Ordinary language philosophy,explanation, and the historical turn in philosophy of science

Taking a cue from remarks Thomas Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within parts of the British philosophical context in the 1950s and early 1960s. During this time, ordinary language philosophy's influence was at its peak. I argue that the ordinary language philosophers' methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation and that these criticisms relate to the historical turn in philosophy of science. To show these connections, I primarily examine the work of Stephen Toulmin, who taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on explanation under Gilbert Ryle and R.B. Braithwaite in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse's appeal to an ordinary language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models and analogies in scientific reasoning, and W.H. Watson's Wittgensteinian philosophy of science, an early influence on Toulmin. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception. Looking at the philosophical background during which so-called linguistic philosophers also had a hand in bringing these questions to prominence helps us understand why.     

Rome and Theistic Evolutionism: The Hidden Strategies behind the ‘Dorlodot Affair’, 1920–1926

In 1918, Henry de Dorlodot—priest, theologian, and professor of geology at the University of Louvain (Belgium)—published Le Darwinisme au point de vue de l'Orthodoxie Catholique (translated as Darwinism and Catholic Thought) in which he defended a reconciliation between evolutionary theory and Catholicism with his own particular kind of theistic evolutionism. He subsequently announced a second volume in which he would extend his conclusions to the origin of Man. Traditionalist circles in Rome reacted vehemently. Operating through the Pontifical Biblical Commission, they tried to force Dorlodot to withdraw his book and to publicly disown his ideas by threatening him with an official condemnation, a strategy that had been used against Catholic evolutionists since the late nineteenth century. The archival material on the ‘Dorlodot affair’ shows how this policy ‘worked’ in the early stages of the twentieth century but also how it would eventually reach the end of its logic. The growing popularity of theistic evolutionism among Catholic intellectuals, combined with Dorlodot's refusal to pull back amidst threats, made certain that the traditionalists did not get their way completely, and the affair ended in an uncomfortable status quo. Dorlodot did not receive the official condemnation that had been threatened, nor did he withdraw his theories, although he stopped short on publishing on the subject. With the decline of the traditionalists’ power and authority, the policy of denunciation towards evolutionists made way for a growing tolerance. The ‘Dorlodot affair’—which occurred in a pivotal era in the history of the Church—can be seen as exemplary with regards to the changing attitude of the Roman authorities towards evolutionism in the first half of the twentieth century.     

“The soul of the fact”—Poincaré and proof

Henri Poincaré acquired a reputation in his lifetime for being difficult to read. It was said that he missed out important steps in his arguments, assumed the truth of claims that would be difficult if not impossible to prove, and in short that he lacked rigour. In the years after his death this view coalesced into an exaggerated claim that his work was simply too vague, and has become a cliché. This paper argues that Poincaré was far from indifferent to rigour, and that what characterises his work is an attempt to convey a particular sense of what it is to understand a topic. Throughout his working life Poincaré was concerned to promote the understanding of many domains of mathematics and physics. This is as apparent in his views about geometry, his conventionalism, and his theory of knowledge, as it is in his work on electricity and optics, on number theory, and function theory. It is one of the ways Poincaré discharged his responsibilities as a scientist, and that it accounts not only for a surprising degree of unity in his work but also gives it its distinctive character—at once profound and elusive.     

From natural history to political economy: the enlightened mission of Domenico Vandelli in late eighteenth-century Portugal

This article presents the main features of the work of Domenico Vandelli (1735–1816), an Italian-born man of science who lived a large part of his life in Portugal. Vandelli’s scientific interests as a naturalist paved the way to his activities as a reformer and adviser on economic and financial issues. The topics covered in his writings are similar to those discussed by Linnaeus, with whom Vandelli corresponded. They clearly reveal that the scientific preparation indispensable for a better knowledge of natural resources was also a fundamental condition for correctly addressing problems of efficiency in their economic allocation. The key argument put forward in this article is that the relationship between natural history and the agenda for economic reform and development deserves to be further analysed. It is indeed a central element in the emergence of political economy as an autonomous scientific discourse during the last decades of the eighteenth century.     

