A frosty disagreement: John Tyndall,James David Forbes,and the early formation of the X-Club

How do glaciers move? This seemingly straightforward question provided the backdrop for a heated debate between the physicists John Tyndall (1820–1893) and James David Forbes (1809–1868) in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Forbes described the motion of glaciers as that of a viscous fluid. After visiting the Alps, Tyndall proposed an alternative theory that combined fracture and regelation. The glacial controversy ensued. Yet the debate was never simply about whether glaciers moved like honey, or if they moved by continuously breaking and re-attaching. This paper shows that the glacial controversy formed an important prelude to the strategies used by the X-Club in reforming science and establishing cultural authority. There was a central difference in the way Forbes and Tyndall presented their scientific arguments. Tyndall and his allies used the changes in the periodical press as part of their strategy for establishing and maintaining cultural and scientific authority. By contrast, Forbes and his supporters, including the North British physicists, were not as quick to make use of this new medium. This paper, therefore, examines in detail the significance of these two publishing strategies in shaping the nature and results of the glacial controversy.     

James geikie,james croll,and the eventful ice age

James Geikie's Great Ice Age (1874) first presented to the geological public the Pleistocene. modern interpretation of alternating mild and cold periods during the Though it was supported by geological evidence, Geikie's view of the Ice Age was based on a theoretical framework supplied by the climatic physics of James Croll. Mid-nineteenth-century British geologists had encountered great difficulty in making sense out of the varied and complicated glacial deposits, or ‘drift’, and had formulated the ‘iceberg’ theory to account for the apparent chaos of the drift, an explanation which discouraged its stratigraphic study. The reaffirmation of faith in continental glaciation by several Scottish geologists in the 1850s brought with it a belief in an eventful Pleistocene, but it remained difficult to discover the events of Ice Age history from study of the glacial deposits. In 1864 Croll presented a detailed climatic history of the Ice Age deduced from astronomy and physical geography. By 1871 James Geikie was using Croll's scheme of Ice Age history as the basis for his impressive synthesis of Pleistocene data from throughout the world.     

The Archaean Controversy in Britain: Part III—The rocks of Anglesey and Caernarvonshire

A detailed account is given of the development of the Archaean Controversy in Caernarvonshire and Anglesey. Sedgwick had found no base for his Cambrian in North Wales, but had intimated that some of the unfossiliferous rocks of the Lleyn Peninsula and Anglesey might be older than his Cambrian. He also described two ‘ribs’ of igneous rock: one running from Caernarvon to Bangor; the other inland, parallel to the first and crossing the Llanberis Pass at Llyn Padarn. The early Surveyors (especially Ramsay) supposed that these ‘ribs’ had altered the surrounding rocks, and the resulting ‘Altered Cambrian’ could be traced across the Menai Strait to Anglesey, where it formed the various metamorphic rocks of that island. This view (which thus denied the occurrence of Precambrian on Anglesey) was challenged by the usual coalition of ‘amateurs’ (Hicks, Hughes, Bonney, Callaway, Blake, etc.) with attempts being made to recognize a sequence of Archaean rocks in North Wales similar to that in Pembrokeshire. However, vigorous debate occurred amongst the ‘Archaean’ geologists themselves, especially about a rock at Twt Hill, Caernarvon, and about a claimed unconformity at the base of the Cambrian in the Llanberis Pass, perhaps adjacent to the Llyn Padarn ‘rib’. (This was at first regarded as a Precambrian ‘island’ like those claimed at St David's, the Malverns, etc.) Vigorous debate took place about the location of the claimed Llanberis unconformity, but the ‘Archaeans’ were united in regarding the metamorphic rocks of Anglesey as Precambrian (or Archaean). Eventually, the greywackes of Anglesey, and around Bangor and Caernarvon, were identified as Ordovician, not Cambrian. Very detailed map-work in Anglesey was carried out privately by Edward Greenly, and his results were published by the Survey in the form of a map and a high-quality Memoir. Greenly utilized for Anglesey tectonic ideas derived from his earlier fieldwork in the Scottish Highlands, so that although his mapping and stratigraphical divisions have proved to be of permanent value it is believed that his structures for Anglesey were mistaken and his stratigraphic sequence inverted. The Survey eventually abandoned its earlier (Ramsay) model of Anglesey without too much difficulty; and the igneous ‘rib’ of Llyn Padarn is now construed as an ignimbrite. However, a definite base for the Cambrian has still not been found in Caernarvonshire, and the stratigraphical evidence for the Precambrian age of the Anglesey rocks (by perceived unconformity with known Cambrian strata) remains incomplete. The study reveals the great difficulty experienced by early geologists when working in unfossiliferous rocks, the evidence from included fragments proving particularly uncertain. The paper also examines further the community of nineteenth-century British geologists, with their various factions and competing interests.     

