Locke’s construction of the idea of power

I explain Locke’s account of the origin of our idea of power, showing that it concerns the idea of the disposition to act or change, and that this idea is constructed out of the ideas of action or change. I also show how Locke could have modified his account to avoid Hume’s criticism and argue that his neglect to do so reflects a studied neglect of taxonomy, an ambiguity in the notion of capacity, and complications in Locke’s conception of simple ideas. A comparison of the two empiricists reveals that not only do they disagree about the role of reason in the origin of our idea of power, but they are also talking about different ideas. Within the framework of Locke’s account of the origin of the idea of power, I explain why he believes that bodies only provide us with an obscure idea of active power. I conclude by defending his insight that there is a deep connection between the ability to predict and the idea of power.     

Causes as proximate events: Thomas Brown and the Positivist interpretation of Hume on causality

A neglected episode in the intellectual history of the Scottish Enlightenment, Thomas Brown’s philosophy has been recently reassessed and reconnected with the emergence of the Positivist interpretation of David Hume. In fact, aiming to defend Hume’s philosophy from the common charges of atheism and scepticism, Brown popularised an interpretation of Humean texts which was later to become the standard view on Hume. In this essay, I aim to identify Brown’s historical sources and connect his reading of Hume with the medical discussion on causality.     

‘Good Sense’ in context: A response to Kidd

In his response to my (2010), Ian Kidd claims that my argument against Stump’s interpretation of Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is unsound because it ignores an important distinction within virtue epistemology. In light of the distinction between reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemology, Kidd argues that Duhem can be seen as supporting the latter, which he further illustrates with a discussion of Duhem’s argument against ‘perfect theory’. I argue that no substantive argument is offered to show that the distinction is relevant and can establish that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ can be understood within responsibilist virtue epistemology. I furthermore demonstrate that Kidd’s attempt to support his contention relies on a crucial misreading of Duhem’s general philosophy of science, and in doing so highlight the importance of understanding ‘good sense’ in its original context, that of theory choice.     

Experimentation in the cosmic laboratory

It might seem impossible to apply Ian Hacking's experimental argument for scientific realism to astrophysical objects; indeed Hacking himself expressed scepticism about extragalactic entities. Such astrophysical antirealism has been the subject of intense debate and is usually seen as an undesired consequence of experimental realism. In this paper, I claim that it is possible to recast the experimental argument by reference to James Woodward's non-anthropocentric account of experimentation so as to apply it to astrophysical entities, such as gravitational lenses. I also argue that this new formulation of the experimental argument solves several problems with Hacking's original version.     

Inference to the best explanation and Norton's material theory of induction

I argue that we should consider Norton's material theory of induction as consisting of two largely independent claims. First, there is the claim that material facts license inductions - a claim which I interpret as a type of contextualism about induction. Second, there is the claim that there are no universal rules of induction. While a good case can be made for the first claim, I believe that Norton's arguments for the second claim are lacking. In particular, I spell out Norton's argument against the claim that all induction may be reduced to inference to the best explanation, and argue that it is not persuasive. Rejecting this part of Norton's theory does not however require us to abandon the first claim that material facts license inductions. In this way, I distinguish the parts of the material theory of induction we should happily accept from the parts about which we should be more skeptical.     

On Popper’s strong inductivism (or strongly inconsistent anti-inductivism)

It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section 2, first, I begin by briefly characterizing the relevant notion of inductivism that is at stake here; second, I present and discuss the main Popperian argument against it and show that in the only reading in which the argument is formally it is restricted to cases of predicted evidence, and that even if restricted in this way the argument is formally valid it is nevertheless materially unsound. In section 3, I analyze the desiderata that, according to Popper, any acceptable measure for evidential support must satisfy, I clean away its ad-hoc components and show that all the remaining desiderata are satisfied by inductuvist-in-strict-sense measures. In section 4 I demonstrate that two of these desiderata, accepted by Popper, imply that in cases of predicted evidence any measure that satisfies them is qualitatively indistinguishable from conditional probability. Finally I defend that this amounts to a kind of strong inductivism that enters into conflict with Popper’s anti-inductivist argument and declarations, and that this conflict does not depend on the incremental versus non-incremental distinction for evidential-support measures, making Popper’s position inconsistent in any reading.     

Does Kant have a pre-Newtonian picture of force in the balance argument? An account of how the balance argument works

In this paper, I discuss whether the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science version of Kant’s argument that space-filling matter requires both attractive and repulsive forces betrays a pre-Newtonian picture of forces as Warren (2010) argues. More generally, I discuss Kant’s overall strategy for securing the possibility of space-filling matter and I describe what motivates Kant to think of the argument in the way, I believe, he does. Ultimately, I argue that Kant’s argument does not suggest a pre-Newtonian picture of forces. Along the way, I discuss the status of quantity of matter and the nature of forces in the Dynamics chapter of that work so as to better clarify what is at work in the balance argument.     

