Berthelot's anti-atomism: A ‘matter of taste’?

The influential French chemist Marcelin Berthelot spoke against the use of Dalton's atomic theory and Avogadro's hypothesis in the second half of the nineteenth century. This paper argues that Berthelot conceded that atomism might be acceptable as a system of conventions, but he feared the power of such conventions in constructing a realistic picture of atoms which was not warranted empirically. Equally, Berthelot's anti-atomism was a last-ditch effort to assert the place of chemistry within the tradition of natural history and to deny the possible reduction of chemical science to the laws of nineteenth-century physics.     

Number crunching vs. number theory: computers and FLT,from Kummer to SWAC (1850–1960), and beyond

The present article discusses the computational tools (both conceptual and material) used in various attempts to deal with individual cases of FLT, as well as the changing historical contexts in which these tools were developed and used, and affected research. It also explores the changing conceptions about the role of computations within the overall disciplinary picture of number theory, how they influenced research on the theorem, and the kinds of general insights thus achieved. After an overview of Kummer’s contributions and its immediate influence, I present work that favored intensive computations of particular cases of FLT as a legitimate, fruitful, and worth-pursuing number-theoretical endeavor, and that were part of a coherent and active, but essentially low-profile tradition within nineteenth century number theory. This work was related to table making activity that was encouraged by institutions and individuals whose motivations came mainly from applied mathematics, astronomy, and engineering, and seldom from number theory proper. A main section of the article is devoted to the fruitful collaboration between Harry S. Vandiver and Emma and Dick Lehmer. I show how their early work led to the hesitant introduction of electronic computers for research related with FLT. Their joint work became a milestone for computer-assisted activity in number theory at large.     

Theophrastus on Lyngurium: Medieval and Early Modern Lore from the Classical Lapidary Tradition

The ancient philosopher Theophrastus (c. 371-285 BC) described a gemstone called lyngurium, purported to be solidified lynx urine, in his work De lapidibus ('On Stones'). Knowledge of the stone passed from him to other classical authors and into the medieval lapidary tradition, but there it was almost always linked to the 'learned master Theophrastus'. Although no physical example of the stone appears to have been seen or touched in ancient, medieval, or early modern times, its physical and medicinal properties were continually reiterated and elaborated as if it did 'exist'. By the seventeenth century, it began to disappear from lapidaries, but with no attempt to explain previous authors' errors since it had never 'existed' anyway. In tracing the career of lyngurium, this study sheds some light on the transmission of knowledge from the classical world to the Renaissance and the changing criteria by which such knowledge was judged.     

Poinsinet's Edition of the Naturalis historia (1771–1782) and the Revival of Pliny in the Sciences of the Enlightenment

This paper analyses the revival of Pliny's Naturalis historia within the scientific culture of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, focusing on a French effort to produce an edition with annotations by scientists and scholars. Between the Renaissance and the early eighteenth century, the Naturalis historia had declined in scientific importance. Increasingly, it was relegated to the humanities, as we demonstrate with a review of editions. For a variety of reasons, however, scientific interest in the Naturalis historia grew in the second half of the eighteenth century. Epitomizing this interest was a plan for a scientifically annotated, Latin-French edition of the Naturalis historia. Initially coordinated by the French governmental minister Malesherbes in the 1750s, the edition was imperfectly realized by Poinsinet a few decades later. It was intended to rival two of the period's other distinguished multi-volume books of knowledge, Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie and Buffon's Histoire naturelle, to which we compare it. Besides narrating the scientific revival of the Historia naturalis during this period, we examine its causes and the factors contributing to its end in the first half of the nineteenth century.     

Measurement in French Experimental Physics from Regnault to Lippmann. Rhetoric and Theoretical Practice

This paper explores the legacy of the great French experimental physicist Victor Regnault through the example of Gabriel Lippmann, whose engagement with electrical standardization during the early 1880s was guided by Regnault's methodological precept to measure ‘directly’. Lippmann's education reveals that the theoretical practice of ‘direct’ measurement entailed eliminating extraneous physical effects through the experimental design, rather than, like physicists in Britain and Germany, making numerical ‘corrections’ to measured values. It also provides, paradoxically, exemplars of the qualitative theoretical practices that sustained Regnault's misguided ambition to avoid theory. By considering the largely negative reactions to Lippmann's proposals for selecting suitable electrical units and methods of measuring the ohm, this paper associates these theoretical practices with the ineffectual rhetorical strategies employed by Lippmann to promote his work, and thereby indicates that the practice of direct measurement was limited to French experimental physics. Whilst this result aligns readily with the existence of divergent nineteenth century British and German cultures of precision, it emerges from a very different disciplinary context in which the practice of precision electrical measurement developed independently of submarine telegraphy. This is because, as this paper illustrates, telegraphic engineering and experimental physics remained separate professions in France.     

