Chemistry and Chemists at the London Institution 1807-1912

The London Institution, established in the City of London in 1807, was devoted, as its full title proclaimed, to the 'advancement of Literature and the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge'. With its extensive lecture programme, splendid reference library, reading rooms, laboratory and other amenities, it provided for its members a scientific and cultural centre, modelled on the highly successful and fashionable Royal Institution in London's West End. Among its scientific activities, chemistry long maintained a leading role, in terms of both the sheer volume and variety of its presentations, and the high standing of its lecturers; they included Faraday, Playfair, Hofmann, Roscoe, Odling, Norman Lockyer, Meldola, and Sir William Ramsay, as well as other visiting lecturers, specially selected for their ability to present their subject in an interesting and attractive fashion to a wider lay public. The laboratory of the Institution, although limited in size and facilities, was the scene of instruction in practical chemistry, and between 1863 and 1884 attained the reputation of a significant centre of chemical research during the successive tenure of the professorship in chemistry by J. A. Wanklyn and H. E. Armstrong. Their publications, appearing under the device 'From the Laboratory of the London Institution', were a frequent feature of the leading chemical periodicals. Thus, within its many-sided activities, the Institution promoted significantly the public appreciation of the function of chemistry, as a contributor both to pure knowledge, and to technical and economic progress. It achieved this in an environment of influential City merchants, manufacturers and financiers and doubtless led to beneficient, if unrecorded, consequences. It was only towards the close of the nineteenth century, when the universities had become increasingly concerned with the systematic study of the discipline, that chemistry lost its direct impact in the London Institution, but continued to maintain a presence within its cultural framework.     

‘… not fundamental in a state of full civilization’: The Sociedad Astronómica de Barcelona (1910–1921) and its Popularization Programme

Scrutinizing the main activities of the Sociedad Astronómica de Barcelona (SAB), a scientific society that was founded in 1910 and lasted until 1921, this paper analyses how and why its members disseminated astronomy to society at large. Inspired by Camille Flammarion (1842–1925), and with a strong amateur character, the programme of the SAB raised interest among academic scientists, politicians, priests, navy officers, educated audiences, and positivist anticlerical writers. It rapidly conquered the public sphere through well-attended lectures, exhibitions, observations, and publications. In the context of an industrial city, which at that time was suffering serious social tensions, the popularization of astronomy transcended social and cultural boundaries. It created common ground between expert and lay knowledge, science and art, the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’, and between science and religion. In addition, it was considered as one of the only possible ways to raise the scientific level of a country such as Spain, which at that time perceived itself as peripheral, even backward, in terms of mainstream innovations in science and technology.     

Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding

What is scientific progress? On Alexander Bird's epistemic account of scientific progress, an episode in science is progressive precisely when there is more scientific knowledge at the end of the episode than at the beginning. Using Bird's epistemic account as a foil, this paper develops an alternative understanding-based account on which an episode in science is progressive precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world at the end of the episode than at the beginning. This account is shown to be superior to the epistemic account by examining cases in which knowledge and understanding come apart. In these cases, it is argued that scientific progress matches increases in scientific understanding rather than accumulations of knowledge. In addition, considerations having to do with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value all favor this understanding-based account over its epistemic counterpart.     

Constructing dystopian experience: A Neurath-Cartwrightian approach to the philosophy of social technology

Social situations, the object of the social sciences, are complex and unique: they contain so many variable aspects that they cannot be reproduced, and it is even difficult to experience two situations that are alike in many respects. The social scientists' past experiences that serve as their background knowledge to intervene in an existent situation is poor compared to what a traditional epistemologist would consider ideal. A way of dealing with the variable and insufficient background of social scientists is by means of models. But, then, how should we characterize social scientific models? This paper examines Otto Neurath's scientific utopianism as an attempt to deal with this problem. Neurath proposes that social scientists work with utopias: broad imaginative plans that coordinate a multitude of features of a social situation. This notion can be used in current debates in philosophy of science because we notice that utopias, in Neurath's sense, are comparable to models and nomological machines in Nancy Cartwright's conception. A model-based view of science lays emphasis on the fact that scientists learn from the repeated operation of such abstract entities, just as they learn from the repetition of experiments in a laboratory. Hence this approach suggests an approximation between the natural and the social sciences, as well as between science and utopian literature. This is exemplified by analyzing the literary dystopia We, written by Yevgeny Zamyatin, to show that reasoning from and debating about utopian writings, even if fictional and pessimistic, creates phenomena of valuation, which are fundamental for constituting a background of experiences in the social sciences.     