The rhetorical strategy of William Paley’s Natural theology (1802): Part 2, William Paley’s Natural theology and the challenge of atheism

The first part of this two-part article suggested that William Paley’s Natural theology (1802) should be viewed as the culmination of a complex psychological strategy for inculcating religious and moral sentiments. Having focused in Part 1 on Paley’s rhetoric, we now turn our attention to the philosophical part of the programme. This article attempts to settle the vexed question of how far Paley responded to the devastating critique of the teleological argument contained in Hume’s posthumously published Dialogues concerning natural religion (1779). It also identifies tensions that arose in Natural theology between the rhetorical and intellectual sides of the stratagem. In response to Erasmus Darwin’s evolutionary theories, Paley asserted that the divinely designed architecture of nature had remained unchanged since the creation. But the more he emphasized the preordained nature of providence, its effectuation through mechanical dispositions, the less room there appeared to be for particular interventions. Section 2 concentrates on Paley’s efforts to reconcile this model of a law-governed, mechanical universe, with the belief in a personal God who was active in worldly affairs. It therefore challenges the view, long unquestioned in the historical literature, that Paley’s Deity was merely a watchmaker, who had remained idle since the Creation.     

Two arguments for scientific realism unified

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist’s favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist’s argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention.     

Signs, toy models, and the a priori: from Helmholtz to Wittgenstein

The Marburg neo-Kantians argue that Hermann von Helmholtz’s empiricist account of the a priori does not account for certain knowledge, since it is based on a psychological phenomenon, trust in the regularities of nature. They argue that Helmholtz’s account raises the ‘problem of validity’ (Gültigkeitsproblem): how to establish a warranted claim that observed regularities are based on actual relations. I reconstruct Heinrich Hertz’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Bild theoretic answer to the problem of validity: that scientists and philosophers can depict the necessary a priori constraints on states of affairs in a given system, and can establish whether these relations are actual relations in nature. The analysis of necessity within a system is a lasting contribution of the Bild theory. However, Hertz and Wittgenstein argue that the logical and mathematical sentences of a Bild are rules, tools for constructing relations, and the rules themselves are meaningless outside the theory. Carnap revises the argument for validity by attempting to give semantic rules for translation between frameworks. Russell and Quine object that pragmatics better accounts for the role of a priori reasoning in translating between frameworks. The conclusion of the tale, then, is a partial vindication of Helmholtz’s original account.     

Three concepts of causation in Newton

In this paper, I argue that recent debates about Newton’s attitude toward action at a distance have been hampered by a lack of conceptual clarity. To clarify the metaphysical background of the debates, I distinguish three kinds of causes within Newton’s work: mechanical, dynamical, and substantial causes. This threefold distinction enables us to recognize that although Newton clearly regards gravity as an impressed force that operates across vast distances, he denies that this commitment requires him to think that some substance acts at a distance on another substance. (Dynamical causation is distinct from substantial causation.) Newton’s denial of substantial action at a distance may strike his interpreters as questionable, so I provide an argument to show that it is in fact acceptable.     

Galilean argumentation and the inauthenticity of the Cigoli letter on painting vs. sculpture

This essay is partly a case study of the role of logic in historiography. It is also partly a test case for the thesis of a Galilean correspondence between aesthetic attitude and scientific thought, advanced by Panofsky, Koyré, and Heilbron. Intrinsically, it is a discussion of the authenticity of the letter to Cigoli dated 26 June 1612, widely attributed to Galileo, containing argumentation about the relative aesthetic merits of painting and sculpture. I undertake a systematic analysis of the letter’s method of argument, comparing and contrasting it with Galileo’s. I argue that the letter does have some Galilean characteristics: critical reasoning; ad hominem argumentation, in the seventeenth-century sense; and appeal to experimentation. However, the letter falls short of the typical Galilean open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, and clarity; crucially, it uses several illative terms which Galileo never uses, and does not use the one he uses most often. The latter features outweigh the former. Moreover, I discuss some aspects of the letter’s substantive content, primarily a theory of vision that disregards the dynamics of perspective and the faculty of binocularity, which Galileo understood and exploited very well. My novel argument vindicates an old judgment of Favaro, who doubted the letter’s authenticity.     

