On “the application of science to science itself:” chemistry,instruments, and the scientific labor process

The “Instrumental Revolution” in chemistry refers to a transitional period in the mid-20th century during which sophisticated instrumentation based on physical principles was introduced to solve chemical problems. Historical and philosophical reflection on whether the revolution was a scientific one has been dominated by general models of scientific revolution, in particular, those proposed by Thomas Kuhn, I. B. Cohen and Ian Hacking. In this article I propose that the Industrial Revolution is a useful model for understanding the transformation wrought by the increasingly important role of machines in chemical research. Drawing on Marx's analysis of that event, I argue that that the Instrumental Revolution bears a striking resemblance to the industrial one. I offer grounds for thinking that the resemblance is not fortuitous, but rather reflects a general pattern of development involving the mechanization of the labor process. It is suggested that the cognitive consequences of radical changes in the means of production, as exemplified in the Instrumental Revolution, warrant the consideration of whether the latter is an instance of a kind of revolution in science rather than a singular episode.     

The rise of alternative bread leavening technologies in the nineteenth century

This article reveals how nineteenth-century chemists and health reformers tried to eradicate the use of yeast in bread, claiming they had devised healthier and more sanitary ways to raise bread. It describes the alternative technological solutions to baking bread, investigating factors that influenced their development and adaptation in the marketplace. A lack of scientific and cultural consensus surrounding yeast, what it was and what it did, fermented during this period. The conflict over yeast helped create a heterogeneous industrialization of the baking industry, changing processes and ingredients and creating new forms of bakery products. By examining the claims of promoters of rival scientific beliefs and technologies, as well as those of users and social commentators, we can see that technology’s eventual adaptation and impact on society is not predictable at its outset. Exploring the relationship between differing scientific beliefs, cultural understandings and alternative technologies also shows how science and industry cannot be isolated from their social and cultural context. The examination of the nineteenth-century technological development of commonplace commodities such as bread, baking powder and yeast, also reveals and explores a story that has not been told before in the history of science and technology. Why it has not been told is as enlightening as the story itself, revealing as it does our own privileging of what is important in science and history.     

A consideration of Babylonian astronomy within the historiography of science

This paper traces the reception of Babylonian astronomy into the history of science, beginning in early to mid twentieth century when cuneiform astronomical sources became available to the scholarly public. The dominant positivism in philosophy of science of this time influenced criteria employed in defining and demarcating science by historians, resulting in a persistently negative assessment of the nature of knowledge evidenced in cuneiform sources. Ancient Near Eastern astronomy (and astrology) was deemed pre- or non-scientific, and even taken to reflect a stage in the evolution of thought before the emergence of science (in ancient Greece). Two principal objections are examined: first, that the Near East produced merely practical as opposed to theoretical knowledge and, second, that astronomy was in the service of astrology and religion. As the notion of a universal scientific method has been dismantled by post-positivists and constructivists of the second half of the twentieth century, an interest in varieties of intellectual and cultural contexts for science has provided a new ground for the re-consideration of Babylonian astronomical texts as science developed here.     

The existence in Europe of four groups of mice (genus Mus L.) of species and subspecies rank, demonstrated by biochemical genetics]

Analysis at 20 genetic loci by starch gel electrophoresis of a population from Greece shows that contrary to most accepted views, the outdoor Eastern Mediterranean Short-tailed Mouse (i) does not belong to the same species as the House Mouse (Mus musculus), (ii) is not less distant from the Eastern European semi-species of House Mouse (biochemical group 2) than from the Western and Mediterranean European semi-species (group 1), and (iii) is not more closely related to the outdoor Western Mediterranean Short-tailed Mouse Mus spretus (group 3), than to M. musculus. It represents a new biochemical group (group 4) and deserves a species rank (Mus spicilegus).     

‘Working in a new world’: Kuhn,constructivism, and mind-dependence

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn famously advanced the claim that scientists work in a different world after a scientific revolution. Kuhn's view has been at the center of a philosophical literature that has tried to make sense of his bold claim, by listing Kuhn's view in good company with other seemingly constructivist proposals. The purpose of this paper is to take some steps towards clarifying what sort of constructivism (if any) is in fact at stake in Kuhn's view. To this end, I distinguish between two main (albeit not exclusive) notions of mind-dependence: a semantic notion and an ontological one. I point out that Kuhn's view should be understood as subscribing to a form of semantic mind-dependence, and conclude that semantic mind-dependence does not land us into any worrisome ontological mind-dependence, pace any constructivist reading of Kuhn.     

