Making sense of absolute measurement: James Clerk Maxwell,William Thomson,Fleeming Jenkin,and the invention of the dimensional formula

During the 1860s, the Committee on Electrical Standards convened by the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) attempted to articulate, refine, and realize a system of absolute electrical measurement. I describe how this context led to the invention of the dimensional formula by James Clerk Maxwell and subsequently shaped its interpretation, in particular through the attempts of William Thomson and Fleeming Jenkin to make absolute electrical measurement intelligible to telegraph engineers. I identify unit conversion as the canonical purpose for dimensional formulae during the remainder of the nineteenth century and go on to explain how an operational interpretation was developed by the French physicist Gabriel Lippmann. The focus on the dimensional formula reveals how various conceptual, theoretical, and material aspects of absolute electrical measurement were taken up or resisted in experimental physics, telegraphic engineering, and electrical practice more broadly, which leads to the conclusion that the integration of electrical theory and telegraphic practice was far harder to achieve and maintain than historians have previously thought. This ultimately left a confusing legacy of dimensional concepts and practices in physics.     

Paul Natorp and the emergence of anti-psychologism in the nineteenth century

This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. This interpretation of Natorp suggests that attention paid to late nineteenth century theories of subjectivity and philosophy of psychology could improve our understanding of the emergence of anti-psychologism in that period.     

Gaining traction: Foothold concepts and exemplars in conceptual change

This paper investigates the emergence of conformational analysis in organic chemistry as a case of conceptual change in science. In this case, the mechanism of conceptual change is identified as the emergence of a new exemplar. This new exemplar was made possible because of the identification of a distinctive chemical structure to which ‘foothold’ concepts were applicable. These concepts facilitated both clear explanation in the particular case, and the analogical extension of the conceptual innovation throughout the discipline. The case suggests a cognitive explanation for the importance of exemplars to scientific content.     

State of the field: Latin American decolonial philosophies of science

Today, new histories of science are producing skeptical questions about the supposedly international philosophies of science that prevail in the North. The conceptual resources of such philosophies seem inadequate to enable them to interact effectively with how sciences and their philosophies do, could, and should function in today's economic, political, social and cultural, local and global contexts. How international, or universal, are these philosophies of science in reality? Here the focus will be on just one strain of these challenges. This one has emerged from Latin Americans who are creating anti-colonial histories and philosophies of knowledge production. They have named it modernity/coloniality/decolonial theory (MCD). They intend to develop a philosophy of science adequate for its own, Latin American needs. In the process, they transform typical Northern assumptions about modernity, its origins and its effects on Northern philosophies of science, as these are understood in both Latin America and around the globe.Five aspects of the MCD accounts will be discussed here. The first is historical differences between the worlds of the Spanish and Portuguese colonization of the Americas in the sixteenth century and of the worlds of the mostly British colonization of India and Africa in the ‘long nineteenth century’. Second is feminist and anti-racist issues in these Latin American histories. Third is the neglect of these histories in the North. Fourth is the continuing effects of the rise and fall of a positivist philosophy of science in Latin America. The fifth is two progressive post-positivist tensions for Northern philosophy of science produced in this work.     

Reflecting ‘Popular Culture’: The Introduction,Diffusion, and Construction of the Reflecting Telescope in the Netherlands

The eighteenth century was an era in which science came to play a major role in the cultural ideal of the city elite. The phenomenon of the ‘gentleman-scientist’ arose: a layman without a scientific education who for a variety of often socially desirable reasons devoted himself to scientific endeavours. Scientific instruments were the tools for this interest. This article describes the introduction, diffusion, and construction in the Netherlands of one of the most prominent eighteenth-century instruments: the reflecting telescope. The reception of this instrument casts new light on the usually almost invisible network of gentleman-scientists and instrument-makers in this region. The specific economic and political factors of the Netherlands led to a totally different development of this instrument compared with the ‘motherland’ England. Whereas in Great Britain the reflecting telescope was a great success well into the nineteenth century, in the Netherlands it became a symbol of technical inability and stagnation.     