Harmony and simplicity: aesthetic virtues and the rise of testability

Copernicus claimed that his system was preferable in part on the grounds of its superior harmony and simplicity, but left very few hints as to what was meant by these terms. Copernicus’s pupil, Rheticus, was more forthcoming. Kepler, influenced by Rheticus, articulated further the nature of the virtues of harmony and simplicity. I argue that these terms are metaphors for the structural features of the Copernican system that make it more able to effectively exploit the available data. So it is a mistake to conclude that early Copernicans could only offer aesthetic or pragmatic arguments; they could and did offer evidential ones as well. Moreover, the evidential arguments they offered parallel current arguments in the philosophical literature.     

The platinum pyrometers of Louis Bernard Guyton de Morveau,F.R.S. (1737–1816)

As we have seen, it was clearly Guyton's intention, in 1808, to supply details of his improved platinum pyrometer, and he did submit a drawing of the instrument at the meeting of the Class in December 1810. It would seem that on that occasion he did not supply those details which are to be found in the fourth, unpublished, part of the ‘Essay’. The existence of a text fit to be sent to the printer, and the execution of a drawing relating to the improved version of his platinum pyrometer, might be taken as evidence that Guyton intended to publish. His paper of 1810 did not appear until 1814, however, so that publication of the fourth part of the ‘Essay’ could scarcely have occurred until 1815 or later. Guyton probably hoped to be able to read it to the Class of Physical and Mathematical Sciences before publishing it in the Annales de Chimie, but his death on 2 January 1816 robbed him of the opportunity.     

The rhetorical strategy of William Paley’s Natural theology (1802): Part 1, William Paley’s Natural theology in context

This article reconstructs the historical and philosophical contexts of William Paley’s Natural theology (1802). In the wake of the French Revolution, widely believed to be the embodiment of an atheistic political credo, the refutation of the transmutational biological theories of Buffon and Erasmus Darwin was naturally high on Paley’s agenda. But he was also responding to challenges arising from his own moral philosophy, principally the psychological quandary of how men were to be kept in mind of the Creator. It is argued here that Natural theology was the culmination of a complex rhetorical scheme for instilling religious impressions that would increase both the virtue and happiness of mankind. Philosophy formed an integral part of this strategy, but it did not comprise the whole of it. Equally vital were those purely rhetorical aspects of the discourse which, according to Paley, were more concerned with creating ‘impression’. This facet of his writing is explored in part one of this two-part article. Turning to the argumentative side of the scheme, part two examines Paley’s responses to David Hume and Erasmus Darwin in the light of the wider strategy of inculcation at work throughout all his writings.     

James Hutton on Religion and Geology: the unpublished preface to his Theory of the Earth (1788)

James Hutton knew before its publication that his geological theory would be subjected to religious criticism, and in an eventually rejected preface (published here for the first time) he endeavoured to mitigate that criticism. His theory is an almost perfect expression of the deistic tenets in which he believed. But he sensed that his attempted defence was inadequate, and so he submitted his preface to William Robertson for advice. Robertson rewrote Hutton's preface for him but also suggested tactfully that it not be published, advice which Hutton took. Upon publication, his theory received its full measure of religious opposition, but it is unlikely that Hutton's preface would have forestalled any of it. I transcribe and attempt to date the preface, discuss its contents, and suggest its usefulness in Huttonian studies.     

The pressure responses of lobster larvae following selective cautery and treatment with surface active substances

Summary The pressure responses of phase II larvae of the lobster,Homarus gammarus, are not affected by Cetavlon cetrimide, nor by other surface active substances. Amputation of the first and second antennae indicates that these structures, like the embryonic statocyst are essential neither for the perception of the pressure stimulus, nor for the orientation of the response.This work was carried out while at the Marine Biological Station, Port Erin, Isle of Man. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the hospitality of the Director and his staff.     

Viète's Controversy with Clavius Over the Truly Gregorian Calendar

Some twenty years after the Gregorian calendar reform, towards the end of his life, François Viète published his own calendar proposal. This treatise contains a sharp attack against the Jesuit scholar Clavius, the mathematical mind behind the reform. Understandably enough, Clavius prepared a negative reply. Viète heard of it and exploded in a fit of rage, ``I demonstrated that you are a false mathematician [ . . . ], and a false theologian.'' Sadly, Clavius' rejection, added as a chapter to his monumental apology of the Gregorian reform, appeared when Viète had already passed away.Viète seriously believed that the true aim of the Gregorian reform has been betrayed and he was furious about some logical inconsistencies which he claimed to have found in Clavius' calendar. Clavius apparently confused solar day and epactal day (or ``tithi''), the thirtieth part of a lunar month. This is the very core of Viète's attack against Clavius whom he accused of having introduced a false lunar period (``falsa periodus lunaris''). But his own work has some logical inconsistencies too. For instance, he reproaches Clavius for having introduced lunar months of 31 days which, indeed, are unrealistic. Grievously, his own rules can likewise give rise to lunations of unnatural lengths.In order to understand these subtle twists reader and author must work largely through both Clavius and Viète's methods of Easter reckoning. The fruit of all those efforts might be an insight into Viète's clear mathematical thinking. His calendar, however, was never considered.     

