Poinsinet's Edition of the Naturalis historia (1771–1782) and the Revival of Pliny in the Sciences of the Enlightenment

This paper analyses the revival of Pliny's Naturalis historia within the scientific culture of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, focusing on a French effort to produce an edition with annotations by scientists and scholars. Between the Renaissance and the early eighteenth century, the Naturalis historia had declined in scientific importance. Increasingly, it was relegated to the humanities, as we demonstrate with a review of editions. For a variety of reasons, however, scientific interest in the Naturalis historia grew in the second half of the eighteenth century. Epitomizing this interest was a plan for a scientifically annotated, Latin-French edition of the Naturalis historia. Initially coordinated by the French governmental minister Malesherbes in the 1750s, the edition was imperfectly realized by Poinsinet a few decades later. It was intended to rival two of the period's other distinguished multi-volume books of knowledge, Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie and Buffon's Histoire naturelle, to which we compare it. Besides narrating the scientific revival of the Historia naturalis during this period, we examine its causes and the factors contributing to its end in the first half of the nineteenth century.     

Essay review

This paper treats van Helmont's attack on Aristotle as an example of the difficulty of accounting for one author's attack on another by simply comparing the texts of the two authors. The Aristotle that van Helmont is attacking is the Aristotle represented in contemporary textbooks, and the attack on his authority is closely connected to the attack on the importance of verbal disputation in education. The importance of knowledge of Aristotle and of argumentative skills means van Helmont displays them to claim competence in them, while arguing they are worthless, and states many of his own doctrines as denials of Aristotelian doctrines. After a brief account of van Helmont's cosmology, three texts of his are examined: the conclusion of Causae et initia naturalium, where van Helmont demonstrates the worthlessness of Aristotelian method, by giving an example of his own method's greater success, the beginning of Physica Aristotelis et Galeni ignara, where he argues in Aristotelian terms against an Aristotelian definition of nature, and his general attack on Aristotelian method and on verbal disputation in Logica inutilis.     

Fresnel's laws,ceteris paribus

This article is about structural realism, historical continuity, laws of nature, and ceteris paribus clauses. Fresnel's Laws of optics support Structural Realism because they are a scientific structure that has survived theory change. However, the history of Fresnel's Laws which has been depicted in debates over realism since the 1980s is badly distorted. Specifically, claims that J. C. Maxwell or his followers believed in an ontologically-subsistent electromagnetic field, and gave up the aether, before Einstein's annus mirabilis in 1905 are indefensible. Related claims that Maxwell himself did not believe in a luminiferous aether are also indefensible. This paper corrects the record. In order to trace Fresnel's Laws across significant ontological changes, they must be followed past Einstein into modern physics and nonlinear optics. I develop the philosophical implications of a more accurate history, and analyze Fresnel's Laws' historical trajectory in terms of dynamic ceteris paribus clauses. Structuralists have not embraced ceteris paribus laws, but they continue to point to Fresnel's Laws to resist anti-realist arguments from theory change. Fresnel's Laws fit the standard definition of a ceteris paribus law as a law applicable only in particular circumstances. Realists who appeal to the historical continuity of Fresnel's Laws to combat anti-realists must incorporate ceteris paribus laws into their metaphysics.     

Huygens at work: Annotations in his rediscovered personal copy of Hooke's Micrographia

It is well known that Hooke's wave theory of light, set forth in his Micrographia of 1665, is viewed as a step towards Huygens's famous theory of light. This view depends mostly on some short remarks given by Huygens in his Traité de la Lumi`ere (1690) and the earlier Projet du Contenu de la Dioptrique (1673). Huygens's personal copy of Micrographia was believed to be lost until found at Braunschweig (Brunswick) University Library by the author three years ago. It is annotated at Observ. IX (pp. 47–67) only, where Hooke deals with his wave theory of light and colours. This article provides a short review of Hooke's theory, and an interpretation of Huygens's annotations, which show clearly the first steps towards the opinions he was to express in his Traité de la lumi`ere, particularly methodological ones. Furthermore, a short comparison is here drawn with Huygens's annotations in his copy of Ango's L'optique divisée en trois livres, which show similar patterns of reasoning.     

The Science of Magnetism Before Gilbert Leonardo Garzoni's Treatise on the Loadstone

This paper presents the main features of the treatise on magnetism written by the Jesuit Leonardo Garzoni (1543–92). The treatise was believed to be lost, but a copy of it has been recently recovered. The treatise is briefly described and analysed. The results of a comparison between Garzoni's treatise, Della Porta's Magia Naturalis (1589), and Gilbert's De Magnete (1600) are also summarized. As claimed in the seventeenth century by Niccolò Cabeo and Niccolò Zucchi, the treatise contains quite a lot of the material to be found subsequently in the Magia Naturalis and in the De Magnete. Most importantly, the treatise presents so many interesting features, well before Gilbert's work, which make it the first example of a modern treatment of magnetic phenomena.     