Why did John Herschel fail to understand polarization? The differences between object and event concepts

This paper offers a solution to a problem in Herschel studies by drawing on the dynamic frame model for concept representation offered by cognitive psychology. Applying the frame model to represent the conceptual frameworks of the particle and wave theories, this paper shows that discontinuity between the particle and wave frameworks consists mainly in the transition from a particle notion ‘side’ to a wave notion ‘phase difference’. By illustrating intraconceptual relations within concepts, the frame representations reveal the ontological differences between these two concepts. ‘Side’ is an object concept built on spatial relations, but ‘phase difference’ is an event concept built on temporal relations. The conceptual analyses display a possible cognitive source of Herschel’s misconception of polarization. Limited by his experimental works and his philosophical beliefs, Herschel comprehended polarization solely in terms of spatial relations, which prevented him from replacing the object concept ‘side’ with the event concept ‘phase difference’, and eventually resulted in his failure to understand the wave account of polarization.     

Education and Training in the Mining Industry, 1750-1860: European Models and the Italian Case

Mining education was one of the areas of technical savoir transformed during the eighteenth century. Mining academies arose and spread through Europe in the second half of that century. This happened first in the German states and the Austrian dominions, due to the cameralistic system, and soon developed elsewhere through a transfer of the German model to France (Ecole des mines) as well as to other francophone and Spanish-speaking areas (Belgium and Piedmont-Savoy, Spain and America). The mining academies may rightly be considered among the prototypes of technical high schools (Polytechniques and Technische Hochschulen) established during the nineteenth century. In the course of exploring some of the details of this development, the present paper aims at suggesting outlines to be followed in pursuing a comparative analysis of special schools for the training of technicians and mining officers (Bergschulen and Bergakademien). A second aim is to examine more closely the Italian case as a typical example of adaptation, although on a smaller scale, of French and German experiences. This can provide a framework within which to place further microanalyses and case-studies.     

A view from nowhere: quantum reference frames and uncertainty

Attending carefully to the role that reference frames play in the definition of physical concepts in quantum theory can lead us to a clearer understanding of the uncertainty relations, and the connection that they have with the fact that physical quantities are defined in terms of, and measured relative to, reference frames.     

The Parallelogram Rule from Pseudo-Aristotle to Newton

The history of the Parallelogram Rule for composing physical quantities, such as motions and forces, is marked by conceptual difficulties leading to false starts and halting progress. In particular, authors resisted the required assumption that the magnitude and the direction of a quantity can interact and are jointly necessary to represent the quantity. Consequently, the origins of the Rule cannot be traced to Pseudo-Aristotle or Stevin, as commonly held, but to Fermat, Hobbes, and subsequent developments in the latter part of the seventeenth century.     

Collaboration,interdisciplinarity, and the epistemology of contemporary science

Over the last decades, science has grown increasingly collaborative and interdisciplinary and has come to depart in important ways from the classical analyses of the development of science that were developed by historically inclined philosophers of science half a century ago. In this paper, I shall provide a new account of the structure and development of contemporary science based on analyses of, first, cognitive resources and their relations to domains, and second of the distribution of cognitive resources among collaborators and the epistemic dependence that this distribution implies. On this background I shall describe different ideal types of research activities and analyze how they differ. Finally, analyzing values that drive science towards different kinds of research activities, I shall sketch the main mechanisms underlying the perceived tension between disciplines and interdisciplinarity and argue for a redefinition of accountability and quality control for interdisciplinary and collaborative science.     

Infrared metaphysics: the elusive ontology of radiation. Part 1

Hardly any ontological result of modern science is more firmly established than the fact that infrared radiation differs from light only in wavelength; this is part of the modern conception of the continuous spectrum of electromagnetic radiation reaching from radio waves to gamma radiation. Yet, like many such evident truths, the light-infrared unity was an extremely difficult thing to establish. We examine the competing arguments in favour of the unified and pluralistic theories of radiation, as put forward in the first half of the nineteenth century by three of the most important early pioneers of the study of radiation: Herschel, Melloni and Draper. In this part of the paper, we conclude that there were no compelling reasons of observational adequacy to prefer the unified theory to the pluralistic theory. (Whether there were other conclusive reasons for that preference is the question addressed in Part 2 of the paper.)     

