Comments on papers by Sharlin and Wall

Wall is convincing on the Fuller court, but less so on Holmes, who may have understood Spencer's Social statics as a laissez faire rather than as a Darwinist document. Sharlin helps us to follow Spencer's attempt to universalize the concept of energy, even if Sharlin's explanation for Spencer's failure reduces to an application of the classical insight that physical phenomena are more predictable than social phenomena. Sharlin's conception of ‘scientism’ is helpful in some contexts, but less so in others; we need to remind ourselves that the role of values in scientism is active as well as passive.     

Social Darwinism and constitutional law with special reference to Lochner v. New York

American historians have generally accepted Richard Hofstadter's thesis that the scientism of Social Darwinism, or more appropriately, Spencerianism, dominated American thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and nowhere more enthusiastically or more purposively than within the conservative business community, which used Herbert Spencer's scientism to justify corporate business practices and to rewrite American Constitutional law to protect property interests against governmental regulations. Following Sharlin's general exposition of Herbert Spencer's scientism, this paper examines in detail the validity of the Hofstadter thesis as applied to the notorious Lochner v. New York Supreme Court opinion of 1905. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are offered as a repudiation of the generally accepted belief that it was the conservative activists on the Court who were guilty of Spencerian scientism. On the contrary, the argument is presented that it was Justice Holmes and the liberal reformers who found the evolutionary doctrines of Spencer congenial to their efforts of identifying needed reinterpretations of the American Constitution with biological evolution.     

The union of arts and sciences in the eighteenth century: Lorenz Spengler (1720–1807), artistic turner and natural scientist

The life and career of Lorenz Spengler (1720–1807) provides evidence to support the view that the eighteenth century was a period when there was a fruitful interrelationship between the arts, crafts, and sciences in the courts and capitals of Europe. Spengler was trained as a turner, and was appointed teacher of ornamental turning to the Danish royal family and turner of the court in 1745. Even in the early years of his artistic career Spengler was interested in electricity and its role in healing, and he became an avid collector of shells and naturalia. Over the years, Spengler's interests turned more to the natural sciences, and in 1771 he was appointed director of the King's Kunstkammer. Only by considering both aspects of Spengler's career can his scientific activities be placed in their proper historical context.     

William Whewell,natural theology and the philosophy of science in mid nineteenth century Britain

This article aims to reveal the moral and theological dimensions of William Whewell's philosophy of science. It suggests that, in addition to an internalist account of Whewell's method and epistemology, there is a need to view his philosophy of science (and knowledge) within the intellectual context constituted by the assumptions of natural theology. It argues that writers of natural theology saw man's ability to know the world as an indication of his special place in nature, and that epistemological theories were therefore invested with moral and theological significance. Whewell's work is interpreted as an attempt to dissociate natural science from Utilitarianism and empiricist philosophy: he sought to promote a philosophy of science which guaranteed the principles of natural theology and the values of Christianity. But the idealist epistemology which he proposed was criticized by both scientists and theologians. In 1853 (in his book Of the plurality of worlds), again within the framework of natural theology, Whewell attempted to justify this epistemology by affirming the metaphysics of a Christian Platonism. From this position, Whewell defended natural theology against the metaphysical scepticism of both Henry Mansel and the positivists.     

The Price of Success: Sociologist Harry Alpert,the NSF's First Social Science Policy Architect

Harry Alpert (1912–1977), the US sociologist, is best-known for his directorship of the National Science Foundation's social science programme in the 1950s. This study extends our understanding of Alpert in two main ways: first, by examining the earlier development of his views and career. Beginning with his 1939 biography of Emile Durkheim, we explore the early development of Alpert's views about foundational questions concerning the scientific status of sociology and social science more generally, proper social science methodology, the practical value of social science, the academic institutionalisation of sociology, and the unity-of-science viewpoint. Second, this paper illuminates Alpert's complex involvement with certain tensions in mid-century US social science that were themselves linked to major transformations in national science policy, public patronage, and unequal relations between the social and natural sciences. We show that Alpert's views about the intellectual foundations, practical relevance, and institutional standing of the social sciences were, in some important respects, at odds with his NSF policy work. Although remembered as a quantitative evangelist and advocate for the unity-of-science viewpoint, Alpert was in fact an urbane critic of natural-science envy, social scientific certainty, and what he saw as excessive devotion to quantitative methods.     

From positivism to conventionalism: Comte,Renouvier, and Poincaré

Considered in its historical context, conventionalism is quite different from the way in which it has been caricatured in more recent philosophy of science, that is, as a conservative philosophy that allows the preservation of theories through arbitrary ad hoc stratagems. It is instead a liberal outgrowth of Comtean positivism, which broke with the Reidian interpretation of the Newtonian tradition in France and defended a role for hypotheses in the sciences. It also has roots in the social contract political philosophy of Renouvier, who explicitly drew the analogy between conventions in political life and the conventional acceptance of hypotheses in the sciences, and conceived a philosophy that permits scientists to set aside foundational worries and explore new ideas. Although Poincaré and Renouvier may have hesitated to accept certain then recent developments in mathematics and the sciences such as non-Euclidean geometries, this conservatism cannot necessarily be attributed to their conventionalism. It may instead reflect the engineering background they shared with Comte, which emphasizes practical applications. Although Renouvier and Poincaré may have seen no practical use for these new ideas, unlike Comte they did not prohibit others from pursuing them, reflecting conventionalism's more liberal attitude toward recent developments in the sciences.     

