玻尔的测量实在观

本文从EPR悖论引出了实在观问题，在澄清了科学实在观的概念及简要概括了传统实在观的基本点之后。重点论述了玻尔测量实在观的内容；在测量问题上，突出了测量结构的整体性和测量结果的互补性，以实现理论描述的相对性与客观性的统一；在实在问题上，划定了现象实在与本体实在的界限，在强调建立在测量经验基础上的现象实在的同时也不否认本体实在。玻尔的这种兼容哲学对科学哲学的发展有很大的推动作用。     

范·弗拉森关于量子测量的模态解释

范·弗拉森的量子测量的模态解释不仅是他的量子力学哲学理论的核心,也是他的一般科学哲学理论--建构经验论--的主要科学思想基础.本文主要从量子测量的解释问题,测量的模态解释的主要思想内容和模态解释的意义等几个层次较深入浅出地介绍范·弗拉森的量子测量解释理论,并概括地说明它与范·弗拉森的整个量子力学哲学及与他的建构经验论的关系.     

量子测量的相对态解释及其理解

本文系统地考察了量子测量的相对态解释语境，阐述了解读相对态解释的两种意义语境——多世界解释与多心解释——的主要观点。     

论费耶阿本德后期的科学实在观

从"实在世界"的实在性问题、"现象世界"的实在性以及主体与"实在世界"的关系等方面系统地阐述了费耶阿本德后期的科学实在论思想,并从本体论和认识论角度予以评析.     

量子测量的玻姆解释语境

本文立足于玻姆对量子测量过程的本体论阐述与量子势和主动信息概念,分析了玻姆理解量子客体的本体论语境和量子测量过程的整体性语境,揭示了玻姆的整体性概念与玻尔的整体性概念之间的区别与联系,剖析了在量子测量的玻姆解释语境中,微观粒子与经典粒子之间存在的异同关系。     

从物理实在观的变革到关系实在论

关系实在论是我们在近年来的哲学探讨中形成的一种关于客观实在的哲学观点或理论。尽管在实在问题上注意到关系这一范畴的重要性的哲学学说可以说古已有之,但我们的关系实在论,却主要来源于现代物理学,特别是量子力学中物理实在观的变革的启示。量子力学自建立迄今已60余年,一方面其形式体系的严谨自洽和实验上的巨大成功使它无可争议地为物理学家们所广泛接受和运用;另一方面却由于其正统诠释在波函数的本性,测量问题和EPR佯谬等问题上涉及模型的非图象化、性质的不确定性和状态的非定域性,而与经典的物理学图象及其实在概念大相径庭。因此数十年来,关于量子力学描述物理实在的完备性问题和它的诠释问题,始终是物理学和科学哲学中的热点之一。我们认为,这场争论     

量子实在:从量子力学到量子通讯

1935年为论证量子力学的完备性提出的EPR悖论开启了量子信息思想火花。20世纪80年代,由本奈特和多依奇等人研究、倡导和推进引发了量子信息研究的爆发。作为用量子力学机制处理信息问题的一种技术手段,量子信息技术同时也是对量子力学所描述的量子实在的技术性证明。信息技术的广泛使用不仅改变了普通人的生活,同时也对学者们理解我们存在的世界提供了技术方法和深刻的思想思路。从历史上考察这一技术的发展过程,有利于我们对这一新生技术的理解。     

量子测量中的多世界理论及其意义分析

多世界解释理论作为量子测量解释的一种,已经存在了半个多世纪。它从相关态解释开始,经过漫长的沉默期、发展期逐渐成为主流物理学家和哲学家关注的热点。该理论的确立为量子测量问题提出了一致的解释,更为量子理论谋求到坚实的、另类的实在论基础。它捍卫了科学理论的真理性,并揭示了现代量子理论的发展趋势。本文分析多世界理论的哲学根源,概述其在量子测量中的研究路径,探讨其哲学意义,期望有助于人们全面了解多世界理论。     

格罗夫算法、量子控制及其对量子测量的意义

波函数具有可控性。量子算法是幺正算法,能够对一个量子系统进行变换(量子控制),且变换前后的经典物理意义并不发生变化。格罗夫算法具有放大波函数的系数的能力。量子算法对被测量子系统的控制,在一定程度上体现为对量子测量进行控制,于是,测量后显现的经典实在并不是量子实在的任意所为。量子控制是面对实事本身,是一种现象学式的处理方式,它不去追究量子系统有什么样的结构。     

Quantum Nonlocality and the Challenge to Scientific Realism

In this essay I examine various aspects of the nearcentury-long debate concerning the conceptualfoundations of quantum mechanics and the problems ithas posed for physicists and philosophers fromEinstein to the present. Most crucial here is theissue of realism and the question whether quantumtheory is compatible with any kind of realist orcausal-explanatory account which goes beyond theempirical-predictive data. This was Einstein's chiefconcern in the famous series of exchanges with NielsBohr when he refused to accept the truth orcompleteness of a doctrine (orthodox QM) which ruledsuch questions to be strictly inadmissible. I discussthe later history of quantum-theoretical debate withparticular reference to the issue of nonlocality,i.e., the phenomenon of superluminal(faster-than-light) interaction betweenwidely-separated particles. Then I show how thestandard `Copenhagen' interpretation of QM hasinfluenced current anti-realist orontological-relativist approaches to philosophy ofscience. Indeed, there are clear signs that somephilosophers have retreated from a realist positionvery largely in response to just these problems. So itis important to ask exactly why – on what scientificor philosophical grounds – any preferred alternative(causal-realist) construal should have been ruled outas a matter of orthodox QM wisdom. Moreconstructively, my paper presents various arguments infavour of one such alternative, the `hidden-variables'theory developed since the early 1950s by David Bohmand consistently marginalised by proponents of theCopenhagen doctrine.     

Salmon and Van Fraassen on the Existence of Unobservable Entities: A Matter of Interpretation of Probability

A careful analysis of Salmon’s Theoretical Realism and van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism shows that both share a common origin: the requirement of literal construal of theories inherited by the Standard View. However, despite this common starting point, Salmon and van Fraassen strongly disagree on the existence of unobservable entities. I argue that their different ontological commitment towards the existence of unobservables traces back to their different views on the interpretation of probability via different conceptions of induction. In fact, inferences to statements claiming the existence of unobservable entities are inferences to probabilistic statements, whence the crucial importance of the interpretation of probability.     

论空间时间的量子观念

本文论述了空间时间量子观念的物理内容，并给出某些哲学反思特别是时空和真空的关系和不同之处。     

Quantum Superpositions and the Representation of Physical Reality Beyond Measurement Outcomes and Mathematical Structures

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical (actualist) representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the (metaphysical) presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions.     

自然观的转型

本文提出人类第一阶段的自然观是人类敬畏自然的自然观，人类考虑不到生命和环境会有系统地进化或衰退。这是客体高于主体的自然观；第二阶段的自然观是生命的进化观，认为持续进化的人类可以主宰自然，战胜自然，是主体高于客体的自然观；第三阶段是生命的诞生，发展到衰亡的全过程的自然观，是人类主动尊重自然规律的自然观，演化又回归了客体高于主体的自然观。     

科学史的辉格解释与反辉格解释

如何看待和解释科学的历史?用今天的观点和标准去审视衡量,还是以历史的眼光和尺度去看待、复原历史,西方史学中有"辉格史学"和"反辉格史学"之争.本文试图通过对这一历史的梳理说明能否正确处理这两种历史解释方式,必须有一种真正的辩证眼光.科学史家的任务不是给过去"打分",而是理解科学、理解科学的历史、理解科学历史长河中的科学家.