From secondary causes to artificial instruments: Pierre-Sylvain Régis's rethinking of scholastic accounts of causation

Although several of Descartes's disciples established occasionalism as the natural outcome of Cartesianism, Pierre-Sylvain Régis forcefully resisted this conclusion by developing an account of secondary causes in which God does not immediately intervene in the natural world. In order to understand this view, it has been argued that Régis melds Aquinas's concurrentism with the new, mechanist natural philosophy defended in Cartesian physics. In this paper, I contend that such a reading of Régis's position is misleading for our understanding of both his account of secondary causality and the relationship between medieval debates and seventeenth century natural philosophy. I show that Régis's account of secondary causality denies two fundamental features at the core of the account proposed by Aquinas, namely that God acts immediately in nature and that secondary causes are per se causes. I contend that Régis's view more closely resembles a specific account of artificial instrumental causality developed by Duns Scotus. The comparison with Scotus shows that Régis is still dealing with conceptual tools that can be traced back to the scholastic tradition. Yet, Régis implements these tools to establish an account of causation that is fundamentally irreconcilable with scholastic natural philosophy.     

William Thomson's dynamical theory: An insight into a scientist's thinking

William Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, played a major role in the nineteenth century in changing scientific theory from the statical view, associated with imponderables, to the dynamical view which conceived of energy as a separate and convertible entity. Thomson's conversion from the statical to the dynamical view of nature was due to the influence of experimentalists, Michael Faraday and James Prescott Joule. It was Thomson's use of mathematical metaphor that enabled him to interpret on a theoretical level the physical explanation given by Faraday and Joule.     

Spheres of Influence: Illustration,Notation, and John Dalton's Conceptual Toolbox, 1803–1835

In the early years of the nineteenth century, the English chemist John Dalton (1766–1844) developed his atomic theory, a set of theoretical commitments describing the nature of atoms and the rules guiding their interactions and combinations. In this paper, I examine a set of conceptual and illustrative tools used by Dalton in developing his theory as well as in presenting it to the public in printed form as well as in his many public lectures. These tools—the concept of ‘atmosphere’, the pile of shot analogy, and Dalton's system of chemical notation—served not just to guide Dalton's own thinking and to make his theories clear to his various audiences, but also to bind these theories together into a coherent system, presented in its definitive form in the three volumes of A New System of Chemical Philosophy (1808, 1810, and 1827). Despite these links, Dalton's contemporaries tended to pick and choose which of his theories to accept; his system of notation failed to be adopted in part because it embodied the whole of his system indivisibly.     

A new instrument for infrared radiation measurements: the thermopile of Macedonio Melloni

Towards the second decade of the nineteenth century Seebeck discovered that when two different conductors are joined together at both ends with the two junctions kept at different temperatures, an electromotive force arises. Seebeck's discovery, thanks to Melloni, converted the thermopile into the best measuring apparatus for the study of radiation. In this paper I discuss some technical properties of the thermopile used by Melloni in his early studies on radiant heat polarization; quantify in modern terms the behaviour of the thermopile; and solve an enigma concerning its sensitivity.     

Epistemology of a believing historian: Making sense of Duhem's anti-atomism

Pierre Duhem's (1861–1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter has been traditionally attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, this traditional view position has been challenged by the claim that Duhem's opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories during the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem's opposition to atomism and provide a new framework in which to understand his rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem's philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem's resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics.     