The American Philosophical Society and the rise of astronomy in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century

Early geological investigations in the St David's area (Pembrokeshire) are described, particularly the work of Murchison. In a reconnaissance survey in 1835, he regarded a ridge of rocks at St David's as intrusive in unfossiliferous Cambrian; and the early Survey mapping (chiefly the work of Aveline and Ramsay) was conducted on that assumption, leading to the publication of maps in 1845 and 1857. The latter represented the margins of the St David's ridge as ‘Altered Cambrian’. So the supposedly intrusive ‘syenite’ was regarded as younger, and there was no Precambrian. These views were challenged by a local doctor, Henry Hicks, who developed an idea of the ex-Survey palaeontologist John Salter that the rocks of the ridge were stratified and had formed a Precambrian island, round which Cambrian sediments (now confirmed by fossil discoveries) had been deposited. Hicks subsequently proposed subdivision of his Precambrian into ‘Dimetian’, ‘Pebidian’, and (later) ‘Arvonian’, and he attempted correlations with rocks in Shropshire, North Wales, and even North America, seeking to develop the neo-Neptunist ideas of Sterry Hunt. The challenge to the Survey's work was countered in the 1880s by the Director General, Geikie, who showed that Hicks's idea of stratification in the Dimetian was mistaken. A heated controversy developed, several amateur geologists, supported by a group of Cambridge Sedgwickians, forming a coalition of ‘Archaeans’ against the Survey. Geikie was supported by Lloyd Morgan. Attention focused particularly on Ogof Lle-sugn Cave and St Non's Arch, with theory/controversy-ladenness of observations evident on both sides. Evidence from an eyewitness student record of a Geological Society meeting reveals the ‘sanit`ized’ nature of the official summary of the debate in QJGS. Field mapping early in the twentieth century by J. F. N. Green allowed a compromise consensus to be achieved, but Green's evidence for unconformity between the Cambrian and the Dimetian, obtained by excavation, can no longer be verified, and his consensual history of the area may need revision. Unconformity between the Cambrian and the Pebidian tuffs is not in doubt, however, and Precambrian at St David's is accepted. The study exhibits features of geological controversy and the British geological community in the nineteenth century. It also furnishes a further instance of the great influence of Murchison in nineteenth-century British geology and the side-effects of his controversy with Sedgwick.     

Sharing Knowledge,Shaping Europe: US Technological Collaboration and Nonproliferation

While many aspects of Shapin's historical thesis (see preceding article) are accepted, this paper raises objections to specific parts of his historical account, and also to the historiographical assumptions underlying his sociological programme. In particular, Shapin's claim to have explained the Edinburgh phrenology debate in social terms is analysed and rejected.     

The professor and the pea: Lives and afterlives of William Bateson’s campaign for the utility of Mendelism

As a defender of the fundamental importance of Mendel’s experiments for understanding heredity, the English biologist William Bateson (1861–1926) did much to publicize the usefulness of Mendelian science for practical breeders. In the course of his campaigning, he not only secured a reputation among breeders as a scientific expert worth listening to but articulated a vision of the ideal relations between pure and applied science in the modern state. Yet historical writing about Bateson has tended to underplay these utilitarian elements of his program, to the extent of portraying him, notably in still-influential work from the 1960s and 1970s, as a type specimen of the scientist who could not care less about application. This paper offers a corrective view of Bateson himself—including the first detailed account of his role as an expert witness in a courtroom dispute over the identity of a commercial pea variety—and an inquiry into the historiographic fate of his efforts in support of Mendelism’s productivity. For all that a Marxian perspective classically brings applied science to the fore, in Bateson’s case, and for a range of reasons, it did the opposite during the Cold War.     

