Isaac Newton and the problem of the earth's shape

In this article I discuss the theory of the earth's shape presented by Isaac Newton in Book III of his Principia. I show that the theory struck even the most reputable continental mathematicians of the day as incomprehensible. I examine the many obstacles to understanding the theory which the reader faced — the gaps, the underived equations, the unproven assertions, the dependence upon corollaries to practically incomprehensible theorems in Book I of the Principia and the ambiguities of these corollaries, the conjectures without explanations of their bases, the inconsistencies, and so forth. I explain why these apparent drawbacks are, historically considered, strengths of Newton's theory of the earth's shape, not weaknesses.     

‘The long-lost truth’: Sir Isaac Newton and the Newtonian pursuit of ancient knowledge

In the 1720s the antiquary and Newtonian scholar Dr. William Stukeley (1687-1765) described his friend Isaac Newton as ‘the Great Restorer of True Philosophy’. Newton himself in his posthumously published Observations upon the prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John (1733) predicted that the imminent fulfilment of Scripture prophecy would see ‘a recovery and re-establishment of the long-lost truth’. In this paper I examine the background to Newton’s interest in ancient philosophy and theology, and how it related to modern natural philosophical discovery. I look at the way in which the idea of a ‘long-lost truth’ interested others within Newton’s immediate circle, and in particular how it was carried forward by Stukeley’s researches into ancient British antiquities. I show how an interest in and respect for ancient philosophical knowledge remained strong within the first half of the eighteenth century.     

Jewish theologies of space in the scientific revolution: Henry More,Joseph Raphson,Isaac Newton and their predecessors

Theological speculations on God's relation to place and space were introduced into the Jewish tradition by the early rabbis, initially in response to the previous appearance of words like māqôm (place) in Biblical literature. In the Middle Ages, Jewish philosophers modified these rabbinical ideas in the context of Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and anti-Aristotelian currents within Jewish thought. One development in medieval Jewish thought of special interest for the development of ideas of space was the rise of Cabala, which Christian thinkers of the Renaissance and early modern periods saw as a sacred and primeval deposit of wisdom akin to prisca theologia. Both Henry More and, under More's influence, Joseph Raphson made use of Cabalist ideas in developing their own theologies of space. Isaac Newton was aware of these Jewish ideas but for the most part repudiated them, while making some use of māqôm as an expression of God's omnipresence.     

William Whiston, Isaac Newton and the crisis of publicity

William Whiston was one of the first British converts to Newtonian physics and his 1696 New theory of the earth is the first full-length popularization of the natural philosophy of the Principia. Impressed with his young protégé, Newton paved the way for Whiston to succeed him as Lucasian Professor of Mathematics in 1702. Already a leading Newtonian natural philosopher, Whiston also came to espouse Newton’s heretical antitrinitarianism in the middle of the first decade of the eighteenth century. In all, Whiston enjoyed twenty years of contact with Newton dating from 1694. Although they shared so much ideologically, the two men fell out when Whiston began to proclaim openly the heresy that Newton strove to conceal from the prying eyes of the public. This paper provides a full account of this crisis of publicity by outlining Whiston’s efforts to make both Newton’s natural philosophy and heterodox theology public through popular texts, broadsheets and coffee house lectures. Whiston’s attempts to draw Newton out through published hints and innuendos, combined with his very public religious crusade, rendered the erstwhile disciple a dangerous liability to the great man and helps explain Newton’s eventual break with him, along with his refusal to support Whiston’s nomination to the Royal Society. This study not only traces Whiston’s successes in preaching the gospel of Newton’s physics and theology, but demonstrates the ways in which Whiston, who resolutely refused to accept Newton’s epistemic distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ forms of knowledge, transformed Newton’s grand programme into a singularly exoteric system and drove it into the public sphere.     

Written in the flesh: Isaac Newton on the mind–body relation

Isaac Newton’s views on the mind–body relation are of interest not only because of their somewhat unique departure from popular early modern conceptions of mind and its relation to body, but also because of their connections with other aspects of Newton’s thought. In this paper I argue that (1) Newton accepted an interesting sort of mind–body monism, one which defies neat categorization, but which clearly departs from Cartesian substance dualism, and (2) Newton took the power by which we move our bodies by thought alone to be a member of the family of forces that includes gravity and electricity. Time and again, Newton draws an analogy between the ultimate cause and nature of the volitional powers of mind and the ultimate cause and nature of these other forces.     

Bayesian personalism,the methodology of scientific research programmes,and Duhem's problem

The detailed analysis of a particular quasi-historical numerical example is used to illustrate the way in which a Bayesian personalist approach to scientific inference resolves the Duhemian problem of which of a conjunction of hypotheses to reject when they jointly yield a prediction which is refuted. Numbers intended to be approximately historically accurate for my example show, in agreement with the views of Lakatos, that a refutation need have astonishingly little effect on a scientist's confidence in the ‘hard core’ of a successful research programme even when a comparable confirmation would greatly enhance that confidence (an initial confidence of 0.9 fell by a fraction of a percent in the refutation case and rose to only a fraction of a percent short of unity in the comparable confirmation case). Timeo Danaos et dona ferentis.     