Reception and discovery: the nature of Johann Wilhelm Ritter’s invisible rays

Ultraviolet radiation is generally considered to have been discovered by Johann Wilhelm Ritter in 1801. In this article, we study the reception of Ritter’s experiment during the first decade after the event—Ritter’s remaining lifetime. Drawing on the attributional model of discovery, we are interested in whether the German physicists and chemists granted Ritter’s observation the status of a discovery and, if so, of what. Two things are remarkable concerning the early reception, and both have to do more with neglect than with (positive) reception. Firstly, Ritter’s observation was sometimes accepted as a fact but, with the exception of C. J. B. Karsten’s theory of invisible light, it played almost no role in the lively debate about the nature of heat and light. We argue that it was the prevalent discourse based on the metaphysics of Stoffe that prevented a broader reception of Ritter’s invisible rays, not the fact that Ritter himself made his findings a part of his Naturphilosophie. Secondly, with the exception of C. E. Wünsch’s experiments on the visual spectrum, there was no experimental examination of the experiment. We argue that theorizing about ontological systems was more common than experimenting, because, given its social and institutional situation, this was the appropriate way of contributing to physics. Consequently, it was less clear in 1810 than in 1801 what, if anything, had been discovered by Ritter.     

‘Land-marks of the universe’: John Herschel against the background of positional astronomy

John Herschel (1792–1871) was the leading British natural philosopher of the nineteenth century, widely known and regarded for his work in philosophy, optics and chemistry as well as his important research and popular publications on astronomy. To date, however, there exists no extended treatment of his astronomical career. This paper, part of a larger study exploring Herschel's contributions to astronomy, examines his work in the context of positional astronomy, the dominant form of astronomical practice throughout his lifetime. Herschel, who did not himself practice positional astronomy and who was known for his non-meridional observations of specific stellar objects, was nonetheless a strong advocate for positional astronomy—but for very different reasons than the terrestrial applications to which it was most often put. For Herschel, the star catalogues of positional astronomy were the necessary observational foundation upon which information about the stars as physical objects could be constructed. Positional astronomy practiced in the great national observatories was not about navigation or timekeeping; it was a way to standardize stellar observations and make them useful data for constructing theories of the stars themselves. For Herschel, the seeds of the new astronomy emerged from the practices of the old.     

Robert Boyle and the heuristic value of mechanism

This paper argues that, contrary to the claims of Alan Chalmers, Boyle understood his experimental work to be intimately related to his mechanical philosophy. Its central claim is that the mechanical philosophy has a heuristic structure that motivates and gives direction to Boyle's experimental programme. Boyle was able to delimit the scope of possible explanations of any phenomenon by positing both that all qualities are ultimately reducible to a select group of mechanical qualities and that all explanations of natural phenomena are to be in terms of the operations of machines and are to appeal only to qualities that are already familiar. This is illustrated by his investigations into the Torricellian experiment. Boyle's explanation of the elevation of the mercurial cylinder by appeal to the spring of the air was an intermediate mechanical explanation. Boyle was convinced that the spring of the air was ultimately reducible to the mechanical qualities. This in turn had implications for his research into the cause of respiration. In a move that was both parsimonious and consistent with the broad requirements of the mechanical philosophy, Boyle was able to solve the problem of the cause of the inflow of air into the lungs by appeal to his research in pneumatics. This application of a mechanical explanation in pneumatics to physiology is just what one would expect if the mechanical philosophy was as universal as Boyle claimed it to be. Therefore, far from Boyle's experiments having a life of their own, they were clearly directed by and understood in terms of the mechanical philosophy.     