Reasons for relativism: Feyerabend on the ‘Rise of Rationalism’ in ancient Greece

This paper argues that essential features of Feyerabend's philosophy, namely his radicalization of critical rationalism and his turn to relativism, could be understood better in the light of his engagement with early Greek thought. In contrast to his earlier, Popperian views he came to see the Homeric worldview as a genuine alternative, which was not falsified by the Presocratics. Unlike socio–psychological and externalist accounts my reading of his published and unpublished material suggests that his alternative reconstruction of the ancient beginnings of the Western scientific tradition motivate and justify his moderate Protagorean relativism.     

A different kind of revolutionary change: transformation from object to process concepts

I propose a new perspective with which to understand scientific revolutions. This is a conversion from an object-only perspective to one that properly treats object and process concepts as distinct kinds. I begin with a re-examination of the Copernican revolution. Recent findings from the history of astronomy suggest that the Copernican revolution was a move from a conceptual framework built around an object concept to one built around a process concept. Drawing from studies in the cognitive sciences, I then show that process concepts are independent of object concepts, grounded in specific regions of the brain and involving unique representational mechanisms. There are cognitive obstacles to the transformation from object to process concepts, and an object bias—a tendency to treat processes as objects—makes this kind of conceptual change difficult. Consequently, transformation from object to process concepts is disruptive and revolutionary. Finally, I explore the implications of this new perspective on scientific revolutions for both the history and philosophy of science.     

Structures and strategies in ancient Greek and Roman technical writing: An Introduction

Most of our knowledge of Greek and Roman scientific practice and its place in ancient culture is derived from our study of ancient texts. In the last few decades, this written evidence—ancient technical or specialist literature—has begun to be studied using tools of literary analysis to help answer questions about, for instance, how these works were composed, their authors’ intentions and the expectations of their readers.This introduction to Structures and strategies in ancient Greek and Roman technical writing provides an overview of recent scholarship in the area, and the difficulty in pinning down what ‘technical/specialist literature’ might mean in an ancient context, since Greek and Roman authors communicated scientific knowledge using a wide variety of styles and forms of text (e.g. poetry, dialogues, letters).An outline of the three sections is provided: Form as a mirror of method, in which Sabine Föllinger and Alexander Mueller explore ways in which the structures of texts by Aristotle and Plutarch may reflect methodological concerns; Authors and their implied readers, with contributions by Oliver Stoll, David Creese, Boris Dunsch and Paula Olmos, which examines what ancient texts can tell us about the place of technical knowledge in antiquity; Science and the uses of poetry, with articles by Jochen Althoff, Michael Coxhead and Laurence Totelin, and a new English translation of the Aetna poem by Harry Hine, which explores the (to us) unexpected roles of poetry in ancient scientific culture.     

Forecasting the Daily Time‐Varying Beta of European Banks During the Crisis Period: Comparison Between GARCH Models and the Kalman Filter

This intention of this paper is to empirically forecast the daily betas of a few European banks by means of four generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models and the Kalman filter method during the pre‐global financial crisis period and the crisis period. The four GARCH models employed are BEKK GARCH, DCC GARCH, DCC‐MIDAS GARCH and Gaussian‐copula GARCH. The data consist of daily stock prices from 2001 to 2013 from two large banks each from Austria, Belgium, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. We apply the rolling forecasting method and the model confidence sets (MCS) to compare the daily forecasting ability of the five models during one month of the pre‐crisis (January 2007) and the crisis (January 2013) periods. Based on the MCS results, the BEKK proves the best model in the January 2007 period, and the Kalman filter overly outperforms the other models during the January 2013 period. Results have implications regarding the choice of model during different periods by practitioners and academics. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Revolution that never happened

If we define scientific revolutions as changes of scientists' ontologies, types of causal explanation, and paradigmatic types of methods and instruments, Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier's contribution to chemistry did not amount to a scientific revolution. Contrary to the received view that Lavoisier initiated a “chemical revolution,” which is accepted by Chang and Kusch, I argue that Lavoisier shared with the phlogistonists their “flat ontology” of chemical substance, established decades before the 1770s, their types of explaining chemical transformation, and their quantitative methods. Based on my historical reconstruction, I criticize Chang's argument that the late eighteenth-century phlogistic systems and Lavoisier's system belonged to two different theoretical traditions. As a consequence, I also question Chang's argument that the acceptance of Lavoisier's system can be explained in terms of dominance of “compositionism” over “principlism.”     