Becoming a Darwinian: the micro-politics of Sir Francis Galton's scientific career 1859-65

In 1865 Francis Galton (1822-1911) published 'Hereditary Talent and Character', an elaborate attempt to prove the heritability of intelligence on the basis of pedigree data. It was the start of Galton's lifelong commitment to investigating the statistical patterns and physiological mechanisms of hereditary transmission. Most existing attempts to explain Galton's fascination for heredity have argued that he was driven by a commitment to conservative political ideologies to seek means of naturalizing human inequality. However, this paper shows that another factor of at least equal importance has been overlooked by Galton scholars: his determination during the 1860s to be accepted among the ranks of the Darwinian inner circle. By hitching his career to the fortunes of what looked likely to emerge as a new scientific elite, Galton felt that he could bypass the typically slow and uncertain route to achieving scientific distinction. For this essentially strategic reason, between 1860 and 1865 he drifted away from a set of existing scientific concerns that were failing to deliver the approbation that he desired. Earnestly seeking to ingratiate himself with the Darwinian lobby, he then toyed with a variety of potential research projects relevant to Darwinian evolution. Yet Galton consistently failed to stimulate the enthusiasm of the Darwinians. Finally, however, after several months of ruminating, in 1864 he settled on a study of eminent pedigrees as a subject that was both germane and highly useful to the Darwinian enterprise. Galton's willingness to shift the direction of his scientific career during the 1860s underscores the importance of examining the micro-politics of scientific careers in addition to their broader social and political context. This account also emphasizes the limitations of class-based explanations even when considering scientists whose work seems so manifestly indicative of ideological motivation.     

Science,politics and regulation: The trust-based approach to the demarcation problem

Drawing on literature on values in science and a case-study of UK cancer policy, this paper argues for a novel account of the demarcation project in terms of trustworthiness. The first part of the paper addresses the relationship between science, politics and demarcation. In 2010, the UK government decided to pay more for cancer drugs than for drugs for other diseases; in 2016, this Cancer Drugs Fund was reformed so as to lower the evidential standards for approving cancer drugs, rather than paying more for them. Are these two ways of treating cancer as “special” importantly different? This paper argues that, if we the argument from inductive risk seriously, they seem equivalent. This result provides further reason to doubt the notion of demarcating science from non-science. However, the second part of the paper complicates this story, arguing that considerations of epistemic trust might give us reasons to prefer epistemic communities centred around “broadly acceptable” standards, and which are “sociologically well-ordered”, regardless of inductive risk concerns. After developing these claims through the cancer case-study, the final section suggests how these concerns might motivate novel versions of the demarcation project.     

Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation

The recent discussion on scientific representation has focused on models and their relationship to the real world. It has been assumed that models give us knowledge because they represent their supposed real target systems. However, here agreement among philosophers of science has tended to end as they have presented widely different views on how representation should be understood. I will argue that the traditional representational approach is too limiting as regards the epistemic value of modelling given the focus on the relationship between a single model and its supposed target system, and the neglect of the actual representational means with which scientists construct models. I therefore suggest an alternative account of models as epistemic tools. This amounts to regarding them as concrete artefacts that are built by specific representational means and are constrained by their design in such a way that they facilitate the study of certain scientific questions, and learning from them by means of construction and manipulation.     

On reading Newton as an Epicurean: Kant,Spinozism and the changes to the Principia

This paper argues for three distinct, albeit mutually illuminating theses: first it explains why well informed eighteenth-century thinkers, e.g., the pre-critical Immanuel Kant and Richard Bentley would have identified important aspects of Newton’s natural philosophy with (a species of modern) Epicureanism. Second, it explores how some significant changes to Newton’s Principia between the first (1687) and second (1713) editions can be explained in terms of attempts to reframe the Principia so that the charge of “Epicureanism” can be deflected. In order to account for this, the paper discusses the political and theological changes in the wake of the Glorious Revolution (1688); Bentley plays a non-trivial role in these matters. Third, the paper argues that there is an argument in Kant’s (1755) Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens that undermines a key claim of Newton’s General Scholium that was used to discredit Spinozism by Clarke in A demonstration of the being and attributes of God.     

An hypothesis for the process of selection at the subcellular level leading to the appearance of new clones]

According to the hypothesis we propose, the stimulation of one lymphocyte by an antigen induces the simultaneous expression of a great diversity of immunoglobulins of different specificities. Each molecular species is associated with the corresponding mRNA within a subcellular structure: the ergastoplasmic cisterna. It has been shown that in some responding lymphocytes at an early stage of the immune response a few such cisternae are loaded with antibodies while most of the cisternae are synthesizing non specific immunoglobulins. The main point of our proposal is that the selective action of antigen bears on these cisternae and that the mRNA corresponding to the immunoglobulins fitting best to the antigen is transcribed to DNA which is then inserted into the genome. This cell and its progeny become thereafter a monospecific clone submitted to regulation as an element of the network.