The Advantages of Obscurity: Charles Darwin's Negative Inference from the Histories of Domestic Breeds

In The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin famously accounted for the lack of fossil evidence in support of species evolution on the grounds that the fossil record is naturally incomplete. This essay examines a similar argument that Darwin applied to his analogy between natural and artificial selection: the scarcity of data about the historical backgrounds of domestic breeds was the natural by-product of an extremely gradual change process. The point was to enhance the ability of the artificial selection analogy to suggest that nature's species had undergone a similar transformation. Darwin did not depend on this negative inference alone, however, for in his writings he included whatever information he could find about the actual histories of particular breeds. A comparison with Darwin's treatment of the fossil record suggests the reasonableness of this combined use of opposite kinds of evidence to establish a single point. The comparison also suggests the unique qualities of negative inference as applied to the breeding analogy.     

Maxwell's color statistics: From reduction of visible errors to reduction to invisible molecules

This paper presents a cross-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary account of Maxwell's introduction of statistical models of molecules for the composition of gases. The account focuses on Maxwell's deployment of statistical models of data in his contemporaneous color researches as established in Cambridge mathematical physics, especially by Maxwell's seniors and mentors. The paper also argues that the cross-disciplinary, or cross-domain, transfer of resources from the natural and social sciences took place in both directions and relied on the complex intra-disciplinary, or intra-domain, dynamics of Maxwell's researches in natural sciences, in color theory, physical astronomy, electromagnetism and dynamical theory of gases, as well as involving a variety of types of communicating and mediating media, from material objects to concepts, techniques and institutions.     

Constructing dystopian experience: A Neurath-Cartwrightian approach to the philosophy of social technology

Social situations, the object of the social sciences, are complex and unique: they contain so many variable aspects that they cannot be reproduced, and it is even difficult to experience two situations that are alike in many respects. The social scientists' past experiences that serve as their background knowledge to intervene in an existent situation is poor compared to what a traditional epistemologist would consider ideal. A way of dealing with the variable and insufficient background of social scientists is by means of models. But, then, how should we characterize social scientific models? This paper examines Otto Neurath's scientific utopianism as an attempt to deal with this problem. Neurath proposes that social scientists work with utopias: broad imaginative plans that coordinate a multitude of features of a social situation. This notion can be used in current debates in philosophy of science because we notice that utopias, in Neurath's sense, are comparable to models and nomological machines in Nancy Cartwright's conception. A model-based view of science lays emphasis on the fact that scientists learn from the repeated operation of such abstract entities, just as they learn from the repetition of experiments in a laboratory. Hence this approach suggests an approximation between the natural and the social sciences, as well as between science and utopian literature. This is exemplified by analyzing the literary dystopia We, written by Yevgeny Zamyatin, to show that reasoning from and debating about utopian writings, even if fictional and pessimistic, creates phenomena of valuation, which are fundamental for constituting a background of experiences in the social sciences.     

Kant on anatomy and the status of the life sciences

This paper contributes to recent interest in Kant's engagement with the life sciences by focusing on one corner of those sciences that has received comparatively little attention: physical and comparative anatomy. By attending to remarks spread across Kant's writings, we gain some insight into Kant's understanding of the disciplinary limitations but also the methodological sophistication of the study of anatomy and physiology. Insofar as Kant highlights anatomy as a paradigmatic science guided by the principle of teleology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, a more careful study of Kant's discussions of anatomy promises to illuminate some of the obscurities of that text and of his understanding of the life sciences more generally. In the end, it is argued, Kant's ambivalence with regard to anatomy gives way to a pessimistic conclusion about the possibility that anatomy, natural history, and, by extension, the life sciences more generally might one day become true natural sciences.     

The classical roots of wave mechanics: Schrödinger's transformations of the optical-mechanical analogy

In the 1830s, W. R. Hamilton established a formal analogy between optics and mechanics by constructing a mathematical equivalence between the extremum principles of ray optics (Fermat's principle) and corpuscular mechanics (Maupertuis's principle). Almost a century later, this optical-mechanical analogy played a central role in the development of wave mechanics. Schrödinger was well acquainted with Hamilton's analogy through earlier studies. From Schrödinger's research notebooks, we show how he used the analogy as a heuristic tool to develop de Broglie's ideas about matter waves and how the role of the analogy in his thinking changed from a heuristic tool into a formal constraint on possible wave equations. We argue that Schrödinger only understood the full impact of the optical-mechanical analogy during the preparation of his second communication on wave mechanics: Classical mechanics is an approximation to the new undulatory mechanics, just as ray optics is an approximation to wave optics. This completion of the analogy convinced Schrödinger to stick to a realist interpretation of the wave function, in opposition to the emerging mainstream. The transformations in Schrödinger's use of the optical-mechanical analogy can be traced in his research notebooks, which offer a much more complete picture of the development of wave mechanics than has been previously thought possible.     