Marking out a disciplinary common ground: The role of chemical pedagogy in establishing the doctrine of affinity at the heart of British chemistry

This paper presents a case study that contributes to the current debate among historians of chemistry concerning the role and influence of pedagogy in science. Recently, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and her colleagues concluded that in nineteenth-century France, ‘textbooks played an important role in discipline building and in creating theories’.1 ¹A. Garcia-Belmar, B. Bensaude-Vincent and J.R. Bertomeu-Sánchez, ‘The Power of Didactic Writings: French Chemistry Textbooks of the Nineteenth Century’, in Pedagogy and the Practice of Science: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by D. Kaiser (Cambridge, MA, 2005), 243. Developing this idea further, this paper examines the dissemination of knowledge through face-to-face chemical lectures, showing that the influence of pedagogical strategy on theoretical content of the science is far from negligible. The pedagogy of William Cullen was essentially responsible for the prevalence of the doctrine of affinity in British chemistry from the 1760s onwards. Cullen used his affinity theory as a pedagogical tool that to a large extent defined his discipline, and the pedagogical pyramid that he headed similarly ensured that the doctrine would remain at the heart of British chemistry. From a pedagogical tool, the doctrine of affinity was transformed over time into a chemical tool, offering British chemists a disciplinary common ground that both set and reinforced the boundaries to their discipline.     

The statesman and the ophthalmologist: Gladstone and Magnus on the evolution of human colour vision, one small episode of the nineteenth-century Darwinian debate

Among the numerous nineteenth-century sorties into particular aspects of the Darwinian debate are two 1877 publications. The first, Die Geschichtliche Entwickelung des Farbensinnes, was a treatise on the evolutionary development of human colour vision by Hugo Magnus, an obscure German ophthalmologist. The other, The Colour-Sense, was an article by William Ewart Gladstone, the great British statesman. Magnus, working from linguistic science and optical physiology, developed the theory that humankind had passed through successive stages of colour recognition, from none to full perception, brightest colours first. Gladstone supported the theory with data from his studies of Homeric colour words, placing Homer at a very early stage. Their theory was not accepted. It assumed colour vocabulary to be an index of colour recognition, and too little was known about the nature or age of early man. The present study intends to follow this particular episode as an excellent example of the scholarship, argumentation, and limited scientific knowledge of the time, as applied to human evolution.     

British Acoustics and its Transformation from the 1860s to the 1910s

Between the 1860s and the 1910s, British acoustics was transformed from an area of empirical research into a mathematically organized field. Musical motives—improving musical scales and temperaments, making better musical instruments, and understanding the nature of musical tones—were among the major driving forces of acoustical researchers in nineteenth-century Britain. The German acoustician, Helmholtz, had a major impact on British acousticians who also had extensive interactions with American and French acousticians. Rayleigh's acoustics, reflecting all these features, bore remarkable fruit in his treatise The Theory of Sound, which successfully subjected empirical acoustics to analytical mathematics. His accomplishments made British acoustics a subfield of physics, thus distinguishing it from the ‘new acoustics’ in early twentieth-century America.     

The platypus in Edinburgh: Robert Jameson,Robert Knox and the place of the Ornithorhynchus in nature, 1821–24

The duck-billed platypus, or Ornithorhynchus, was the subject of an intense debate among natural historians in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Its paradoxical mixture of mammalian, avian and reptilian characteristics made it something of a taxonomic conundrum. In the early 1820s Robert Jameson (1774–1854), the professor of natural history at the University of Edinburgh and the curator of the University's natural history museum, was able to acquire three valuable specimens of this species. He passed one of these on to the anatomist Robert Knox (1791–1862), who dissected the animal and presented his results in a series of papers to the Wernerian Natural History Society, which later published them in its Memoirs. This paper takes Jameson's platypus as a case study on how natural history specimens were used to create and contest knowledge of the natural world in the early nineteenth century, at a time when interpretations of the relationships between animal taxa were in a state of flux. It shows how Jameson used his possession of this interesting specimen to provide a valuable opportunity for his protégé Knox while also helping to consolidate his own position as a key figure in early nineteenth-century natural history.     