William Hasledine Pepys FRS: A Life in Scientific Research,Learned Societies and Technical Enterprise

In a long and many-sided career, William Hasledine Pepys (1775-1856) contributed significantly to the advancement of the chemical and physical sciences during the first half of the nineteenth century. As an original investigator he determined, in collaboration with William Allen, the composition of carbon dioxide, and the density of ammonia, and elucidated the chemical phenomena of respiration in man, animals, and plants. The success of these researches was largely due to the use of ingenious apparatus of his own invention and design. In the field of experimental physics, he investigated several aspects of the recently discovered Voltaic electricity: his 'Voltaic coil', consisting of only two plates, but of very large dimensions, was particularly suited for investigating electromagnetic phenomena and was so used in Davy's researches. Pepys was one of the co-founders of the Mineralogical and Geological Societies, and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1808. As a prominent member of both the Royal and London Institutions, he held honorary office as Manager and Vice-President, contributing materially to the direction of the affairs of these bodies. Pepys was a friend of Humphry Davy and was acquainted with nearly all the leading scientists and medical men of the day. At the same time, he superintended a notable manufacture of surgical instruments in the City, and promoted by his active directorship the affairs of two public companies, both pioneers in their technological fields, namely the Imperial Continental Gas Association, which was active in introducing the new gas illumination to cities and towns across Europe, and the General Steam Navigation Company, which first maintained a regular passenger and cargo service to Continental ports by the exclusive use of steam-propelled vessels. Pepys' advice in scientific and technical matters was widely sought and freely given; he retained his mental powers to the end of his long life, fulfilling his professional commitments until a few days before his death.     

Poinsinet's Edition of the Naturalis historia (1771–1782) and the Revival of Pliny in the Sciences of the Enlightenment

This paper analyses the revival of Pliny's Naturalis historia within the scientific culture of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, focusing on a French effort to produce an edition with annotations by scientists and scholars. Between the Renaissance and the early eighteenth century, the Naturalis historia had declined in scientific importance. Increasingly, it was relegated to the humanities, as we demonstrate with a review of editions. For a variety of reasons, however, scientific interest in the Naturalis historia grew in the second half of the eighteenth century. Epitomizing this interest was a plan for a scientifically annotated, Latin-French edition of the Naturalis historia. Initially coordinated by the French governmental minister Malesherbes in the 1750s, the edition was imperfectly realized by Poinsinet a few decades later. It was intended to rival two of the period's other distinguished multi-volume books of knowledge, Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie and Buffon's Histoire naturelle, to which we compare it. Besides narrating the scientific revival of the Historia naturalis during this period, we examine its causes and the factors contributing to its end in the first half of the nineteenth century.     

Thomas Reid on Mathematics and Natural Philosophy

This paper is both (a) an exercise in historical recovery in that it details some of the events surrounding the founding of the City and Guilds of London Institute and describes the way in which the Institute set about the building and running of two of its colleges, the City and Guilds Technical College, Finsbury, and the Central Institution in South Kensington (new archival detail is added to what is already known of this history) and (b) an attempt to interpret the above material in terms of various forms of association within the City Corporation and the guilds. Collectively the City and the guilds made an effort to come to terms with a modernizing world through the means of providing scientific and technical education. The guilds wanted to remain important even though traditional apprenticeship was dying out. In joining in a new venture to provide technical education for young people it was necessary to maintain an order in which the City's presence was clear and apparent. This paper will show how such an order was achieved and, in so doing, it shows something more generally of the relationship of tradition and rhetoric to institution building.     

The early years of the Lycée and the Lycée des Arts. A chapter in the lives of A. L. Lavoisier and A. F. de Fourcroy

The first professors at the newly-established London University (later University College London) were appointed in 1827, but a chair in geology was not created there until 1841. In the intervening years, teaching in geology and palaeontology was included in other natural science courses. Early in 1831, John Phillips, keeper of the Yorkshire Museum at York, was prompted to give a formal course of geological lectures and subsequently he was informally offered the professorship, which he declined.     