Challenging Expertise: Paul Feyerabend vs. Harry Collins & Robert Evans on democracy,public participation and scientific authority: Paul Feyerabend vs. Harry Collins & Robert Evans on scientific authority and public participation

This paper compares Feyerabend's arguments in Science in a Free Society to the controversial theory of expertise proposed by Harry Collins and Robert Evans as a Third Wave of Science Studies. Is the legitimacy of democratic decisions threatened by the unquestioned authority of scientific advice? Or does, on the contrary, science need protection from too much democratic participation in technical decisions? Where Feyerabend's political relativism envisions democratic society as inherently pluralist and demands equal contribution of all traditions and worldviews to public decision-making, Collins and Evans hold a conception of elective modernism, defending the reality and value of technical expertise and arguing that science deserves a privileged status in modern democracies, because scientific values are also democratic values. I will argue that Feyerabend's political relativism provides a valuable framework for the evaluation of Collins' and Evans' theory of expertise. By constructing a dialog between Feyerabend and this more recent approach in Science and Technology Studies, the aim of this article is not only to show where the two positions differ and in what way they might be reconciled, but also how Feyerabend's philosophy provides substantial input to contemporary debate.     

Huxley's defence of Darwin

This article ventures a reappraisal of Huxley's role in the Darwinian debates. First, the views on life-history held by Huxley before 1859 are identified. Next, the disharmony between these views and the view put forward by Darwin in the Origin of species (1859) is discussed. Huxley's defence of the Origin is then reviewed in an effort to show that, despite his fervour on Darwin's behalf, his advocacy of the case for natural selection was not particularly compelling, and that his own scientific work took no revolutionary new direction after 1859.     

A Dispute Over Superposition: John Wallis,Honoré Fabri,and Giovanni Alfonso Borelli

This paper aims first and foremost to unravel and clarify an interesting 17^th century controversy around superposition in projectiles, which allegedly existed between the French Jesuit Honoré Fabri and the Italian physicist and astronomer Giovanni Alfonso Borelli. This conflict – initially described by the English mathematician John Wallis in a letter from 1670 to the secretary of the Royal Society – has been erroneously identified with Fabri's Dialogi physici (1669), a work written in response to Borelli's De vi percussionis (1669). In fact, this “conflict” was nothing but Wallis's account of a contradiction between Borelli's above mentioned work and Fabri's Tractatus physicus de motu locali from 1646, while Fabri's 1669 work expressed views very different from those contained in his Tractatus physicus. I will try here to reconstruct Fabri's change of heart between 1646 and 1669 concerning projectiles and superposition, while tracing the real bone of contention between (the later) Fabri and Borelli – superimposing contrary motions – to its Aristotelian origins. My analysis will lead me to problematize the way modern historians usually interpret the relation between Aristotle's physical thinking and projectile theories of early modern theoreticians (e.g. Nicollò Tartaglia's).     

The ‘Chemistry of Space’: The Sources of Hermann Grassmann's Scientific Achievements

Albert Lewis's article (Annals of Science, 1977) analysing the influence of Friedrich Schleiermacher on Hermann Grassmann, stimulated many different studies on the founder of n-dimensional outer algebra.

Following a brief outline of the various, sometimes diverging, analyses of Grassmann's creative thinking, new research is presented which confirms Lewis's original contribution and widens it considerably. It will be shown that:

i.?Grassmann, although a self-taught mathematician, was at the centre of a hitherto understated intellectual trend, which was defining for Germany. Initiated by Pestalozzi's concept of elementary mathematical education and culminating in the modern mathematics of the late 19th Century, it was reflected in the contributions of Grassmann, Riemann, Jacobi and Eisenstein.

ii.?Hermann Grassmann, his father Justus, and his brother Robert were all demonstrably influenced by Schleiermacher's dialectic; however the two brothers responded to it in very different ways.

iii.?Whilst the more philosophical parts of Hermann's 1844 Extension Theory are characterised by the influence of Schleiermacher and also by the mathematical knowledge of his father, the entire development of this work is the unfolding of a single idea based on the father's interpretation of combinatorial multiplication as a ‘chemical conjunction‘, which was developed largely dialectically by Hermann.     

The genesis of a mediaeval historian: Pierre Duhem and the origins of statics

Contrary to what might be expected given a religious or other motivation, Pierre Duhem's interest in mediaeval science was the result of his surprise encounter with Jordanus de Nemore while working on Les origines de la statique in the late autumn of 1903. Historical assumptions common among physicists at that time may explain this surprise, which occasioned a frantic search for more mediaeval precursors for Renaissance mechanics. It also raised serious historiographical problems that threatened even his methodological views, until they were resolved in his To save the phenomena of 1908.     

