The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.     

Debunking material induction

In this paper, we present an explanatory objection to Norton's material theory of induction, as applied to predictive inferences. According to the objection we present, there is an explanatory disconnect between our beliefs about the future and the relevant future facts. We argue that if we recognize such a disconnect, we are no longer rationally entitled to our future beliefs.     

History of Science through Koyré's Lenses

Alexandre Koyré was one of the most prominent historians of science of the twentieth century. The standard interpretation of Koyré is that he falls squarely within the internalist camp of historians of science—that he focuses on the history of the ideas themselves, eschewing cultural and sociological interpretations regarding the influence of ideologies and institutions on the development of science. When we read what Koyré has to say about his historical studies (and most of what others have said about them), we find him embracing and championing this Platonic view of his work. Ultimately I think this interpretation of Koyré's history of science is lopsided and in need of correction. I claim, rather, that a careful reading of Koyré's work suggests that a tension exists between internal and external methodological considerations. The external considerations stem from Koyré's commitment to the unity of human thought and the influence he admits that the ‘transscientifiques’ (philosophy, metaphysics, religion) have on the development of science. I suggest in conclusion then, that if we are to put a philosophical label on his work, rather than ‘Platonist’, as has been the custom, ‘Hegelian’ makes a better fit.     

Inductive reasoning in the context of discovery: Analogy as an experimental stratagem in the history and philosophy of science

Building on Norton's “material theory of induction,” this paper shows through careful historical analysis that analogy can act as a methodological principle or stratagem, providing experimentalists with a useful framework to assess data and devise novel experiments. Although this particular case study focuses on late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century experiments on the properties and composition of acids, the results of this investigation may be extended and applied to other research programs. A stage in-between what Steinle calls “exploratory experimentation” and robust theory, I argue that analogy encouraged research to substantiate why the likenesses should outweigh the differences (or vice versa) when evaluating results and designing experiments.     

Inference to the best explanation and Norton's material theory of induction

I argue that we should consider Norton's material theory of induction as consisting of two largely independent claims. First, there is the claim that material facts license inductions - a claim which I interpret as a type of contextualism about induction. Second, there is the claim that there are no universal rules of induction. While a good case can be made for the first claim, I believe that Norton's arguments for the second claim are lacking. In particular, I spell out Norton's argument against the claim that all induction may be reduced to inference to the best explanation, and argue that it is not persuasive. Rejecting this part of Norton's theory does not however require us to abandon the first claim that material facts license inductions. In this way, I distinguish the parts of the material theory of induction we should happily accept from the parts about which we should be more skeptical.     

Overmathematisation in game theory: pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme against the Epistemic Programme

The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms of unjustified degrees of mathematisation in Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme. While this programme’s mathematical models were often inspired by purely mathematical concerns rather than the economic phenomena they were intended to model, the Epistemic Programme’s models were developed with a keen eye to the role beliefs and desires play in strategic interaction between rational economic agents playing games; that is, their interactive epistemology. The Epistemic Programme succeeded in developing mathematical models formalising aspects of strategic interaction that remained implicit in the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme (NERP) owing to an unjustified degree of mathematisation. As a result, the Epistemic Programme is the more successful theory.     

How to think about analogical inferences: A reply to Norton

In this paper, I raise some worries with John D. Norton's application of his material theory of induction to the study of analogical inferences. Skeptical that these worries can be properly addressed, I propose a principle to guide the philosophical research on analogical inferences and argue for its usefulness.     

Kuhn, the correspondence theory of truth and coherentist epistemology

Kuhn argued against both the correspondence theory of truth and convergent realism. Although he likely misunderstood the nature of the correspondence theory, which it seems he wrongly believed to be an epistemic theory, Kuhn had an important epistemic point to make. He maintained that any assessment of correspondence between beliefs and reality is not possible, and therefore, the acceptance of beliefs and the presumption of their truthfulness has to be decided on the basis of other criteria. I will show that via Kuhn’s suggested epistemic values, specifically via problem-solving, his philosophy can be incorporated into a coherentist epistemology. Further, coherentism is, in principle, compatible with convergent realism. However, an argument for increasing likeness to truth requires appropriate historical continuity. Kuhn maintained that the history of science is full of discontinuity, and therefore, the historical condition of convergent realism is not satisfied.     

Epistemic divergence and the publicity of scientific methods

Epistemic divergence occurs when different investigators give different answers to the same question using evidence-collecting methods that are not public. Without following the principle that scientific methods must be public, scientific communities risk epistemic divergence. I explicate the notion of public method and argue that, to avoid the risk of epistemic divergence, scientific communities should (and do) apply only methods that are public.     

The theory theory thrice over: the child as scientist, Superscientist or social institution?

Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) a rational reconstruction of a Superscientist, or (iii) the scientific community. We argue that (i) is false, (ii) is non-empirical (which is problematic since the theory theory is supposed to be a bold empirical hypothesis), and (iii) is either false or doesn't make enough sense to have a truth-value. We conclude that the theory theory is an interesting failure. Its failure points the way to a full, empirical picture of scientific development, one that marries a concern with the social dynamics of science to a psychological theory of scientific cognition.     

The goal of explanation

I defend the claim that understanding is the goal of explanation against various persistent criticisms, especially the criticism that understanding is not truth-connected in the appropriate way, and hence is a merely psychological (rather than epistemic) state. Part of the reason why understanding has been dismissed as the goal of explanation, I suggest, is because the psychological dimension of the goal of explanation has itself been almost entirely neglected. In turn, the psychological dimension of understanding—the Aha! experience, the sense that a certain explanation “feels right”, and so on—has been conspicuously overemphasized. I try to correct for both of these exaggerations. Just as the goal of explanation includes a richer psychological—including phenomenological—dimension than is generally acknowledged, so too understanding has a stronger truth connection than is generally acknowledged.     