Spectroscopic Portraiture

This paper describes a now widely forgotten tradition in the nineteenth century which - to borrow a simile used or implied by the actors themselves - may be described as 'spectroscopic portraiture'. Quite unlike the later obsession with numerical precision in wavelength measurement, and also in stark contrast to the contemporary vogue of photographic mapping which presumptuously claimed 'mechanical objectivity', that is avoidance of any human intervention in the recorded data, there was among some spectroscopists a much greater preoccupation with qualitative rather than quantitative aspects. The atlases of the solar spectrum by Cornu, Thollon, and Piazzi Smyth were supposed to convey the subjectively perceived Gestalt of the Fraunhofer lines, at the expense of precision. I shall argue that this was a systematic research programme addressed to a welldefined but small audience of specialists in the new subdiscipline of spectroscopy which was distinct from other practices such as spectrum analysis, which was directed mainly at chemists. Apart from this, the new tradition can also be identified by the dense net of cross-references in the publications of the various members, and by their critique of earlier work. This tradition of spectrum portraiture started with Kirchhoff's 1861-2 high-resolution chromolithographic plates of the solar spectrum, which were printed off a half-dozen different stones in order to render most faithfully the various line intensities. Focusing especially on the tension between representational goals and technical possibilities in the rapidly developing printing industry, I then trace the emerging tradition through its apogee to the close of the nineteenth century.     

The Concept of Existence and the Role of Constructions in Euclid's Elements

 This paper examines the widely accepted contention that geometrical constructions serve in Greek mathematics as proofs of the existence of the constructed figures. In particular, I consider the following two questions: first, whether the evidence taken from Aristotle's philosophy does support the modern existential interpretation of geometrical constructions; and second, whether Euclid's Elements presupposes Aristotle's concept of being. With regard to the first question, I argue that Aristotle's ontology cannot serve as evidence to support the existential interpretation, since Aristotle's ontological discussions address the question of the relation between the whole and its parts, while the modern discussions of mathematical existence consider the question of the validity of a concept. In considering the second question, I analyze two syllogistic reformulations of Euclidean proofs. This analysis leads to two conclusions: first, it discloses the discrepancy between Aristotle's view of mathematical objects and Euclid's practice, whereby it will cast doubt on the historical and theoretical adequacy of the existential interpretation. Second, it sets the conceptual background for an alternative interpretation of geometrical constructions. I argue, on the basis of this analysis that geometrical constructions do not serve in the Elements as a means of ascertaining the existence of geometrical objects, but rather as a means of exhibiting spatial relations between geometrical figures. (Received January 1, 2002) Communicated by A. JONES Dedicated to the memory of Yonathan Begin     

Artful Physics

This paper gives an account of the establishment and expansion of a Faculty of Science at the Calvinist ‘Free University’ in the Netherlands in the 1930s. It describes the efforts of a group of orthodox Christians to come to terms with the natural sciences in the early twentieth century. The statutes of the university, which had been founded in 1880, prescribed that all research and teaching should be based on Calvinist, biblical principles. This ideal was formulated in opposition to the claim of nineteenth-century scientific naturalists that there was an inherent conflict between science and religion. However, despite their selection on the basis of their strict Calvinist beliefs, the first science professors attributed a certain independence to the domain of science. They agreed with the criticism of the conflict thesis, and tried to defuse the tensions between science and religion, although mainly at the level of philosophy and history, looking for example for harmony between science and religion in the past. Ironically, as a result of this approach, the Calvinist scientists mainly contributed to the acceptance of mainstream science in Dutch Calvinist circles, contrary to developments in other countries (notably the USA) where the conflict between science and orthodox Christianity has reasserted itself.     

Blood clots: the nineteenth-century debate over the substance and means of transfusion in Britain

Historians have devoted little attention to blood transfusion in the nineteenth century. In part, this neglect reflects the presentist assumption that, before Karl Landsteiner's discovery of blood types, this practice would have failed too often to gain currency. Yet, transfusion was in fact the subject of much debate, and was actively practised, primarily by obstetricians on haemorrhaging women. Examining this practice through the conceptual lens of 'blood clots', both as noun and as observation, I follow transfusors' assumptions about the nature of the blood and the problem of its coagulation. Tracing the medicalization of ideas about blood by the century's end, I map this shift onto changing notions about why transfusion was performed, what substance was best employed, and what instrument best fitted that substance's movement into the circulation. In this way, 'Blood Clots' reconstructs the discourse surrounding transfusion, extending that discourse to material culture in order to illuminate the rationale that guided transfusion's practice in nineteenth-century Britain.     