William Whiston, Isaac Newton and the crisis of publicity

William Whiston was one of the first British converts to Newtonian physics and his 1696 New theory of the earth is the first full-length popularization of the natural philosophy of the Principia. Impressed with his young protégé, Newton paved the way for Whiston to succeed him as Lucasian Professor of Mathematics in 1702. Already a leading Newtonian natural philosopher, Whiston also came to espouse Newton’s heretical antitrinitarianism in the middle of the first decade of the eighteenth century. In all, Whiston enjoyed twenty years of contact with Newton dating from 1694. Although they shared so much ideologically, the two men fell out when Whiston began to proclaim openly the heresy that Newton strove to conceal from the prying eyes of the public. This paper provides a full account of this crisis of publicity by outlining Whiston’s efforts to make both Newton’s natural philosophy and heterodox theology public through popular texts, broadsheets and coffee house lectures. Whiston’s attempts to draw Newton out through published hints and innuendos, combined with his very public religious crusade, rendered the erstwhile disciple a dangerous liability to the great man and helps explain Newton’s eventual break with him, along with his refusal to support Whiston’s nomination to the Royal Society. This study not only traces Whiston’s successes in preaching the gospel of Newton’s physics and theology, but demonstrates the ways in which Whiston, who resolutely refused to accept Newton’s epistemic distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ forms of knowledge, transformed Newton’s grand programme into a singularly exoteric system and drove it into the public sphere.     

Chemist,entomologist, Darwinian,and man of affairs: Raphael Meldola and the making of a scientific career

In 1925 a debate erupted in the correspondence columns of the British Medical Journal concerning the effectiveness of eating raw pancreas as a treatment for diabetes. Enthusiasts were predominantly general practitioners (GPs), who claimed success for the therapy on the basis of their clinical impressions. Their detractors were laboratory‐oriented ‘biochemist‐physicians,’ who considered that their own experiments demonstrated that raw pancreas therapy was ineffective. The biochemist‐physicians consistently dismissed the GPs' observations as inadequately ‘controlled’. They did not define the meaning of ‘control’ in this context, although it clearly did not have the term's present‐day meaning of a trial employing an untreated comparison group of patients. Rather, the physician‐biochemists' ‘properly controlled’ experiments involved careful regulation of their patients' diet and other environmental factors, and evaluation of the therapy's success through biochemical, rather than just clinical, criteria. However, my analysis suggests that these factors alone are inadequate to account for the biochemist‐physicians' dismissal of the GPs' work as ‘uncontrolled’. I suggest that the biochemist‐physicians were deliberately exploiting the powerful rhetorical connotations of the term ‘control’. Ultimately, they implied that only a trial which they themselves had conducted could be deemed ‘adequately controlled’.     

Maligned for mathematics: Sir Thomas Urquhart and his Trissotetras

Thomas Urquhart (1611–1660), celebrated for his English translation of Rabelais’ Gargantua et Pantagruel, has earned some notoriety for his eccentric, putatively incomprehensible early book on trigonometry The Trissotetras (1645). The Trissotetras was too impractical to succeed in its own day as a textbook, since it lacked both trigonometric tables and sample calculations. But its current bad reputation is based on literary authors’ amplifications of the verdict prefaced to its 19th century reprinting by one mathematician, William Wallace, who lacked the background to appreciate the book’s historical context. Considering that context (including seventeenth century ‘copious’ prose, and medieval logic and ‘art of memory’), the bad reputation is undeserved: the book is mathematically clear, clever (e.g. in superimposing 16 problems into one diagram), and complete. The Trissotetras may thus be viewed as simply one more of Urquhart’s polymathic projects and involvements – which included education, rise of the middle class, religious and class conflicts, development of science and mathematics, search for patronage, universal language construction, and development of English prose – which serve to make him a lively and instructive intellectual Everyman for his time.     