Instrumentalizing Failure: Edison's Invention of the Carbon Microphone

For Thomas Edison, experiencing a failure did not mean that he had failed. Through an examination of the process that led to his invention of the carbon microphone, I argue that his positive approach to failure contributed both to his success as an inventor and to the functional success of his inventions. Edison's laboratory notebooks and legal testimony reveal that his seemingly erratic approach and reliance on trial and error methods in fact had a consistent direction and a rational basis, well suited to the under-determined problems he faced. The outcome of this process, the carbon microphone, contributed significantly to the commercial success of the telephone and remains in use today. Thomas Hughes has observed that nineteenth century inventors made use of the unexpected behaviour of their inventions as sources of novel phenomena to exploit in new inventions. This paper identifies other ways in which Edison made use of failure and proposes that, paradoxically, the success of technological artefacts can be determined by the thoroughness with which failure is pursued in their creation. It also notes a parallel between Edison's instrumentalizing of failure and the way in which recent philosophers of science have proposed that scientists should make use of error.     

Associationism without associative links: Thomas Brown and the associationist project

There are two roles that association played in 18th–19th century associationism. The first dominates modern understanding of the history of the concept: association is a causal link posited to explain why ideas come in the sequence they do. The second has been ignored: association is merely regularity in the trains of thought, and the target of explanation. The view of association as regularity arose in several forms throughout the tradition, but Thomas Brown (1778–1820) makes the distinction explicit. He argues that there is no associative link, and association is mere sequence. I trace this view of association through the tradition, and consider its implications: Brown's views, in particular, motivate a rethinking of the associationist tradition in psychology. Associationism was a project united by a shared explanandum phenomenon, rather than a theory united by a shared theoretical posit.     

Edward Williams Morley and the Atomic Weight of Oxygen: the Death of Prout's Hypothesis Revisited

Prout's hypothesis was influential in—if not necessary for—the establishment of the atomic weight of oxygen, a figure conclusively demonstrated in 1895. Ironically, the successful determination of oxygen's weight also led to a final refutation of the hypothesis (at least the hypothesis in the classical sense). But more than this, the end of Prout's hypothesis via the determination of oxygen's atomic weight was due to three fundamental changes that characterized the way chemistry was practised and communicated in the late nineteenth century. First, encyclopaedia‐like presentations of past atomic‐weight investigations became the focus in numerous and influential studies. Second, there was a dramatic change in the way professional publications presented investigations and experiments, characterized by experimental detail and apparatus design at the expense of theoretical discussion. Finally, the production of hydrogen became the focus of research, as it was one of the principal components of any investigation into atomic weights. Here I present Prout's hypothesis in its historical context by focusing on these three developments and their influence on the research of Edward Williams Morley. While doing so I also illustrate the way marginalized scientists were able to take advantage of their otherwise dubious position and participate in an active and important role in atomic‐weight investigations.     

Prelude to chemistry in industry

The Smith's Prize competition was established in Cambridge in 1768 by the will of Robert Smith (1689-1768). By fostering an interest in the study of applied mathematics, the competition contributed towards the success in mathematical physics that was to become the hallmark of Cambridge mathematics during the second half of the nineteenth century. Perceptions of Smith's intentions were to play a part in discussions about the content and balance of the mathematics curriculum, as may be seen in the Airy quotation in the title. In the twentieth century the competition acted to stimulate the formalization of Cambridge postgraduate research in mathematics. Throughout its existence the competition has played a significant role by providing a springboard for graduates considering an academic career and the majority of prize-winners have gone on to become professional mathematicians or physicists. In seeking the reasons behind the competition's success, attention has been paid to the life and work of Robert Smith, the intention behind his bequest, and the history of the competition from its origins until 1940.     

Unwarranted assumptions: Claude Bernard and the growth of the vera causa standard

The physiologist Claude Bernard was an important nineteenth-century methodologist of the life sciences. Here I place his thought in the context of the history of the vera causa standard, arguably the dominant epistemology of science in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Its proponents held that in order for a cause to be legitimately invoked in a scientific explanation, the cause must be shown by direct evidence to exist and to be competent to produce the effects ascribed to it. Historians of scientific method have argued that in the course of the nineteenth century the vera causa standard was superseded by a more powerful consequentialist epistemology, which also admitted indirect evidence for the existence and competence of causes. The prime example of this is the luminiferous ether, which was widely accepted, in the absence of direct evidence, because it entailed verified observational consequences and, in particular, successful novel predictions. According to the received view, the vera causa standard's demand for direct evidence of existence and competence came to be seen as an impracticable and needless restriction on the scope of legitimate inquiry into the fine structure of nature. The Mill-Whewell debate has been taken to exemplify this shift in scientific epistemology, with Whewell's consequentialism prevailing over Mill's defense of the older standard. However, Bernard's reflections on biological practice challenge the received view. His methodology marked a significant extension of the vera causa standard that made it both powerful and practicable. In particular, Bernard emphasized the importance of detection procedures in establishing the existence of unobservable entities. Moreover, his sophisticated notion of controlled experimentation permitted inferences about competence even in complex biological systems. In the life sciences, the vera causa standard began to flourish precisely around the time of its alleged abandonment.     

