An overlooked autograph letter of Galileo on the thermometer

Scientism applies the ideas and methods of the natural sciences to the humanities and social sciences. Herbert Spencer applied the law of the conservation of energy to social questions and arrived at formula answers to the issues of the day. The kind of certitude that Spencer aimed for was possible only by ignoring a system of values. Much as he may have believed that he was above personal beliefs, there are values implicit in Spencer's theories and they are the values of the nineteenth-century British middle class. Reasoning by analogy is as valid in social theory as it is in the natural sciences. Spencer's error was in universally applying the idea of the conservation of energy to social systems by means of identity rather than by analogy. Scientists in Britain, where there was a self-assured scientific community, dismissed Spencer's theories as being unscientific, but he enjoyed a vogue in the United States.     

Social Darwinism and constitutional law with special reference to Lochner v. New York

American historians have generally accepted Richard Hofstadter's thesis that the scientism of Social Darwinism, or more appropriately, Spencerianism, dominated American thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and nowhere more enthusiastically or more purposively than within the conservative business community, which used Herbert Spencer's scientism to justify corporate business practices and to rewrite American Constitutional law to protect property interests against governmental regulations. Following Sharlin's general exposition of Herbert Spencer's scientism, this paper examines in detail the validity of the Hofstadter thesis as applied to the notorious Lochner v. New York Supreme Court opinion of 1905. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are offered as a repudiation of the generally accepted belief that it was the conservative activists on the Court who were guilty of Spencerian scientism. On the contrary, the argument is presented that it was Justice Holmes and the liberal reformers who found the evolutionary doctrines of Spencer congenial to their efforts of identifying needed reinterpretations of the American Constitution with biological evolution.     

Comments on papers by Sharlin and Wall

Wall is convincing on the Fuller court, but less so on Holmes, who may have understood Spencer's Social statics as a laissez faire rather than as a Darwinist document. Sharlin helps us to follow Spencer's attempt to universalize the concept of energy, even if Sharlin's explanation for Spencer's failure reduces to an application of the classical insight that physical phenomena are more predictable than social phenomena. Sharlin's conception of ‘scientism’ is helpful in some contexts, but less so in others; we need to remind ourselves that the role of values in scientism is active as well as passive.     

Natural selection and the ‘antiquity of man’: Intellectual impacts in the Australian colonies

Two months before the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859), Scottish geologist Charles Lyell announced a consensus on ‘the antiquity of man.’ Although stemming from separate intellectual traditions, human antiquity and natural selection had such a powerful influence on nineteenth century science that the former is often thought to be an inevitable conceptual and chronological consequence of the latter. Various scholars have argued it was in fact the acceptance of human antiquity that provided a foundation for the intelligibility and eventual acceptance of evolution by natural selection. This article investigates how these two interwoven theories affected understandings of human antiquity in Australia; itself an under-examined topic in Australian scholarship. Indeed, most historians maintain Australia's human antiquity was not ‘discovered’ or broadly understood until the advent of radiocarbon dating and professional archaeology in the 1960s. This over-simplified narrative has only recently begun to be reassessed. To contribute to this reassessment, and to the broader reclamation of human antiquity as a historical subject, this article focuses on the early decades of human antiquity's dissemination in Australia, examines its complex relationship with natural selection, and ultimately challenges narratives of its ‘recent’ discovery.     

Eric aiton: an appreciation

Summary

A famous debate between John Ray, Joseph Pitton de Tournefort and Augustus Quirinus Rivinus at the end of the seventeenth century has often been referred to as signalling the beginning of a rift between classificatory methods relying on logical division and classificatory methods relying on empirical grouping. Interestingly, a couple of decades later, Linnaeus showed very little excitement in reviewing this debate, and this although he was the first to introduce the terminological distinction of artificial vs. natural methods. In this paper, I will explain Linnaeus's indifference by the fact that earlier debates were revolving around problems of plant diagnosis rather than classification. From Linnaeus's perspective, they were therefore concerned with what he called artificial methods alone – diagnostic tools, that is, which were artificial no matter which characters were taken into account. The natural method Linnaeus proposed, on the other hand, was not about diagnosis, but about relations of equivalence which played a vital, although largely implicit role in the practices of specimen exchange on which naturalists relied to acquire knowledge of the natural world.     

Berthelot's anti-atomism: A ‘matter of taste’?