The roots of the silver tree: Boyle,alchemy, and teleology

Though Robert Boyle called final causes one of the most important subjects for a natural philosopher to study, his own treatise on the subject, the Disquisition about Final Causes, has received comparatively little scholarly attention. In this paper, I explicate Boyle's complex argument against the use of teleological explanations for inanimate bodies, such as metals. The central object of this argument is a mysterious allusion to a silver plant. I claim that the silver plant is best understood as a reference to alchemical product: the Arbor Dianae, an offshoot of George Starkey's recipe for the Philosophers' Stone. Then, I show how the context of alchemy not only clarifies Boyle's argument but also places it within a wider dialectic about matter and teleology. I then contrast the parallel arguments of Boyle and John Ray on the question of whether metals have divine purposes and show that the difference is explained by Boyle's belief in the transmutation of metals.     

Cartesian analysis and synthesis

This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method of theory elaboration that fuses the modern methods of discovery and confirmation in one enterprise. I discuss Descartes’ methodological writings, assess their continuity and coherence, and I address the major shortcoming of previous interpretations of Cartesian methodology. I also discuss the Cartesian method in the context of other conceptions of scientific method of that era and argue that Descartes’ method significantly transforms these conceptions. In the second part I argue that mathematical and natural-philosophical writings exhibit this kind of analysis. To that effect I examine in Descartes’ writings on the method as used in mathematics, and Descartes’ account of the discovery of the nature of the rainbow in the Meteors. Finally, I briefly assess Descartes’ claim regarding the universality of his method.     

On reading Newton as an Epicurean: Kant,Spinozism and the changes to the Principia

This paper argues for three distinct, albeit mutually illuminating theses: first it explains why well informed eighteenth-century thinkers, e.g., the pre-critical Immanuel Kant and Richard Bentley would have identified important aspects of Newton’s natural philosophy with (a species of modern) Epicureanism. Second, it explores how some significant changes to Newton’s Principia between the first (1687) and second (1713) editions can be explained in terms of attempts to reframe the Principia so that the charge of “Epicureanism” can be deflected. In order to account for this, the paper discusses the political and theological changes in the wake of the Glorious Revolution (1688); Bentley plays a non-trivial role in these matters. Third, the paper argues that there is an argument in Kant’s (1755) Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens that undermines a key claim of Newton’s General Scholium that was used to discredit Spinozism by Clarke in A demonstration of the being and attributes of God.     

What’s right about Carnap, Neurath and the Left Vienna Circle thesis: a refutation

This paper rejects as unfounded a recent criticism of research on the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle and the claim that it sported a political philosophy of science. The demand for ‘specific, local periodized claims’ is turned against the critic. It is shown (i) that certain criticisms of Red Vienna’s leading party cannot be transferred to the members of the Circle involved in popular education, nor can criticism of Carnap’s Aufbau be transferred to Neurath’s unified science project; (ii) that neither with regard to Carnap nor to Neurath does the criticism raise points that either engage with the thesis proposed or stand up to closer scrutiny; (iii) that the main thesis attacked is just what I had warned the claim that the Vienna Circle had a political philosophy of science should not be understood as. The question whether theirs is ‘political enough’ today can and should be discussed without distortion of the historical record.     

Kuhn and coherentist epistemology

The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) ‘the weak notion of rationality’, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not ‘ultimately empirical’, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.     

Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals

In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, and both have weaknesses. Fortunately, two elements of Douglas’s work that have previously received much less emphasis (namely, her comments about the goals of scientific activity and the ethics of communicating about values) provide resources for developing a more promising approach for regulating values in science.     

Dark matter,the Equivalence Principle and modified gravity

Dark matter (DM) is an essential ingredient of the present Standard Cosmological Model, according to which only 5% of the mass/energy content of our universe is made of ordinary matter. In recent times, it has been argued that certain cases of gravitational lensing represent a new type of evidence for the existence of DM. In a recent paper, Peter Kosso attempts to substantiate that claim. His argument is that, although in such cases DM is only detected by its gravitational effects, gravitational lensing is a direct consequence of Einstein's Equivalence Principle (EEP) and therefore the complete gravitational theory is not needed in order to derive such lensing effects. In this paper I critically examine Kosso's argument: I confront the notion of empirical evidence involved in the discussion and argue that EEP does not have enough power by itself to sustain the claim that gravitational lensing in the Bullet Cluster constitutes evidence for the DM Hypothesis. As a consequence of this, it is necessary to examine the details of alternative theories of gravity to decide whether certain empirical situations are indeed evidence for the existence of DM. It may well be correct that gravitational lensing does constitute evidence for the DM Hypothesis—at present it is controversial whether the proposed modifications of gravitation all need DM to account for the phenomenon of gravitational lensing and if so, of which kind—but this will not be a direct consequence of EEP.