互联网对传统铁路货运代理的影响分析

自上世纪九十年代以来，信息及通信技术进入了一个飞速发展的黄金时代，互联网的应用和发展正深刻改变着人们的生活。社会生产生活方式的变革必然产生一个新的商务环境，铁路货运代理行业也必然根据具体环境和要求的变化而不断发展。本文在这样的背景下，介绍了铁路货运代理企业的发展现状，并针对互联网对传统铁路货运代理产生的影响，进行了逐层分析，提出了在网络电子商务环境下铁路货运代理企业的发展策略。     

Philosophy in the trenches: from naturalized to experimental philosophy (of science)

Recent years have seen the development of an approach both to general philosophy and philosophy of science often referred to as ‘experimental philosophy’ or just ‘X-Phi’. Philosophers often make or presuppose empirical claims about how people would react to hypothetical cases, but their evidence for claims about what ‘we’ would say is usually very limited indeed. Philosophers of science have largely relied on their more or less intimate knowledge of their field of study to draw hypothetical conclusions about the state of scientific concepts and the nature of conceptual change in science. What they are lacking is some more objective quantitative data supporting their hypotheses. A growing number of philosophers (of science), along with a few psychologists and anthropologists, have tried to remedy this situation by designing experiments aimed at systematically exploring people’s reactions to philosophically important thought experiments or scientists’ use of their scientific concepts. Many of the results have been surprising and some of the conclusions drawn from them have been more than a bit provocative. This symposium attempts to provide a window into this new field of philosophical inquiry and to show how experimental philosophy provides crucial tools for the philosopher and encourages two-way interactions between scientists and philosophers.     

The “Unknown Heritage”: trace of a forgotten locus of mathematical sophistication

The “unknown heritage” is the name usually given to a problem type in whose archetype a father leaves to his first son 1 monetary unit and \({\frac{1}{n}}\) (n usually being 7 or 10) of what remains, to the second 2 units and \({\frac{1}{n}}\) of what remains, and so on. In the end, all sons get the same, and nothing remains. The earliest known occurrence is in Fibonacci’s Liber abbaci, which also contains a number of much more sophisticated versions, together with a partial algebraic solution for one of these and rules for all which do not follow from his algebraic calculation. The next time the problem turns up is in Planudes’s late thirteenth century Calculus according to the Indians, Called the Great. After that the simple problem type turns up regularly in Provençal, Italian and Byzantine sources. It seems never to appear in Arabic or Indian writings, although two Arabic texts (one from c. 1190) contain more regular problems where the number of shares is given; they are clearly derived from the type known from European and Byzantine works, not its source. The sophisticated versions turn up again in Barthélemy de Romans’ Compendy de la praticque des nombres (c. 1467) and, apparently inspired from there, in the appendix to Nicolas Chuquet’s Triparty (1484). Apart from a single trace in Cardano’s Practica arithmetice et mensurandi singularis, the sophisticated versions never surface again, but the simple version spreads for a while to German practical arithmetic and, more persistently, to French polite recreational mathematics. Close examination of the texts shows that Barthélemy cannot have drawn his familiarity with the sophisticated rules from Fibonacci. It also suggests that the simple version is originally either a classical, strictly Greek or Hellenistic, or a medieval Byzantine invention; and that the sophisticated versions must have been developed before Fibonacci within an environment (located in Byzantium, Provence, or possibly in Sicily?) of which all direct traces has been lost, but whose mathematical level must have been quite advanced.     

Isaac Newton and Augustan Anglo-Latin poetry

Although many historians of science acknowledge the extent to which Greek and Roman ideals framed eighteenth-century thought, many classical references in the texts they study remain obscure. Poems played an important role not only in spreading ideas about natural philosophy, but also in changing people’s perceptions of its value; they contributed to Newton’s swelling reputation as an English hero. By writing about Latin poetry, we focus on the intersection of two literary genres that were significant for eighteenth-century natural philosophy, but seem alien to modern science. We classify Augustan Latinate scientific poetry by considering the audiences for whom the poems were intended. We distinguish three broad categories. One type of poetry was circulated amongst gentlemanly scholars (we look particularly at Tripos verses, and laments for Queen Caroline). A second group comprised poetry written specifically to promote or criticise Newton and his books, particularly the Principia (we look at versions of Pope’s epitaph, and Halley’s Lucretian poem). After Newton’s death, a third type of poetry became increasingly significant, included in collections of poems rather than in texts of natural philosophy. Overall, we show how the classical past was vital for creating the scientific future.     

