Between relativism and pluralism: Philosophical and political relativism in Feyerabend's late work

Relativism is one of the most problematic terms associated with philosophical discourse, with Feyerabend considered among the most important twentieth century theorists subscribing to it. This paper provides a detailed overview of relativist positions advanced in Feyerabend's mid-to-late work and investigates the associated epistemic and political applications. Emphasis is placed on how Feyerabend supported certain aspects of relativism, and at what stage he rejected others. It is noted that Feyerabend had already imposed limitations on relativism in Farewell to Reason, in which he entertained the possibility of epistemic definition within stable contexts, and advanced the notion that opportunities and equality associated with political and cultural units could only be valid within a democratic system. In Conquest of Abundance, political relativism is largely discarded, while epistemological relativism is increasingly treated as an appeal for diversity in all areas.In this re-reading of his work, it becomes clear that Feyerabend was already advocating a moderate form of epistemic and political relativism in the middle of his career, which he subsequently developed in the direction of “ontological pluralism” in his later work. This paper thus shows that Feyerabend's relativism should not be completely rejected, but rather that it continues to offer interesting food for thought.     

Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of ‘anything goes’

The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan ‘anything goes’, was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (Lloyd 1997; Staley 1999; Munévar 2000; Farrell 2003; Tsou 2003; Oberheim 2006; Roe 2009). This makes anarchism a mere criticism rather than a substantive position in its own right. In this paper, I argue that Feyerabend held anarchism as a positive thesis. Specifically, I present two possible interpretations of anarchism: one where anarchism is entailed by Feyerabend's radical view of pluralism and another where scientists must be ‘methodological opportunists’, which Feyerabend held simultaneously from at least 1970. I then consider how these positions fare against the more influential criticisms of anarchism (Nagel 1977; Worrall 1978; Godfrey-Smith 2003). I conclude by suggesting two avenues to constraining a literal interpretation of ‘anything goes’ on Feyerabendian grounds.     

A tale of three theories: Feyerabend and Popper on progress and the aim of science

In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: (i) the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery (1935/1959); (ii) the theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations (1963); (iii) the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put forward in the essay “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” (1965) and defended as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). It is argued that, contrary to what Feyerabend scholars have predominantly assumed, Feyerabend's changing attitude towards falsificationism—which he often advocated at the beginning of his career, and vociferously attacked in the 1970s and 1980s—must be explained by taking into account not only Feyerabend's very peculiar view of the aim of science, but also Popper's changing account of progress.     

Feyerabend's perspectivism

Although, Feyerabend himself seems never to have used the term ‘perspectivism’ to designate a philosophical position, I think his views about science are very well characterized as perspectival. In fact, his later writings contain much that contributes to current thinking about perspectivism. I would like, therefore, to distinguish my own perspectivism from Feyerabend's. In the end, I will argue, his perspectivism is lacking enough of the critical bite that the younger Feyerabend found so attractive in Popper's philosophy.     

Rediscovering Einstein's legacy: How Einstein anticipates Kuhn and Feyerabend on the nature of science

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend promote incommensurability as a central component of their conflicting accounts of the nature of science. This paper argues that in so doing, they both develop Albert Einstein's views, albeit in different directions. Einstein describes scientific revolutions as conceptual replacements, not mere revisions, endorsing ‘Kant-on-wheels’ metaphysics in light of ‘world change’. Einstein emphasizes underdetermination of theory by evidence, rational disagreement in theory choice, and the non-neutrality of empirical evidence. Einstein even uses the term ‘incommensurable’ specifically to apply to challenges posed to comparatively evaluating scientific theories in 1949, more than a decade before Kuhn and Feyerabend. This analysis shows how Einstein anticipates substantial components of Kuhn and Feyerabend's views, and suggests that there are strong reasons to suspect that Kuhn and Feyerabend were directly inspired by Einstein's use of the term ‘incommensurable’, as well as his more general methodological and philosophical reflections.     