The influential French chemist Marcelin Berthelot spoke against the use of Dalton's atomic theory and Avogadro's hypothesis in the second half of the nineteenth century. This paper argues that Berthelot conceded that atomism might be acceptable as a system of conventions, but he feared the power of such conventions in constructing a realistic picture of atoms which was not warranted empirically. Equally, Berthelot's anti-atomism was a last-ditch effort to assert the place of chemistry within the tradition of natural history and to deny the possible reduction of chemical science to the laws of nineteenth-century physics.     

The union of arts and sciences in the eighteenth century: Lorenz Spengler (1720–1807), artistic turner and natural scientist

The life and career of Lorenz Spengler (1720–1807) provides evidence to support the view that the eighteenth century was a period when there was a fruitful interrelationship between the arts, crafts, and sciences in the courts and capitals of Europe. Spengler was trained as a turner, and was appointed teacher of ornamental turning to the Danish royal family and turner of the court in 1745. Even in the early years of his artistic career Spengler was interested in electricity and its role in healing, and he became an avid collector of shells and naturalia. Over the years, Spengler's interests turned more to the natural sciences, and in 1771 he was appointed director of the King's Kunstkammer. Only by considering both aspects of Spengler's career can his scientific activities be placed in their proper historical context.     

The platypus in Edinburgh: Robert Jameson,Robert Knox and the place of the Ornithorhynchus in nature, 1821–24

The duck-billed platypus, or Ornithorhynchus, was the subject of an intense debate among natural historians in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Its paradoxical mixture of mammalian, avian and reptilian characteristics made it something of a taxonomic conundrum. In the early 1820s Robert Jameson (1774–1854), the professor of natural history at the University of Edinburgh and the curator of the University's natural history museum, was able to acquire three valuable specimens of this species. He passed one of these on to the anatomist Robert Knox (1791–1862), who dissected the animal and presented his results in a series of papers to the Wernerian Natural History Society, which later published them in its Memoirs. This paper takes Jameson's platypus as a case study on how natural history specimens were used to create and contest knowledge of the natural world in the early nineteenth century, at a time when interpretations of the relationships between animal taxa were in a state of flux. It shows how Jameson used his possession of this interesting specimen to provide a valuable opportunity for his protégé Knox while also helping to consolidate his own position as a key figure in early nineteenth-century natural history.     

The mathematician Rehuel Lobatto advocates life insurances in The Netherlands in the period 1830–1860

In 1807 the first life insurance society was established in The Netherlands. In the second half of the century, life insurance societies underwent considerable expansion. During the intervening period, the lines had to be laid along which this new phenomenon was to develop in the future: between 1827 and 1830, the government started discussing the nature of its responsibility in this field and the kind of policy to be developed, and in 1830, a book on the organization of life insurance societies, the calculation of life annuities and widows' fund premiums was published, written by the mathematician Rehuel Lobatto. This book played an important role in the government's discussion. Royal Decrees which prescribed government approval for the establishment of life assurance societies were promulgated in 1830, 1833 and 1840. In 1832, Lobatto became the government's scientific adviser on the assessment of the calculations performed by these societies, and in the same year, he was also appointed adviser to the first life insurance society. From 1832 until his death in 1866 he advised the company on the use of life tables for life as well as for reversionary annuities, and he calculated the premiums based on these life tables. Another decree was promulgated in 1864 prescribing exactly which life tables were to be used. Because Lobatto probably played a part in this decree, he was responsible for a very ‘conservative’ government policy, which was no longer adequate in the second half of the century.     

Spectroscopic Portraiture

This paper describes a now widely forgotten tradition in the nineteenth century which - to borrow a simile used or implied by the actors themselves - may be described as 'spectroscopic portraiture'. Quite unlike the later obsession with numerical precision in wavelength measurement, and also in stark contrast to the contemporary vogue of photographic mapping which presumptuously claimed 'mechanical objectivity', that is avoidance of any human intervention in the recorded data, there was among some spectroscopists a much greater preoccupation with qualitative rather than quantitative aspects. The atlases of the solar spectrum by Cornu, Thollon, and Piazzi Smyth were supposed to convey the subjectively perceived Gestalt of the Fraunhofer lines, at the expense of precision. I shall argue that this was a systematic research programme addressed to a welldefined but small audience of specialists in the new subdiscipline of spectroscopy which was distinct from other practices such as spectrum analysis, which was directed mainly at chemists. Apart from this, the new tradition can also be identified by the dense net of cross-references in the publications of the various members, and by their critique of earlier work. This tradition of spectrum portraiture started with Kirchhoff's 1861-2 high-resolution chromolithographic plates of the solar spectrum, which were printed off a half-dozen different stones in order to render most faithfully the various line intensities. Focusing especially on the tension between representational goals and technical possibilities in the rapidly developing printing industry, I then trace the emerging tradition through its apogee to the close of the nineteenth century.     

Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's concept of space and its later influence

This study considers the contribution of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529–1597) to the development of the concepts of void space and an infinite universe. Patrizi plays a greater role in the development of these concepts than any other single figure in the sixteenth century, and yet his work has been almost totally overlooked. I have outlined his views on space in terms of two major aspects of his philosophical attitude: on the one hand, he was a devoted Platonist and sought always to establish Platonism, albeit his own version of it, as the only currect philosophy; and on the other hand, he was more determinedly anti-Aristotelian than any other philosopher at that time. Patrizi's concept of space has its beginnings in Platonic notions, but is extended and refined in the light of a vigorous critique of Aristotle's position. Finally, I consider the influence of Patrizi's ideas in the seventeenth century, when various thinkers are seeking to overthrow the Aristotelian concept of place and the equivalence of dimensionality with corporeality. Pierre Gassendi (1592–1652), for example, needed a coherent concept of void space in which his atoms could move, while Henry More (1614–1687) sought to demonstrate the reality of incorporeal entities by reference to an incorporeal space. Both men could find the arguments they needed in Patrizi's comprehensive treatment of the subject.     

The role of orientation experiments in discovering mechanisms

Many types of experiments have been recognized in the literature. One important type we discuss in this article is the orientation experiment. While orientation experiments are like other types of experiments in that they are tests for causal relevance, they also have other qualities. One important (but not the only) goal of these experiments is to offer a rough, qualitative characterization of the mechanism responsible for a capacity of interest, effectively constraining future research. This makes them particularly useful during the early stages of investigation, when an explanandum-phenomenon has just been identified and several (often competing) hypotheses as to the qualitative character of the mechanism responsible for it are proposed. We illustrate our claims, and explicate a number of additional aims that orientation experiments can sometimes serve, by considering three case studies from different era's, namely the discovery of the mechanisms responsible for i) the capacity of eels to produce numbing sensations (17th and 18th century), ii) puerperal fever in Semmelweis' Vienna Maternity Hospital (19th century), and iii) the capacity of pigeons to home (20th century).     

The nomological image of nature: explaining the tide in the thirteenth century

The paper examines the relevance of the nomological view of nature to three discussions of tide in the thirteenth century. A nomological conception of nature assumes that the basic explanatory units of natural phenomena are universally binding rules stated in quantitative terms. (1) Robert Grosseteste introduced an account of the tide based on the mechanism of rarefaction and condensation, stimulated by the Moon's rays and their angle of incidence. He considered the Moon's action over the sea an example of the general efficient causality exerted through the universal activity of light or species. (2) Albert the Great posited a plurality of causes which cannot be reduced to a single cause. The connaturality of the Moon and the water is the only principle of explanation which he considered universal. Connaturality, however, renders neither formulation nor quantification possible. While Albert stressed the variety of causes of the tide, (3) Roger Bacon emphasized regularity and reduced the various causes producing tides into forces. He replaced the terminology of ‘natures’ by one of ‘forces’. Force, which in principle can be accurately described and measured, thus becomes a commensurable aspect of a diverse cosmos. When they reasoned why waters return to their place after the tide, Grosseteste argued that waters return in order to prevent a vacuum, Albert claimed that waters ‘follow their own nature’, while Bacon held that the ‘proper force’ of the water prevails over the distant force of the first heaven. I exhibit, for the thirteenth century, moments of the move away from the Aristotelian concerns. The basic elements of these concerns were essences and natures which reflect specific phenomena and did not allow for an image of nature as a unified system. In the new perspective of the thirteenth century the key was a causal link between the position of the Moon and the tide cycle, a link which is universal and still qualitative, yet expressed as susceptible to quantification.     

From secondary causes to artificial instruments: Pierre-Sylvain Régis's rethinking of scholastic accounts of causation

Although several of Descartes's disciples established occasionalism as the natural outcome of Cartesianism, Pierre-Sylvain Régis forcefully resisted this conclusion by developing an account of secondary causes in which God does not immediately intervene in the natural world. In order to understand this view, it has been argued that Régis melds Aquinas's concurrentism with the new, mechanist natural philosophy defended in Cartesian physics. In this paper, I contend that such a reading of Régis's position is misleading for our understanding of both his account of secondary causality and the relationship between medieval debates and seventeenth century natural philosophy. I show that Régis's account of secondary causality denies two fundamental features at the core of the account proposed by Aquinas, namely that God acts immediately in nature and that secondary causes are per se causes. I contend that Régis's view more closely resembles a specific account of artificial instrumental causality developed by Duns Scotus. The comparison with Scotus shows that Régis is still dealing with conceptual tools that can be traced back to the scholastic tradition. Yet, Régis implements these tools to establish an account of causation that is fundamentally irreconcilable with scholastic natural philosophy.     