Knowing what would happen: The epistemic strategies in Galileo's thought experiments

While philosophers have subjected Galileo's classic thought experiments to critical analysis, they have tended to largely ignored the historical and intellectual context in which they were deployed, and the specific role they played in Galileo's overall vision of science. In this paper I investigate Galileo's use of thought experiments, by focusing on the epistemic and rhetorical strategies that he employed in attempting to answer the question of how one can know what would happen in an imaginary scenario. Here I argue we can find three different answers to this question in Galileo later dialogues, which reflect the changing meanings of ‘experience’ and ‘knowledge’ (scientia) in the early modern period. Once we recognise that Galileo's thought experiments sometimes drew on the power of memory and the explicit appeal to ‘common experience’, while at other times, they took the form of demonstrative arguments intended to have the status of necessary truths; and on still other occasions, they were extrapolations, or probable guesses, drawn from a carefully planned series of controlled experiments, it becomes evident that no single account of the epistemological relationship between thought experiment, experience and experiment can adequately capture the epistemic variety we find Galileo's use of imaginary scenarios. To this extent, we cannot neatly classify Galileo's use of thought experiments as either ‘medieval’ or ‘early modern’, but we should see them as indicative of the complex epistemological transformations of the early seventeenth century.     

Alexis Fontaine's ‘Fluxio-differential method’ and the origins of the calculus of several variables

Alexis Fontaine des Bertins (1704–1771) was the first French mathematician to introduce what we would now regard as results in the calculus of several variables. One example is Fontaine's theorem nF = (?F/?x)x + (?F/?y)y of 1737 for homogeneous expressions F of degree n in x and y. Many years later Fontaine indicated this particular result to have been ‘a continuation of the method of solution’ introduced by him in 1734 to solve the problem of the tautochrones. It is tempting to disregard this announcement, since the method applied to the tautochrones was a method of variations and not manifestly an exercise in the calculus of several variables. Do we have just another case of a mathematician's confusion about the origins of his earlier work? In this paper I describe Fontaine's possible intentions in his remarks.     

The Lighthouse and the Observatory: Islam,Science, and Empire in Late Ottoman Egypt

Well-known in his day, but overlooked since, Erasmus King lectured in natural and experimental philosophy from the 1730s until 1756 at his Westminster home and twenty other venues, publicizing his frequent courses exclusively in the Daily Advertiser. In 1739 he escorted Desaguliers's youngest son to Russia, hoping to demonstrate experimental philosophy to the Russian empress. En route, he conducted trials with a sea-guage in the Baltic which were reported by Stephen Hales in his Statical Essays. Various sources testify to King's subsequent experimental research for Hales in the fields of anatomy, respiration and electricity. There is recorded evidence for the exceptional range and quality of King's scientific apparatus and models.     

William Stukeley and the early history of the Orrery

Relations between J. A. C. Chaptal, pioneer of heavy chemical industry in France, and A. L. Lavoisier, reformer of chemical theory, are examined in the light of unpublished correspondence they exchanged in the period 1784–1790. The letters, together with Chaptal's early publications, allow a reconstruction of his conversion to Lavoisier's antiphlogistic chemistry. They also reveal a series of petitions that Chaptal made to Lavoisier, in the latter's official capacity as a director of the Régie des poudres et salpêtres, for relief from the controlled price of saltpetre for his acid works in Languedoc. Finally, the relationship is explored as a window on the interplay between chemical theory and industrial practice during the period of the Industrial Revolution.     

PARX model for football match predictions

We propose an innovative approach to model and predict the outcome of football matches based on the Poisson autoregression with exogenous covariates (PARX) model recently proposed by Agosto, Cavaliere, Kristensen, and Rahbek (Journal of Empirical Finance, 2016, 38(B), 640–663). We show that this methodology is particularly suited to model the goal distribution of a football team and provides a good forecast performance that can be exploited to develop a profitable betting strategy. This paper improves the strand of literature on Poisson‐based models, by proposing a specification able to capture the main characteristics of goal distribution. The betting strategy is based on the idea that the odds proposed by the market do not reflect the true probability of the match because they may also incorporate the betting volumes or strategic price settings in order to exploit betters' biases. The out‐of‐sample performance of the PARX model is better than the reference approach by Dixon and Coles (Applied Statistics, 1997, 46(2), 265–280). We also evaluate our approach in a simple betting strategy, which is applied to English football Premier League data for the 2013–2014, 2014–2015, and 2015–2016 seasons. The results show that the return from the betting strategy is larger than 30% in most of the cases considered and may even exceed 100% if we consider an alternative strategy based on a predetermined threshold, which makes it possible to exploit the inefficiency of the betting market.