Challenging Expertise: Paul Feyerabend vs. Harry Collins & Robert Evans on democracy,public participation and scientific authority: Paul Feyerabend vs. Harry Collins & Robert Evans on scientific authority and public participation

This paper compares Feyerabend's arguments in Science in a Free Society to the controversial theory of expertise proposed by Harry Collins and Robert Evans as a Third Wave of Science Studies. Is the legitimacy of democratic decisions threatened by the unquestioned authority of scientific advice? Or does, on the contrary, science need protection from too much democratic participation in technical decisions? Where Feyerabend's political relativism envisions democratic society as inherently pluralist and demands equal contribution of all traditions and worldviews to public decision-making, Collins and Evans hold a conception of elective modernism, defending the reality and value of technical expertise and arguing that science deserves a privileged status in modern democracies, because scientific values are also democratic values. I will argue that Feyerabend's political relativism provides a valuable framework for the evaluation of Collins' and Evans' theory of expertise. By constructing a dialog between Feyerabend and this more recent approach in Science and Technology Studies, the aim of this article is not only to show where the two positions differ and in what way they might be reconciled, but also how Feyerabend's philosophy provides substantial input to contemporary debate.     

(Mis)Understanding scientific disagreement: Success versus pursuit-worthiness in theory choice

Scientists often diverge widely when choosing between research programs. This can seem to be rooted in disagreements about which of several theories, competing to address shared questions or phenomena, is currently the most epistemically or explanatorily valuable—i.e. most successful. But many such cases are actually more directly rooted in differing judgments of pursuit-worthiness, concerning which theory will be best down the line, or which addresses the most significant data or questions. Using case studies from 16^th-century astronomy and 20^th-century geology and biology, I argue that divergent theory choice is thus often driven by considerations of scientific process, even where direct epistemic or explanatory evaluation of its final products appears more relevant. Broadly following Kuhn's analysis of theoretical virtues, I suggest that widely shared criteria for pursuit-worthiness function as imprecise, mutually-conflicting values. However, even Kuhn and others sensitive to pragmatic dimensions of theory ‘acceptance’, including the virtue of fruitfulness, still commonly understate the role of pursuit-worthiness—especially by exaggerating the impact of more present-oriented virtues, or failing to stress how ‘competing’ theories excel at addressing different questions or data. This framework clarifies the nature of the choice and competition involved in theory choice, and the role of alternative theoretical virtues.     

Hilbert's axiomatic method and Carnap's general axiomatics

This paper compares the axiomatic method of David Hilbert and his school with Rudolf Carnap's general axiomatics that was developed in the late 1920s, and that influenced his understanding of logic of science throughout the 1930s, when his logical pluralism developed. The distinct perspectives become visible most clearly in how Richard Baldus, along the lines of Hilbert, and Carnap and Friedrich Bachmann analyzed the axiom system of Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry—the paradigmatic example for the axiomatization of science. Whereas Hilbert's axiomatic method started from a local analysis of individual axiom systems in which the foundations of mathematics as a whole entered only when establishing the system's consistency, Carnap and his Vienna Circle colleague Hans Hahn instead advocated a global analysis of axiom systems in general. A primary goal was to evade, or formalize ex post, mathematicians' ‘material’ talk about axiom systems for such talk was held to be error-prone and susceptible to metaphysics.     

Mechanisms,the interventionist theory,and the ability to use causal relationships

In the area of social science, in particular, although we have developed methods for reliably discovering the existence of causal relationships, we are not very good at using these to design effective social policy. Cartwright argues that in order to improve our ability to use causal relationships, it is essential to develop a theory of causation that makes explicit the connections between the nature of causation, our best methods for discovering causal relationships, and the uses to which these are put. I argue that Woodward's interventionist theory of causation is uniquely suited to meet Cartwright's challenge. More specifically, interventionist mechanisms can provide the bridge from ‘hunting causes’ to ‘using them’, if interventionists (i) tell us more about the nature of these mechanisms, and (ii) endorse the claim that it is these mechanisms—or whatever constitutes them—that make causal claims true. I illustrate how having an understanding of interventionist mechanisms can allow us to put causal knowledge to use via a detailed example from organic chemistry.     

The Philosopher's conception of Mathesis Universalis from Descartes to Leibniz

In Descartes, the concept of a ‘universal science’ differs from that of a ‘mathesis universalis’, in that the latter is simply a general theory of quantities and proportions. Mathesis universalis is closely linked with mathematical analysis; the theorem to be proved is taken as given, and the analyst seeks to discover that from which the theorem follows. Though the analytic method is followed in the Meditations, Descartes is not concerned with a mathematisation of method; mathematics merely provides him with examples. Leibniz, on the other hand, stressed the importance of a calculus as a way of representing and adding to what is known, and tried to construct a ‘universal calculus’ as part of his proposed universal symbolism, his ‘characteristica universalis’. The characteristica universalis was never completed—it proved impossible, for example, to list its basic terms, the ‘alphabet of human thoughts’—but parts of it did come to fruition, in the shape of Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus and his various logical calculi. By his construction of these calculi, Leibniz proved that it is possible to operate with concepts in a purely formal way.     