Whewell on the classification of the sciences

Despite deserving a place amongst the historic milestones of the philosophy of disciplines, the system of the sciences put forward by Whewell has so far received little interest. Yet his ideas had a significant impact on the researches subsequently carried out on the topic, exerting in particular a decisive influence on Peirce and Spencer. The present paper aims to display the innovatory nature of the philosophical foundations of the Whewellian classification of the sciences. In this respect, we will argue that the most striking feature of his disciplinary system lies in a heuristic categorization of the sciences according to their “methods of discovery”. This represents a double departure from both the Aristotelian and the Baconian disciplinary paradigms, which are instead underpinned by ontological and epistemological criteria, respectively. Next, we will explore the pivotal role of Whewell's classification of the sciences for his overall project of a philosophy of scientific discovery.     

Drawing scales apart: The origins of Wilson's conception of effective field theories

This article traces the origins of Kenneth Wilson's conception of effective field theories (EFTs) in the 1960s. I argue that what really made the difference in Wilson's path to his first prototype of EFT are his long-standing pragmatic aspirations and methodological commitments. Wilson's primary interest was to work on mathematically interesting physical problems and he thought that progress could be made by treating them as if they could be analyzed in principle by a sufficiently powerful computer. The first point explains why he had no qualms about twisting the structure of field theories; the second why he divided the state-space of a toy model field theory into continuous slices by following a standard divide-and-conquer algorithmic strategy instead of working directly with a fully discretized and finite theory. I also show how Wilson's prototype bears the mark of these aspirations and commitments and clear up a few striking ironies along the way.     

Types of experiments and causal process tracing: What happened on the Kaibab Plateau in the 1920s

In a well-cited book chapter, ecologist Jared Diamond characterizes three main types of experiment performed in community ecology: laboratory experiment, field experiment, and natural experiment. Diamond argues that each form of experiment has strengths and weaknesses, with respect to, for example, realism or the ability to follow a causal trajectory. But does Diamond's typology exhaust the available kinds of cause-finding practices? Some social scientists have characterized something they call “causal process tracing.” Is this a fourth type of experiment or something else? I examine Diamond's typology and causal process tracing in the context of a case study concerning the dynamics of wolf and deer populations on the Kaibab Plateau in the 1920s, a case that has been used as a canonical example of a trophic cascade by ecologists but which has also been subject to controversy. I argue that ecologists have profitably deployed causal process tracing together with other types of experiment to help settle questions of causality in this case. It remains to be seen how widespread the use of causal process tracing outside of the social sciences is (or could be), but there are some potentially promising applications, particularly with respect to questions about specific causal sequences.     

Analogical reflection as a source for the science of life: Kant and the possibility of the biological sciences

In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to his conception of living beings and to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life.     

Biologist Edwin Grant Conklin and the idea of the religious direction of human evolution in the early 1920s

Edwin Grant Conklin, renowned US embryologist and evolutionary popularizer, publicly advocated a social vision of evolution that intertwined science and modernist Protestant theology in the early 1920s. The moral prestige of professional science in American culture — along with Conklin’s own elite scientific status — diverted attention from the frequency with which his work crossed boundaries between natural science, religion and philosophy. Writing for broad audiences, Conklin was one of the most significant of the religious and modernist biological scientists whose rhetoric went well beyond simply claiming that certain kinds of religion were amenable to evolutionary science; he instead incorporated religion itself into evolution's broadest workings. A sampling of Conklin's widely-resonant discourse suggests that there was substantially more to the religion-evolution story in the 1920s US than many creationist-centred narratives of the era imply.     

On conceptual issues in classical electrodynamics: Prospects and problems of an action-at-a-distance interpretation

Some conceptual issues in the foundations of classical electrodynamics concerning the interaction between particles and fields have recently received increased attention among philosophers of physics. After a brief review of the debate, I argue that there are essentially two incompatible solutions to these issues corresponding to F.A. Muller's distinction between the extension and the renormalization program. Neither of these solutions comes free of cost: the extension program is plagued with all problems related to extended elementary charges, the renormalization program works with point charges but trades in the notorious divergences of the field energies. The aim of this paper is to bring back into the discussion a third alternative, the action-at-a-distance program, which avoids both the riddles of extended elementary charges as well as the divergences although it admittedly has other problems. It will be discussed, why action-at-a-distance theories are actually not a far cry from particle–field theories, and I will argue that the main reasons for rejecting action-at-a-distance theories originate in certain metaphysical prejudices about locality and energy conservation. I will broadly suggest how these concepts could be adapted in order to allow for action at a distance.