William Whewell,natural theology and the philosophy of science in mid nineteenth century Britain

This article aims to reveal the moral and theological dimensions of William Whewell's philosophy of science. It suggests that, in addition to an internalist account of Whewell's method and epistemology, there is a need to view his philosophy of science (and knowledge) within the intellectual context constituted by the assumptions of natural theology. It argues that writers of natural theology saw man's ability to know the world as an indication of his special place in nature, and that epistemological theories were therefore invested with moral and theological significance. Whewell's work is interpreted as an attempt to dissociate natural science from Utilitarianism and empiricist philosophy: he sought to promote a philosophy of science which guaranteed the principles of natural theology and the values of Christianity. But the idealist epistemology which he proposed was criticized by both scientists and theologians. In 1853 (in his book Of the plurality of worlds), again within the framework of natural theology, Whewell attempted to justify this epistemology by affirming the metaphysics of a Christian Platonism. From this position, Whewell defended natural theology against the metaphysical scepticism of both Henry Mansel and the positivists.     

Spheres of Influence: Illustration,Notation, and John Dalton's Conceptual Toolbox, 1803–1835

In the early years of the nineteenth century, the English chemist John Dalton (1766–1844) developed his atomic theory, a set of theoretical commitments describing the nature of atoms and the rules guiding their interactions and combinations. In this paper, I examine a set of conceptual and illustrative tools used by Dalton in developing his theory as well as in presenting it to the public in printed form as well as in his many public lectures. These tools—the concept of ‘atmosphere’, the pile of shot analogy, and Dalton's system of chemical notation—served not just to guide Dalton's own thinking and to make his theories clear to his various audiences, but also to bind these theories together into a coherent system, presented in its definitive form in the three volumes of A New System of Chemical Philosophy (1808, 1810, and 1827). Despite these links, Dalton's contemporaries tended to pick and choose which of his theories to accept; his system of notation failed to be adopted in part because it embodied the whole of his system indivisibly.     

The experimenters' regress reconsidered: Replication,tacit knowledge,and the dynamics of knowledge generation

This paper revisits the debate between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, concerning the experimenters' regress. Focusing my attention on a case study from recent psychology (regarding experimental evidence for the existence of a Mozart Effect), I argue that Franklin is right to highlight the role of epistemological strategies in scientific practice, but that his account does not sufficiently appreciate Collins's point about the importance of tacit knowledge in experimental practice. In turn, Collins rightly highlights the epistemic uncertainty (and skepticism) surrounding much experimental research. However, I will argue that his analysis of tacit knowledge fails to elucidate the reasons why scientists often are (and should be) skeptical of other researchers' experimental results. I will present an analysis of tacit knowledge in experimental research that not only answers to this desideratum, but also shows how such skepticism can in fact be a vital enabling factor for the dynamic processes of experimental knowledge generation.     

Defending the selective confirmation strategy

Most scientific realists today in one way or another confine the object of their commitment to certain components of a successful theory and thereby seek to make realism compatible with the history of theory change. Kyle Stanford calls this move by realists the strategy of selective confirmation and raises a challenge against its contemporary, reliable applicability. In this paper, I critically examine Stanford's inductive argument that is based on past scientists' failures to identify the confirmed components of their contemporary theories. I argue that our ability to make such identification should be evaluated based on the performance of the scientific community as a whole rather than that of individual scientists and that Stanford's challenge fails to raise a serious concern because it focuses solely on individual scientists' judgments, which are either made before the scientific community has reached a consensus or about the value of the posit as a locus for further research rather than its confirmed status.     

Scientists as experts: A distinct role?

The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference. Based on a systematic analysis of the central aspects of the role of scientists as experts – that is, its aim, context, mode of output, and standards, I propose a moderate version of the separability view. Whereas the aim of scientific research is typically to produce new knowledge through the use of scientific method for evaluation and dissemination in internal settings, the aim of the expert is to provide policymakers and the public with relevant and applicable knowledge that can premise political reasoning and deliberation.     