Thomas Harriot—Sir Walter Ralegh's tutor—On population

The empiricism of eighteenth-century experimental science meant that the development of scientific instruments influenced the formulation of new concepts; a two-way process for new theory also affected instrument design. This relationship between concept and instrumentation will be examined by tracing the development of electrical instruments and theory during this period. The different functions fulfilled by these devices will also be discussed. Empiricism was especially important in such a new field of research as electricity, for it gave rise to phenomena that could not have been predicted by theory alone. However, the interpretation of these phenomena, and what the natural philosopher thought he observed, were often unconsciously determined by current ideas and attitudes; the interaction between instrumentally induced phenomena and observation was more complex than was realized at the time. The shortcomings of this empirical approach will be discussed. In the case of electricity this became increasingly apparent during the latter part of the century. The many discoveries had to be placed in a unifying framework before new advances could be made. Instruments, however, continued to play an important role in scientific progress, for they made visible what was hidden in nature.     

Common Molecular Mechanisms of Mammary Gland Development and Breast Cancer

The mammary gland undergoes major developmental changes during puberty and pregnancy. It is thought that stem cells drive mammary gland development during puberty and are responsible for tissue maintenance as well as the major growth and remodelling that occurs with every pregnancy. The use of sophisticated cell separation procedures has facilitated the prospective isolation of mammary epithelial stem and differentiated cell subpopulations from the mouse mammary gland, while studies of primary human breast cancers have described sub-populations of tumourigenic cells capable of initiating tumour growth in immuno-compromised mice. These potential tumour 'stem cells' constitute an important therapeutic target population with respect to cancer therapy, as these are likely to be the cells which maintain tumour growth. Understanding the origin of these cells, their relationship to breast cancer subtypes, and how and why they differ from normal breast stem cells will lead to a revolution in tumour understanding, treatment and prevention. (Part of a Multi-author Review).     

Skepticism about the paranormal: Legitimate and illegitimate

Summary With the growth of belief in the paranormal, skepticism can play a vital role in the scientific appraisal of claims. There are two forms: the first, hardly legitimate, is negative or total skepticism. It is nihilistic and dogmatic, and essentially self-defeating and self-contradictory. The second, a legitimate form, is selective skepticism. Here skepticism operates as a methodological principle of inquiry, testing hypotheses and theories in the light of evidence, but always open to new departures in thought. Skepticism has been applied historically to epistemology, metaphysics, religion, and ethics. The paranormal field has been full of fraud. Here the skeptic insists upon replicable experiments by neutral or skeptical observers before he will accept a claim as confirmed.     

第六次科技革命的“核心专利争夺”已悄然展开——2001年以来第六次科技革命的十种前兆

2001年以来,关于第六次科技革命的十种前兆涉及自然人、网络人、仿生人和再生人等多个领域。而第六次科技革命的核心专利争夺,主要涉及信息转换器技术、人格信息包技术、仿生技术、创生技术、再生技术等。     

L'introuvable révolution scientifique. Francesco Redi et la génération spontanée

The Italian naturalist F. Redi established in 1668 that insects are not produced by the way of equivocal generation, contrary to what was affirmed since the Antiquity. For that reason, many historians of sciences acknowledge his experiments, like those of Galileo, Boyle or Huygens, contributed to the scientific revolution that emerges in the seventeenth century in Western Europe. Based on the commentaries sparked off by the works of Redi, in his time and today, our contribution shows on the contrary that nothing at all in his approach reveals such an intention. Questioning without arrogance the knowledge and the authority of the Ancients, careful interrogation of the literariness of the Scriptures, adoption of an experimental reasoning still dependent on the scholastic argumentation, those are the main characteristics of his work. But those also could be the ones of Harvey, Borelli or Swammerdam's works. To defend the idea of a scientific revolution in the life sciences similar in its conditions and tempo to the one described in the history of the physical sciences would be a mistake, not to say an anachronism.