Relativism in Feyerabend's later writings

This paper reconstructs, and distinguishes between, Feyerabend's different forms of relativism in his later writings. Science in a Free Society remains close to familiar forms of relativism, while, at the same time, developing an original but under-argued form of political relativism, and rejecting “conversion” models of cultural exchange. Farewell to Reason moves away from common renderings of relativism, and develops a range of different new forms. Central here are links between relativism, skepticism and infallibilism. In the last six years of his life, Feyerabend often criticizes a peculiar radical form of relativism that arguably no-one has ever proposed or defended. In the same context, Feyerabend sketches an “ontological” form of relativism. It combines “Kantian humility”, metaphysical pluralism and constructivism.     

Introduction: Reappraising Paul Feyerabend

This volume is devoted to a reappraisal of the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. It has four aims. The first is to reassess his already well-known work from the 1960s and 1970s in light of contemporary developments in the history and philosophy of science. The second is to explore themes in his neglected later work, including recently published and previously unavailable writings. The third is to assess the contributions that Feyerabend can make to contemporary debate, on topics such as perspectivism, realism, and political philosophy of science. The fourth and final aim is to reconsider Feyerabend's place within the history of philosophy of science in the light of new scholarship.     

The rise of western rationalism: Paul Feyerabend's story

I summarize certain aspects of Paul Feyerabend's account of the development of Western rationalism, show the ways in which that account is supposed to run up against an alternative, that of Karl Popper, and then try to give a preliminary comparison of the two. My interest is primarily in whether what Feyerabend called his ‘story’ constitutes a possible history of our epistemic concepts and their trajectory. I express some grave reservations about that story, and about Feyerabend's framework, finding Popper's views less problematic here. However, I also suggest that one important aspect of Feyerabend's material, his treatment of religious belief, can be given an interpretation which makes it tenable, and perhaps preferable to a Popperian approach.     

Rehabilitating the regulative use of reason: Kant on empirical and chemical laws

In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant asserts that laws of nature “carry with them an expression of necessity” (A159/B198). There is, however, widespread interpretive disagreement regarding the nature and source of the necessity of empirical laws of natural sciences in Kant's system. It is especially unclear how chemistry—a science without a clear, straightforward connection to the a priori principles of the understanding—could contain such genuine, empirical laws. Existing accounts of the necessity of causal laws unfortunately fail to illuminate the possibility of non-physical laws. In this paper, I develop an alternative, ‘ideational’ account of natural laws, according to which ideas of reason necessitate the laws of some non-physical sciences. Chemical laws, for instance, are grounded on ideas of the elements, and the chemist aims to reduce her phenomena to these elements via experimentation. Although such ideas are beyond the possibility of experience, their postulation is necessary for the achievement of reason's theoretical ends: the unification and explanation of the cognitions of science.     

The Replication of Hertz's Cathode Ray Experiments

I reappraise in detail Hertz's cathode ray experiments. I show that, contrary to Buchwald's (1995) evaluation, the core experiment establishing the electrostatic properties of the rays was successfully replicated by Perrin (probably) and Thomson (certainly). Buchwald's discussion of ‘current purification’ is shown to be a red herring. My investigation of the origin of Buchwald's misinterpretation of this episode reveals that he was led astray by a focus on what Hertz ‘could do’—his experimental resources. I argue that one should focus instead on what Hertz wanted to achieve—his experimental goals. Focusing on these goals, I find that his explicit and implicit requirements for a successful investigation of the rays’ properties are met by Perrin and Thomson. Thus, even by Hertz's standards, they did indeed replicate his experiment.     

