‘Physics and fashion’: John Tyndall and his audiences in mid-Victorian Britain

This paper explores how the physicist John Tyndall transformed himself from humble surveyor and schoolmaster into an internationally applauded icon of science. Beginning with his appointment as Professor of Natural Philosophy at the Royal Institution in 1853, I show how Tyndall’s worries about his social class and Irish origins, his painstaking attention to his lecturing performance and skilled use of the material and architectural resources of the Royal Institution were vital to his eventual success as a popular expositor and ambassador for science. Secondly I explore the implications of Tyndall’s ‘popularity’ with respect to debates over the meaning and value of scientific ‘popularisation’. In support of recent work challenging diffusionist models of science communication, I show how Tyndall’s interactions with his audiences illustrate the symbiotic relationship between producer and consumer of ‘popular’ science. By examining the views of Tyndall’s critics—notably the ‘North British’ group of physicists—and his defenders and rivals in the domain of popular scientific lecturing, I show that disputes over Tyndall’s authority reflected anxieties about what constituted popular science and the transient boundaries between instruction and entertainment. The term ‘popularisation’ enjoyed many different uses in these debates, not least of all as a rheorical device with which to either exalt or destroy a scientist’s credibility.     

John Dewey's pragmatist alternative to the belief-acceptance dichotomy

Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts of cognitive attitudes taken by inquirers, but none can be used to support the wedge strategy.     

Cell kinetics and radiation pathology

Conclusion Radiation pathology is a general term describing the damage that occurs in tissues after irradiation. After the very low doses, received by the normal working population, no major pathology is seen. There is a hazard of cancer induction if DNA damage that has been inflicted in an individual cell is repaired in such a way that the DNA remains intact but rearranged. This radiation carcinogenesis is however a low risk compared with many chemical carcinogens in the environment and in cancer chemotherapy.The treatment of cancer by radiation is now commonly accepted as one of the most effective forms of treatment. It can kill tumour cells effectively, but the dose that can be given is limited by the normal tissues that are inevitably included in the beam. Cell function is maintained for some time even after very large doses. However normal tissues show a loss of function and structure because the proliferating subcompartment of each tissue is depleted as the radiation injured cells fail to divide and die. The time at which the cell deficit is detected varies from hours in some tissues to months or years in others. It depends upon the normal rate of cell turnover. The apparent sensitivity of each tissue therefore depends upon the time at which the assessment is made. Lung and kidney would appear very resistant at 1–3 months post irradiation, but would seem very radiosensitive at 6–12 months as their latent damage is expressed.The ultimate expression of radiation pathology is the death of the whole animal as the essential organ function fails. The time of this death is only comprehensible if the time sequence and the proliferation kinetics of the target cells are taken into account. It must be recognised that it is initial damage to the clonogenic cells, not to the differentiated cells per se that is important.     

Ludwig Boltzmann and his influence on science

The life of Ludwig Boltzmann (20 February 1844–5 September 1906) and his influence on science is reviewed. This great Austrian scientist was not only the founder of statistical mechanics and a gifted experimentalist, but his pioneering ideas influenced all the physical sciences. In his honour, many Austrian research institutes carry his name. He had great influence on Albert Einstein whose first papers were, according to his own words, in the spirit of Boltzmann, and intended to proved the reality and the size of certain atoms using the molecular fluctuations postulated by Boltzmann. Max Planck was converted from a ‘Saulus’ to a ‘Paulus’ when he had to use Boltzmann's method to derive his famous law of radiation. In fact, Boltzmann had already used discrete energy levels as early as 1872. Yet his work was heavily criticized by the neopositivists around Ernst Mach and seemed to receive very little attention in the last years of his life when a great number of physicists did not believe in atoms. It is the tragedy of Boltzmann's life that he did not experience the glorius victory of his ideas, but died under the gloomy vision that the work of his whole life was doomed to oblivion.     

A Helmholtzian approach to space and time

A slight modification of Helmholtz’s metrical approach to the foundations of geometry leads to the locally Euclidian character of space without restriction of the curvature. A bolder generalization involving time measurement leads to the locally Minkowskian character of spacetime. Some philosophical consequences of these results are drawn.     

An empirical approach to symmetry and probability

We often rely on symmetries to infer outcomes’ probabilities, as when we infer that each side of a fair coin is equally likely to come up on a given toss. Why are these inferences successful? I argue against answering this question with an a priori indifference principle. Reasons to reject such a principle are familiar, yet instructive. They point to a new, empirical explanation for the success of our probabilistic predictions. This has implications for indifference reasoning generally. I argue that a priori symmetries need never constrain our probability attributions, even for initial credences.     

John Dalton’s puzzles: from meteorology to chemistry

Historical research on John Dalton has been dominated by an attempt to reconstruct the origins of his so-called “chemical atomic theory”. I show that Dalton’s theory is difficult to define in any concise manner, and that there has been no consensus as to its unique content among his contemporaries, later chemists, and modern historians. I propose an approach which, instead of attempting to work backward from Dalton’s theory, works forward, by identifying the research questions that Dalton posed to himself and attempting to understand how his hypotheses served as answers to these questions. I describe Dalton’s scientific work as an evolving set of puzzles about natural phenomena. I show how an early interest in meteorology led Dalton to see the constitution of the atmosphere as a puzzle. In working on this great puzzle, he gradually turned his interest to specifically chemical questions. In the end, the web of puzzles that he worked on required him to create his own novel philosophy of chemistry for which he is known today.