Experiential and cosmopolitan knowledge: The transcontinental field practices of the U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey

Before many of the global environmental knowledge producing networks and technologies emerged later in the twentieth century, another spatially extended form of field science was implemented at a continental scale by the U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey, revealing similar tensions and dynamics. Specimens and observations from across continental spaces were integrated through railroad-based transportation and communications networks in order to map distributions of birds and mammals and delineate “life zones” stretching across the continent. At the same time that field zoologists of the Biological Survey produced this cosmopolitan scientific knowledge, they also developed an intimate, experiential knowledge of many of the places where they traveled. By following the travels of Biological Survey field parties, especially the agency's long-time chief field naturalist Vernon Bailey, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the railroad was dominant, this paper traces the interconnections between the two ways of knowing in the Biological Survey's practice. However, the integration of these different forms of knowledge was ultimately partial and incomplete, as seen through the Survey's daily practices such as food consumption, the seasonality of survey field practice, and limitations on what types of knowledge were incorporated from lay network collaborators and field assistants.     

Abstract considerations: disciplines and the incoherence of Newton’s natural philosophy

Historians have long sought putative connections between different areas of Newton’s scientific work, while recently scholars have argued that there were causal links between even more disparate fields of his intellectual activity. In this paper I take an opposite approach, and attempt to account for certain tensions in Newton’s ‘scientific’ work by examining his great sensitivity to the disciplinary divisions that both conditioned and facilitated his early investigations in science and mathematics. These momentous undertakings, exemplified by research that he wrote up in two separate notebooks, obey strict distinctions between approaches appropriate to both new and old ‘natural philosophy’ and those appropriate to the mixed mathematical sciences. He retained a fairly rigid demarcation between them until the early eighteenth century. At the same time as Newton presented the ‘mathematical principles’ of natural philosophy in his magnum opus of 1687, he remained equally committed to a separate and more private world or ontology that he publicly denigrated as hypothetical or conjectural. This is to say nothing of the worlds implicit in his work on mathematics and alchemy. He did not lurch from one overarching ontological commitment to the next (for example, moving tout court from radical aetherial explanations to strictly vacuist accounts) but instead simultaneously—and often radically—developed generically distinct concepts and ontologies that were appropriate to specific settings and locations (for example, private, qualitative, causal natural philosophy versus public quantitative mixed mathematics) as well as to relevant styles of argument. Accordingly I argue that the concepts used by Newton throughout his career were intimately bound up with these appropriate generic or quasi-disciplinary ‘structures’. His later efforts to bring together active principles, aethers and voids in various works were not failures that resulted from his ‘confusion’ but were bold attempts to meld together concepts or ontologies that belonged to distinct enquiries. His analysis could not be ‘coherent’ because the structures in which they appeared were fundamentally incompatible.     

Examining tensions in the past and present uses of concepts

Examining tensions between the past and present uses of scientific concepts can help clarify their contributions as tools in experimental practices. This point can be illustrated by considering the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations: despite debates over their respective referential reliabilities remaining unresolved within their interdependent histories, both are used as independently stable concepts in neuroimaging experiments. Building on an account of how these concepts function as tools structured for pursuit of diverging goals in experiments, this paper explores this tension by re-examining the continued reliance of each concept on inverse characterisations inherited from the nominally-discarded ‘mediator-view’ of sensory-like mental phenomena (SLMP). In doing so, I seek to demonstrate how examining unresolved tensions can help highlight that entrenched associations can remain both integral to, and obscured by, the uses of concepts as goal-directed tools within experimental practices.     

The scales of experience: Introduction to the special issue Experiencing the global environment

The Scales of Experience introduces the special issue Experiencing the Global Environment by focusing on three dimensions of the theme that are reflected to various degrees in the constitutive essays. First, the introduction highlights the links between the epistemological and political contexts of the historical constitution and development of the global environment (or global environments) in the earth and environmental sciences from the late nineteenth century to today. Second, it argues for a historical approach to the complex concept of scientific experience, whose mutable and contingent qualities are demonstrated by the contributions to the special volume. Lastly, the introduction presents one of the central issues to be tackled by the essays to follow: the development – and, at times, the failure – of strategies and technologies to bridge the seemingly incommensurate gulf between individual, localized experience and the all-encompassing scale of the global environment.