Science and Security before the Atomic Bomb: The Loyalty Case of Harald U. Sverdrup

In the summer of 1941, Harald Sverdrup, the Norwegian-born Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) in La Jolla, California, was denied security clearance to work on Navy-sponsored research in underwater acoustics applied to anti-submarine warfare. The clearance denial embarrassed the world renown oceanographer and Arctic explorer, who repeatedly offered his services to the U.S. government only to see scientists of far lesser reputation called upon to aid the war effort. The official story of Sverdrup's denial was the risk of blackmail over relatives in occupied Norway. Declassified documents tell a different story. Although Sverdrup's integrity was defended on the highest levels of U.S. science, doubt was cast upon him by members of his own institution, who accused him of being a Nazi sympathiser. Personal distrust, rooted in scientific and intellectual disagreement, spilled over into questions about Sverdrup's loyalty and judgement. These doubts were considered sufficient grounds for withholding clearance, until Roger Revelle, a former student of Sverdrup now working within the Navy, was able to obtain a limited clearance for Sverdrup to develop techniques to forecast surf conditions during amphibious assaults. After the war, this work was credited with saving many lives, but at the time it placed Sverdrup out of the mainstream of Navy-sponsored oceanographic research. In being denied access to major areas of scientific work, Sverdrup's position as a leader of American oceanography was undermined.The loyalty case of Harald Sverdrup illustrates the emergence of an institutional apparatus through which the U.S. military began to control and shape the organisation of American science in the twentieth century. Military sponsorship of scientific research, begun during the open conflicts of World War II and continuing into the simmering tensions of the Cold War, involved explicit control by the U.S. military of who had access to critical information. This in turn meant who could do science in conjunction with the military. As the U.S. Navy became the principal sponsor of oceanography in the post-war years, clearance to do military work became to a great extent clearance to do oceanography. Choices about who could be trusted were also choices about who would do science, and what kind of science they would do.     

Scientists and bureaucrats in the establishment of the John Innes horticultural institution under William Bateson

Research in Mendelian heredity was first given permanent institutional support in the U.K. at the John Innes Horticultural Institution. The path by which this was achieved is described. It is shown that Brooke-Hunt in the Board of Agriculture played a decisive part in redirecting the John Innes Bequest from a school for gardeners as intended by the testator to an institute given to research on plants of importance to the horticultural trade. The choice of William Bateson as the institute's first director is traced to the influence of a lobby of academic biologists led by J. B. Farmer. The effects of Bateson's appointment on the shape taken by the new institute and on its subsequent history are described.     

The Munsell Color System: A scientific compromise from the world of art

Color systems make accurate color specification and matching possible in science, art, and industry by defining a coordinate system for all possible color perceptions. The Munsell Color System, developed by the artist Albert Henry Munsell in the early twentieth century, has influenced color science to this day. I trace the development of the Munsell Color System from its origins in the art world to its acceptance in the scientific community.Munsell's system was the first to accurately and quantitatively describe the psychological experience of color. By considering the problems that color posed for Munsell's art community and examining his diaries and published material, I conclude that Munsell arrived at his results by remaining agnostic as to the scientific definition of color, while retaining faith that color perceptions could be objectively quantified. I argue that Munsell was able to interest the scientific community in his work because color had become a controversial topic between physicists and psychologists. Parts of Munsell's system appealed to each field, making it a workable compromise. For contrast, I suggest that three contemporary scientists with whom Munsell had contact – Wilhelm Ostwald, Ogden Rood, and Edward Titchener – did not reach the same conclusions in their color systems because they started from scientific assumptions about the nature of color.     

Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation

The recent discussion on scientific representation has focused on models and their relationship to the real world. It has been assumed that models give us knowledge because they represent their supposed real target systems. However, here agreement among philosophers of science has tended to end as they have presented widely different views on how representation should be understood. I will argue that the traditional representational approach is too limiting as regards the epistemic value of modelling given the focus on the relationship between a single model and its supposed target system, and the neglect of the actual representational means with which scientists construct models. I therefore suggest an alternative account of models as epistemic tools. This amounts to regarding them as concrete artefacts that are built by specific representational means and are constrained by their design in such a way that they facilitate the study of certain scientific questions, and learning from them by means of construction and manipulation.