William Hasledine Pepys FRS: A Life in Scientific Research,Learned Societies and Technical Enterprise

In a long and many-sided career, William Hasledine Pepys (1775-1856) contributed significantly to the advancement of the chemical and physical sciences during the first half of the nineteenth century. As an original investigator he determined, in collaboration with William Allen, the composition of carbon dioxide, and the density of ammonia, and elucidated the chemical phenomena of respiration in man, animals, and plants. The success of these researches was largely due to the use of ingenious apparatus of his own invention and design. In the field of experimental physics, he investigated several aspects of the recently discovered Voltaic electricity: his 'Voltaic coil', consisting of only two plates, but of very large dimensions, was particularly suited for investigating electromagnetic phenomena and was so used in Davy's researches. Pepys was one of the co-founders of the Mineralogical and Geological Societies, and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1808. As a prominent member of both the Royal and London Institutions, he held honorary office as Manager and Vice-President, contributing materially to the direction of the affairs of these bodies. Pepys was a friend of Humphry Davy and was acquainted with nearly all the leading scientists and medical men of the day. At the same time, he superintended a notable manufacture of surgical instruments in the City, and promoted by his active directorship the affairs of two public companies, both pioneers in their technological fields, namely the Imperial Continental Gas Association, which was active in introducing the new gas illumination to cities and towns across Europe, and the General Steam Navigation Company, which first maintained a regular passenger and cargo service to Continental ports by the exclusive use of steam-propelled vessels. Pepys' advice in scientific and technical matters was widely sought and freely given; he retained his mental powers to the end of his long life, fulfilling his professional commitments until a few days before his death.     

From Cutting Nature at Its Joints to Measuring It: New Kinds and New Kinds of People in Biology

In the received version of the development of science, natural kinds are established in the preliminary stages (natural history) and made more precise by measurement (exact science). By examining the move from nineteenth- to twentieth-century biology, this paper unpacks the notion of species as ‘natural kinds’ and grounds for discourse, questioning received notions about both kinds and species. Life sciences in the nineteenth century established several ‘monster-barring’ techniques to block disputes about the precise definition of species. Counterintuitively, precision and definition brought dispute and disrupted exchange. Thus, any attempt to add precision was doomed to failure. By intervening and measuring, the new experimental biology dislocated the established links between natural kinds and kinds of people and institutions. New kinds were built in new places. They were made to measure from the very start. This paper ends by claiming that there was no long-standing ‘species problem’ in the history of biology. That problem is a later construction of the ‘modern synthesis’, well after the disruption of ‘kinds’ and kinds of people. Only then would definitions and precision matter. A new, non-linguistic, take on the incommensurability thesis is hinted at.     

Qualitative vs quantitative conceptions of homogeneity in nineteenth century dimensional analysis

The emergence of dimensional analysis in the early nineteenth century involved a redefinition of the pre-existing concepts of homogeneity and dimensions, which entailed a shift from a qualitative to a quantitative conception of these notions. Prior to the nineteenth century, these concepts had been used as criteria to assess the soundness of operations and relations between geometrical quantities. Notably, the terms in such relations were required to be homogeneous, which meant that they needed to have the same geometrical dimensions. The latter reflected the nature of the quantities in question, such as volume vs area. As natural philosophy came to encompass non-geometrical quantities, the need arose to generalize the concept of homogeneity. In 1822, Jean Baptiste Fourier consequently redefined it to be the condition an equation must satisfy in order to remain valid under a change of units, and the ‘dimension' correspondingly became the power of a conversion factor. When these innovations eventually found an echo in France and Great Britain, in the second half of the century, tensions arose between the former, qualitative understanding of dimensions as reflecting the nature of physical quantities, and the new, quantitative conception based on unit conversion and measurement. The emergence of dimensional analysis thus provides a case study of how existing rules and concepts can find themselves redefined in the context of wider conceptual changes; in the present case this redefinition involved a generalization, but also a shift in meaning which led to conceptual tensions.