Against defaultism and towards localism in the contingency/inevitability conversation: Or,why we should shut up about putting-up

Philosophers and historians of science have for some time now debated whether the results of current science are ‘contingent’ or ‘inevitable’. Scholars have noted that inevitabilism often enjoys the status of a presumptive default position. Consequently, contingentists are, from the outset, lumbered with the burden of proof. This is evident in the case of the inevitabilist demand that the contingentist “put up or shut up” (PUSU). This paper adds to the existing case which says that inevitabilism's default-status is unjustified. However, whilst some have suggested that contingentism should replace inevitabilism as the default position, I argue that the contingency/inevitability (C/I) conversation should proceed sans default. This move is motivated largely by my claim that the C/I issue is best conceived as a ‘local’, rather than a global or universal one. The main problem with taking inevitabilism or contingentism as the default is the globalist nature of such a tack. Whilst localism is arguably an emergent reality of the growing C/I literature, its implications have not been fully realised. I suggest that fully and explicitly embracing localism, including the closely related move of doing away with defaults, represents the most promising way forward for the C/I conversation. In addition, I will show how these moves entail that we stop worrying about the inevitabilist PUSU demand, or more bluntly, that we shut up about putting-up.     

A Kuhnian defence of inference to the best explanation

According to inference to the best explanation (IBE), scientists infer the loveliest of competing hypotheses, ‘loveliness’ being explanatory virtue. This generates two key objections: that loveliness is too subjective to guide inference, and that it is no guide to truth. I defend IBE using Thomas Kuhn’s notion of exemplars: the scientific theories, or applications thereof, that define Kuhnian normal science and facilitate puzzle-solving. I claim that scientists infer the explanatory puzzle-solution that best meets the standard set by the relevant exemplar of loveliness. Exemplars are the subject of consensus, eliminating subjectivity; divorced from Kuhnian relativism, they give loveliness the context-sensitivity required to be truth-tropic. The resulting account, ‘Kuhnian IBE’, is independently plausible and offers a partial rapprochement between IBE and Kuhn’s account of science.     

From Helmholtz to Schlick: The evolution of the sign-theory of perception

Efforts to trace the influence of fin de siècle neo-Kantianism on early 20th Century philosophy of science have led scholars to recognize the powerful influence on Moritz Schlick of Hermann von Helmholtz, the doyen of 19th Century physics and a leader of the zur?ck zu Kant movement. But Michael Friedman thinks that Schlick misunderstood Helmholtz' signature philosophical doctrine, the sign-theory of perception. Indeed, Friedman has argued that Schlick transformed Helmholtz' Kantian view of spatial intuition into an empiricist version of the causal theory of perception. However, it will be argued that, despite the key role the sign-theory played in his epistemology, Schlick thought the Kantianism in Helmholtz' thought was deeply flawed, rendered obsolete by philosophical insights which emerged from recent scientific developments. So even though Schlick embraced the sign-theory, he rejected Helmholtz' ideas about spatial intuition. In fact, like his teacher, Max Planck, Schlick generalized the sign-theory into a form of structural realism. At the same time, Schlick borrowed the method of concept-formation developed by the formalist mathematicians, Moritz Pasch and David Hilbert, and combined it with the conventionalism of Henri Poincaré. Then, to link formally defined concepts with experience, Schlick's introduced his ‘method of coincidences’, similar to the ‘point-coincidences’ featured in Einstein's physics. The result was an original scientific philosophy, which owed much to contemporary scientific thinkers, but little to Kant or Kantianism.     

Incredulity towards Lyotard: a critique of a postmodernist account of science and knowledge

Philosophers of science have paid little attention, positive or negative, to Lyotard’s book The postmodern condition, even though it has been popular in other fields. We set out some of the reasons for this neglect. Lyotard thought that sciences could be justified by non-scientific narratives (a position he later abandoned). We show why this is unacceptable, and why many of Lyotard’s characterisations of science are either implausible or are narrowly positivist. One of Lyotard’s themes is that the nature of knowledge has changed and thereby so has society itself. However much of what Lyotard says muddles epistemological matters about the definition of ‘knowledge’ with sociological claims about how information circulates in modern society. We distinguish two kinds of legitimation of science: epistemic and socio-political. In proclaiming ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ Lyotard has nothing to say about how epistemic and methodological principles are to be justified (legitimated). He also gives a bad argument as to why there can be no epistemic legitimation, which is based on an act/content confusion, and a confusion between making an agreement and the content of what is agreed to. As for socio-political legitimation, Lyotard’s discussion remains at the abstract level of science as a whole rather than at the level of the particular applications of sciences. Moreover his positive points can be accepted without taking on board any of his postmodernist account of science. Finally we argue that Lyotard’s account of paralogy, which is meant to provide a ‘postmodern’ style of justification, is a failure.