Socially conditioned mathematical change: the case of the French Revolution

This paper examines a historical case of conceptual change in mathematics that was fundamental to its progress. I argue that in this particular case, the change was conditioned primarily by social processes, and these are reflected in the intellectual development of the discipline. Reorganization of mathematicians and the formation of a new mathematical community were the causes of changes in intellectual content, rather than being mere effects. The paper focuses on the French Revolution, which gave rise to revolutionary developments in mathematics. I examine how changes in the political constellation affected mathematicians both individually and collectively, and how a new professional community—with different views on the objects, problems, aims, and values of the discipline—arose. On the basis of this account, I will discuss such Kuhnian themes as the role of the professional community and normal versus revolutionary development.     

Reception and discovery: the nature of Johann Wilhelm Ritter’s invisible rays

Ultraviolet radiation is generally considered to have been discovered by Johann Wilhelm Ritter in 1801. In this article, we study the reception of Ritter’s experiment during the first decade after the event—Ritter’s remaining lifetime. Drawing on the attributional model of discovery, we are interested in whether the German physicists and chemists granted Ritter’s observation the status of a discovery and, if so, of what. Two things are remarkable concerning the early reception, and both have to do more with neglect than with (positive) reception. Firstly, Ritter’s observation was sometimes accepted as a fact but, with the exception of C. J. B. Karsten’s theory of invisible light, it played almost no role in the lively debate about the nature of heat and light. We argue that it was the prevalent discourse based on the metaphysics of Stoffe that prevented a broader reception of Ritter’s invisible rays, not the fact that Ritter himself made his findings a part of his Naturphilosophie. Secondly, with the exception of C. E. Wünsch’s experiments on the visual spectrum, there was no experimental examination of the experiment. We argue that theorizing about ontological systems was more common than experimenting, because, given its social and institutional situation, this was the appropriate way of contributing to physics. Consequently, it was less clear in 1810 than in 1801 what, if anything, had been discovered by Ritter.     

The History of Chemistry: A Very Short Introduction

In 1668 Robert Hooke recognised the utility of a barometer which could foretell storms at sea, but neither he nor his contemporaries in Britain or elsewhere in Europe succeeded in constructing such an instrument which would work reliably on a moving ship. Theorists and instrument makers, including Hooke, Amontons, De Luc, Passement, Magellan and Blondeau proposed novel forms of tube, but at the time it was not possible to work glass to the suggested shape. The competition between France and England was won by Edward Nairne, who devised the constricted-tube barometer for Captain Cook's second voyage of 1772-75. Nairne barometers were soon taken on other British exploring voyages, but French ships were slow to follow the pattern, possibly in consequence of naval disruption following the Revolution. The earliest Nairne examples were adapted from the domestic barometer, with the tube mounted on a flat back, but within the lifetime of Nairne &; Blunt marine barometers adopted the form common for most of the nineteenth century, with the tube enclosed within a square or round-section wooden frame.     

The early statistical interpretations of quantum mechanics in the USA and USSR

This article is devoted to the statistical (ensemble) interpretations of quantum mechanics which appeared in the USA and USSR before War II and in the early war years. The author emphasizes a remarkable similarity between the statements which arose in different scientific, philosophical, and even political contexts. The comparative analysis extends to the scientific and philosophical traditions which lay behind the American and Soviet statistical interpretations of quantum mechanics.The author insists that the philosophy of quantum mechanics is an autonomous branch rather than an applied philosophy or philosophical physics.