. The implications of this finding are discussed.The authors are grateful for generous fifts of³H-¹-THC from Dr S. Burstein (Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Massachusetts), and of¹⁴C-¹-THC from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. The authors thank the staff of the Small Animal Unit, Wallaceville Research Centre for their cooperation, and the U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse for their support.     

Introduction to the special issue Hermann Weyl and the philosophy of the ‘New Physics’

This Special Issue Hermann Weyl and the Philosophy of the ‘New Physics’ has two main objectives: first, to shed fresh light on the relevance of Weyl's work for modern physics and, second, to evaluate the importance of Weyl's work and ideas for contemporary philosophy of physics. Regarding the first objective, this Special Issue emphasizes aspects of Weyl's work (e.g. his work on spinors in n dimensions) whose importance has recently been emerging in research fields across both mathematical and experimental physics, as well as in the history and philosophy of physics. Regarding the second objective, this Special Issue addresses the relevance of Weyl's ideas regarding important open problems in the philosophy of physics, such as the problem of characterizing scientific objectivity and the problem of providing a satisfactory interpretation of fundamental symmetries in gauge theories and quantum mechanics. In this Introduction, we sketch the state of the art in Weyl studies and we summarize the content of the contributions to the present volume.