Engineering Entanglement,Conceptualizing Quantum Information

Proposed by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) in 1935, the entangled state has played a central part in exploring the foundation of quantum mechanics. At the end of the twentieth century, however, some physicists and mathematicians set aside the epistemological debates associated with EPR and turned it from a philosophical puzzle into practical resources for information processing. This paper examines the origin of what is known as quantum information. Scientists had considered making quantum computers and employing entanglement in communications for a long time. But the real breakthrough only occurred in the 1980s when they shifted focus from general-purpose systems such as Turing machines to algorithms and protocols that solved particular problems, including quantum factorization, quantum search, superdense code, and teleportation. Key to their development was two groups of mathematical manipulations and deformations of entanglement—quantum parallelism and ‘feedback EPR’—that served as conceptual templates. The early success of quantum parallelism and feedback EPR was owed to the idealized formalism of entanglement researchers had prepared for philosophical discussions. Yet, such idealization is difficult to hold when the physical implementation of quantum information processors is at stake. A major challenge for today's quantum information scientists and engineers is thus to move from Einstein et al.'s well-defined scenarios into realistic models.     

The Accuracy and Use of Sextants and Watches in Rupert's Land in the 1790s

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the sextants and watches employed at the end of the eighteenth century in surveying Rupert's Land, the vast territory of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), and to discuss their usage and accuracy. The results provide information on the standards of manufacture at the time, on the reliability of the contemporary latitude and longitude of various fur-trading posts, and on the careers of the surveyors themselves. The sextant readings are shown to have a standard deviation of about 20 arcseconds when used in a vertical position to find altitudes of the Sun and stars, and about 40 arcseconds otherwise, for finding lunar distances. Because of the use of artificial horizons, these conclusions imply that, at a 95% (2σ) confidence level, a single determination of latitude is reliable to ±20 arcseconds (600 m on the Earth's surface), of longitude ±20 arcminutes (approximately 60 km in Rupert's Land), and a single determination of local apparent time is reliable to ±3 s. The watches, it appears, could run at a steady rate with errors of less than a minute for a period of a week or two.     

Copernicus: A Very Short Introduction

The reception of Buffon's Histoire Naturelle in the Enlightenment has not received the historical attention it deserves. Drawing primarily on archival sources, this paper examines Aberdeen reactions to the Histoire during the period c. 1750–1800. As pedagogues, the Aberdonians endeavoured to maintain intellectual orthodoxy, and hence they attacked Buffon for his apparent materialism and atheism. Moreover, the Aberdonians rejected Buffon's critique of taxonomy because they based their natural history courses on classifications of the three kingdoms of nature, and because they attempted to use classification systems in nosology and the study of the human mind. Finally, in the 1790s Aberdeen readings of the Histoire were profoundly affected by the fears aroused by the French Revolution.     

Knowing what would happen: The epistemic strategies in Galileo's thought experiments

While philosophers have subjected Galileo's classic thought experiments to critical analysis, they have tended to largely ignored the historical and intellectual context in which they were deployed, and the specific role they played in Galileo's overall vision of science. In this paper I investigate Galileo's use of thought experiments, by focusing on the epistemic and rhetorical strategies that he employed in attempting to answer the question of how one can know what would happen in an imaginary scenario. Here I argue we can find three different answers to this question in Galileo later dialogues, which reflect the changing meanings of ‘experience’ and ‘knowledge’ (scientia) in the early modern period. Once we recognise that Galileo's thought experiments sometimes drew on the power of memory and the explicit appeal to ‘common experience’, while at other times, they took the form of demonstrative arguments intended to have the status of necessary truths; and on still other occasions, they were extrapolations, or probable guesses, drawn from a carefully planned series of controlled experiments, it becomes evident that no single account of the epistemological relationship between thought experiment, experience and experiment can adequately capture the epistemic variety we find Galileo's use of imaginary scenarios. To this extent, we cannot neatly classify Galileo's use of thought experiments as either ‘medieval’ or ‘early modern’, but we should see them as indicative of the complex epistemological transformations of the early seventeenth century.