Evidence for the induction and release of pancreatic folylpolyglutamate hydrolase by the ingestion of folyl polyglutamates in the rat

Pteroyl polyglutamate hydrolase (folyl conjugase), which hydrolyses the dietary polyglutamyl folates into simple forms prior to absorption, has been shown to be induced in rat pancreas in response to dietary polyglutamyl folates but not by ingestion of synthetic unconjugated folates. Folate absorption, as measured by the rise in serum folate levels after ingestion, of dietary conjugated folates is impaired in pancreatectomised animals whereas absorption of synthetic simple folate is not. A severe build-up of folyl conjugase is observed in the lumen of control but not in pancreatectomised animals after dietary folate ingestion. These results taken together would suggest that dietary folates are hydrolysed to monoglutamyl forms suitable for absorption in the lumen; the hydrolysis is catalysed by a luminal folyl conjugase of pancreatic origin induced by dietary conjugated folates.     

The scales of experience: Introduction to the special issue Experiencing the global environment

The Scales of Experience introduces the special issue Experiencing the Global Environment by focusing on three dimensions of the theme that are reflected to various degrees in the constitutive essays. First, the introduction highlights the links between the epistemological and political contexts of the historical constitution and development of the global environment (or global environments) in the earth and environmental sciences from the late nineteenth century to today. Second, it argues for a historical approach to the complex concept of scientific experience, whose mutable and contingent qualities are demonstrated by the contributions to the special volume. Lastly, the introduction presents one of the central issues to be tackled by the essays to follow: the development – and, at times, the failure – of strategies and technologies to bridge the seemingly incommensurate gulf between individual, localized experience and the all-encompassing scale of the global environment.     

Rethinking the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge

It is widely believed that the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge comes into serious conflict with mainstream epistemology. I argue that the programme has two aspects—one modest, and the other less so. The programme’s modest aspect—best represented by the “symmetry thesis”—does not contain anything to threaten much of the epistemological mainstream, but does come into conflict with a certain kind of epistemological “externalism”. The immodest aspect, however—in the form of “finitism”—pushes the programme towards a radical form of relativism about truth. Accepting these points will allow us to put an end to much unnecessary debate surrounding the strong programme, and allow a more fruitful discussion to begin.     

Computer models and the evidence of anthropogenic climate change: An epistemology of variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis

To study climate change, scientists employ computer models, which approximate target systems with various levels of skill. Given the imperfection of climate models, how do scientists use simulations to generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change? Addressing a similar question in the context of biological modelling, Levins (1966) proposed an account grounded in robustness analysis. Recent philosophical discussions dispute the confirmatory power of robustness, raising the question of how the results of computer modelling studies contribute to the body of evidence supporting hypotheses about climate change. Expanding on Staley’s (2004) distinction between evidential strength and security, and Lloyd’s (2015) argument connecting variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis, I address this question with respect to recent challenges to the epistemology robustness analysis. Applying this epistemology to case studies of climate change, I argue that, despite imperfections in climate models, and epistemic constraints on variety-of-evidence reasoning and robustness analysis, this framework accounts for the strength and security of evidence supporting climatological inferences, including the finding that global warming is occurring and its primary causes are anthropogenic.     

Effect of human serum on alkaline phosphatase induction in cultured human tumor cells

Summary The continuous cell lines T 24 and HT-29, derived from human bladder and colon carcinomas, produce term-placental and intestinal alkaline phosphatase, respectively. Growth in hyperosmolar medium or exposure to prednisolone or sodium butyrate induces increased enzyme levels, and combinations of inducers elicit synergistic activity increases. The effect of the inducing agents is strikingly diminished when cells are grown in the presence, of high concentrations of human serum, and the synergistic increases are essentially abolished. Major human serum protein fractions do not affect alkaline phosphatase induction.     

自励异步发电机带载稳态的解析计算

从自励异步发电机的暂态等效电路出发,基于其在两相静止坐标系上的状态空间数学模型,对其带载建压暂稳态过程提出了应用Lyapunov稳定性理论的整体性分析方法.依据理论分析方法分析得到了带载自励建压达到稳态的过程之应用暂态数学模型表示的稳态条件.解极限环条件得出了定子频率和转子转速的解析计算式,以及确保自励建压的负载取值范围和电机磁路过度饱和稳态励磁电感的解析关系式;为求解稳态运行点条件,提出了一种基于物理背景的等价转化解析计算方法,解得了稳态运行点的解析计算式.算例分析检验了稳态条件的唯一组解析解.实测值与计算结果相互吻合,验证了稳态条件解析计算式的正确性、科学性和有效性,表明了通用性和工程参考价值,解决了长期以来对异步发电机暂稳态运行性能无法解析计算的难题.理论分析方法适用于具有动力学特性的其他类型电力系统运行分析.     

The stage on which our ingenious play is performed: Kant's epistemology of Weltkenntnis

This paper focuses on Kant's account of physical geography and his theory of the Earth. In spelling out the epistemological foundations of Kant's physical geography, the paper examines 1) their connection to the mode of holding-to-be-true, mathematical construction and empirical certainty and 2) their implications for Kant's view of cosmopolitan right. Moreover, by showing the role played by the mathematical model of the Earth for the foundations of Kant's Doctrine of Right, the exact relationship between the latter and physical geography is highlighted. Finally, this paper shows how, in Kant's view, the progress of physical geography can be assured if and only if the free circulation of human beings is established and regulated by law. Therefore, examining the mutual relationship between the theory of Earth and the foundations of right opens new perspectives on the relationship between epistemology and practical philosophy within Kant's system.