The Philosopher's conception of Mathesis Universalis from Descartes to Leibniz

In Descartes, the concept of a ‘universal science’ differs from that of a ‘mathesis universalis’, in that the latter is simply a general theory of quantities and proportions. Mathesis universalis is closely linked with mathematical analysis; the theorem to be proved is taken as given, and the analyst seeks to discover that from which the theorem follows. Though the analytic method is followed in the Meditations, Descartes is not concerned with a mathematisation of method; mathematics merely provides him with examples. Leibniz, on the other hand, stressed the importance of a calculus as a way of representing and adding to what is known, and tried to construct a ‘universal calculus’ as part of his proposed universal symbolism, his ‘characteristica universalis’. The characteristica universalis was never completed—it proved impossible, for example, to list its basic terms, the ‘alphabet of human thoughts’—but parts of it did come to fruition, in the shape of Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus and his various logical calculi. By his construction of these calculi, Leibniz proved that it is possible to operate with concepts in a purely formal way.     

A study and critique of the teaching of the history of science and technology. Interim report by the committee on undergraduate education of the history of science society (U.S.A.)

A great deal is known about the technical issues surrounding the introduction of Hugo De Vries's mutation theory and the subsequent development of the modern genetical theory of natural selection. But so far little has been done to relate these events to the wider issues of the time. This article suggests that extra-scientific factors played a significant role, and substantiates this by comparing De Vries's respect for the original Darwinian spirit with Thomas Hunt Morgan's use of the mutation theory as part of an attack on the whole philosophy of Darwinism. In particular, it is argued that Morgan's attitude was dictated by his moral objections to the picture of a world dominated by struggle.     

A frosty disagreement: John Tyndall,James David Forbes,and the early formation of the X-Club

How do glaciers move? This seemingly straightforward question provided the backdrop for a heated debate between the physicists John Tyndall (1820–1893) and James David Forbes (1809–1868) in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Forbes described the motion of glaciers as that of a viscous fluid. After visiting the Alps, Tyndall proposed an alternative theory that combined fracture and regelation. The glacial controversy ensued. Yet the debate was never simply about whether glaciers moved like honey, or if they moved by continuously breaking and re-attaching. This paper shows that the glacial controversy formed an important prelude to the strategies used by the X-Club in reforming science and establishing cultural authority. There was a central difference in the way Forbes and Tyndall presented their scientific arguments. Tyndall and his allies used the changes in the periodical press as part of their strategy for establishing and maintaining cultural and scientific authority. By contrast, Forbes and his supporters, including the North British physicists, were not as quick to make use of this new medium. This paper, therefore, examines in detail the significance of these two publishing strategies in shaping the nature and results of the glacial controversy.     

‘Language,Truth and Reason’ 30 years later

This paper traces the origins of the styles project, originally presented as ‘styles of scientific reasoning’. ‘Styles of scientific thinking & doing’ is a better label; the styles can also be called genres, or, ways of finding out. A. C. Crombie’s template of six fundamentally distinct ones was turned into a philosophical tool, but with a tinge of Paul Feyerabend’s anarchism. Ways of finding out are not defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, but can be recognized as distinct within a sweeping, anthropological, vision of the European sciences. The approach is unabashedly whiggish. The emergence of these styles is part of what Reviel Netz calls cognitive history, and is to be understood in an ecological way. How did a species like ours, on an Earth like this, develop a few quite general strategies for finding out about, and altering, its world? At a more analytical level, the project invokes Bernard Williams’ notion of truthfulness to explicate the idea that these styles are ‘self-authenticating’ and without foundations. The paper concludes with open questions. What role (for example) have these few fundamentally distinct genres of inquiry played in the formation of the anomalous Western idea of Nature apart from Man?     

Spheres of Influence: Illustration,Notation, and John Dalton's Conceptual Toolbox, 1803–1835

In the early years of the nineteenth century, the English chemist John Dalton (1766–1844) developed his atomic theory, a set of theoretical commitments describing the nature of atoms and the rules guiding their interactions and combinations. In this paper, I examine a set of conceptual and illustrative tools used by Dalton in developing his theory as well as in presenting it to the public in printed form as well as in his many public lectures. These tools—the concept of ‘atmosphere’, the pile of shot analogy, and Dalton's system of chemical notation—served not just to guide Dalton's own thinking and to make his theories clear to his various audiences, but also to bind these theories together into a coherent system, presented in its definitive form in the three volumes of A New System of Chemical Philosophy (1808, 1810, and 1827). Despite these links, Dalton's contemporaries tended to pick and choose which of his theories to accept; his system of notation failed to be adopted in part because it embodied the whole of his system indivisibly.