Alexis Fontaine's ‘Fluxio-differential method’ and the origins of the calculus of several variables

Alexis Fontaine des Bertins (1704–1771) was the first French mathematician to introduce what we would now regard as results in the calculus of several variables. One example is Fontaine's theorem nF = (?F/?x)x + (?F/?y)y of 1737 for homogeneous expressions F of degree n in x and y. Many years later Fontaine indicated this particular result to have been ‘a continuation of the method of solution’ introduced by him in 1734 to solve the problem of the tautochrones. It is tempting to disregard this announcement, since the method applied to the tautochrones was a method of variations and not manifestly an exercise in the calculus of several variables. Do we have just another case of a mathematician's confusion about the origins of his earlier work? In this paper I describe Fontaine's possible intentions in his remarks.     

On Kepler's awareness of the problem of experimental error

This paper is an account of Kepler's explicit awareness of the problem of experimental error. As a study of the Astronomia nova shows, Kepler exploited his awareness of the occurrences of experimental errors to guide him to the right conclusion. Errors were thus employed, so to speak, perhaps for the first time, to bring about a major physical discovery: Kepler's laws of planetary motion. ‘Know then’, to use Kepler's own words, ‘that errors show us the way to truth.’ With a survey of Kepler's revolutionary contribution to optics, the paper demonstrates that Kepler's awareness of the problem of experimental error extended beyond discrepancies between calculations and observations to types of error which pertain to observations and instruments. It emerges that Kepler's belief in the unity of knowledge and physical realism, facilitated—indeed created—the right philosophical posture for comprehending the problem of error in an entirely novel way.     

The Philosopher's conception of Mathesis Universalis from Descartes to Leibniz

In Descartes, the concept of a ‘universal science’ differs from that of a ‘mathesis universalis’, in that the latter is simply a general theory of quantities and proportions. Mathesis universalis is closely linked with mathematical analysis; the theorem to be proved is taken as given, and the analyst seeks to discover that from which the theorem follows. Though the analytic method is followed in the Meditations, Descartes is not concerned with a mathematisation of method; mathematics merely provides him with examples. Leibniz, on the other hand, stressed the importance of a calculus as a way of representing and adding to what is known, and tried to construct a ‘universal calculus’ as part of his proposed universal symbolism, his ‘characteristica universalis’. The characteristica universalis was never completed—it proved impossible, for example, to list its basic terms, the ‘alphabet of human thoughts’—but parts of it did come to fruition, in the shape of Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus and his various logical calculi. By his construction of these calculi, Leibniz proved that it is possible to operate with concepts in a purely formal way.     

Essay Review: Looking for the Rhetoric of Science

The characteristics of inductivist historiography of science, as practised by earlier scientist/historians, and Whig historiography, as practised by earlier political historians, are described, according to the accounts of Agassi and Butterfield. It is suggested that the writings of Geikie on the history of geology allow us to characterize him as a Whig/inductivist historian of science who formulated anachronistic judgements. It is further suggested that his writings have had a considerable long-term effect on interpretations of the history of geology. The character of Geikie's historiography is related to his social, political and religious views, his historicism, and his romantic enthusiasm for Nature. His methodological pronouncements are examined: he believed that the present is the key to the past, and also that the past is the key to the present. He was an empiricist and inductivist. These epistemological and methodological views impinged on his historiography of science. If one attempts to criticize Geikie's historiography, though one may try to judge his work according to the norms of his own day and age, historical anachronism cannot be avoided entirely and one may oneself be charged with acting ‘Whiggishly’. Historians of science, in the process of professionalization, have accepted the historiographical norms of general historians (perhaps for socio-economic reasons), but in so doing have inherited a problem that arises whenever they contemplate earlier historical writings. It is suggested that there may be more room for Whiggish historiography of science than is presently deemed acceptable. Alternatively, one may wish to draw a careful distinction between science and its meta-discipline, the historiography of science. Whig historiography conflates the two, and the work of Geikie (a scientist/historian par excellence) provides a good illustration of this.