Ordinary language philosophy,explanation, and the historical turn in philosophy of science

Taking a cue from remarks Thomas Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within parts of the British philosophical context in the 1950s and early 1960s. During this time, ordinary language philosophy's influence was at its peak. I argue that the ordinary language philosophers' methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation and that these criticisms relate to the historical turn in philosophy of science. To show these connections, I primarily examine the work of Stephen Toulmin, who taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on explanation under Gilbert Ryle and R.B. Braithwaite in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse's appeal to an ordinary language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models and analogies in scientific reasoning, and W.H. Watson's Wittgensteinian philosophy of science, an early influence on Toulmin. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception. Looking at the philosophical background during which so-called linguistic philosophers also had a hand in bringing these questions to prominence helps us understand why.     

Can the behavioral sciences self-correct? A social epistemic study

Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may converge upon a correct estimate or not depending on the social structure of the community that uses it. Based on this study, I argue that methodological explanations of the “replicability crisis” in psychology are limited and propose an alternative explanation in terms of biases. Finally, I conclude suggesting that scientific self-correction should be understood as an interaction effect between inference methods and social structures.     

Philosophy,history and sociology of science: Interdisciplinary relations and complex social identities

Sociology and philosophy of science have an uneasy relationship, while the marriage of history and philosophy of science has—on the surface at least—been more successful. I will take a sociological look at the history of the relationships between philosophy and history as well as philosophy and sociology of science. Interdisciplinary relations between these disciplines will be analysed through social identity complexity theory in order to draw out some conclusions on how the disciplines interact and how they might develop. I will use the relationships between the disciplines as a pointer for a more general social theory of interdisciplinarity which will then be used to sound a caution on how interdisciplinary relations between the three disciplines might be managed.     

Border cases between autonomy and relevance: Economic sciences in Berlin—A natural experiment

The faculty of economics at today's Humboldt University in Berlin, as no other institution of economics, has witnessed three radical ruptures in its history: in 1933, National Socialism replaced the pluralism prevailing in the Weimar Republic by imposing a “German economics”; after WWII, GDR authorities replaced this NS regime by imposing a Marxist imperative, which after the fall of the wall was replaced by the Western standards of neoclassical economics. In reconstructing these three reforms, institutional history can serve as a context in which questions about the political nature of economic knowledge can be answered that remain speculative in a conceptual context. I thus present a natural experiment in the political epistemology of economics: How do economists respond to, resist, and stabilize, changing political regimes? How do economists renegotiate the autonomy of economic knowledge given changing demands as of its social task? Among others, I show that contrary to Robert Merton's old, but still widely held thesis in political epistemology—that the values of science are compatible only with democratic regimes—the totalitarian and authoritarian regimes created better conditions for methodological pluralism in economics than democratic society.     

Experiment versus mechanical philosophy in the work of Robert Boyle: a reply to Anstey and Pyle

We can distinguish ‘mechanical’ in the strict sense of the mechanical philosophers from ‘mechanical’ in the common sense. My claim is that Boyle's experimental science owed nothing to, and offered no support for, the mechanical philosophy in the strict sense. The attempts by my critics to undermine my case involve their interpreting ‘mechanical’ in something like the common sense. I certainly accept that Boyle's experimental science was productively informed by mechanical analogies, where ‘mechanical’ is interpreted in a common sense. But this leaves my original claim untouched and, in the main, unchallenged.     

The rise of cryptographic metaphors in Boyle and their use for the mechanical philosophy

This paper tracks the development of Boyle's conception of the natural world in terms of the popular “book of nature” trope. Boyle initially spoke of the creatures and phenomena of nature in a spiritual and moral register, as emblems of divine purpose, but gradually shifted from this ideographic view to an alphabetical account, which at times became posed in explicitly cryptographic terms. I explain this transition toward cryptographic metaphors in terms of Boyle's social and intellectual milieu and their concordance with the reductive and conjectural character of the mechanical philosophical program.     

Was Feyerabend a Popperian? Methodological issues in the History of the Philosophy of Science

For more than three decades, there has been significant debate about the relation between Feyerabend and Popper. The discussion has been nurtured and complicated by the rift that opened up between the two and by the later Feyerabend's controversial portrayal of his earlier self. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the accounts of the relation that have been proposed over the years, disentangles the problems they deal with, and analyses the evidence supporting their conclusions as well as the methodological approaches used to process that evidence. Rather than advancing a further speculative account of the relation based on Feyerabend's philosophical work or autobiographical recollections, the second part of the paper strives to clarify the problems at issue by making use of a wider range of evidence. It outlines a historical reconstruction of the social context within which Feyerabend's intellectual trajectory developed, putting a special emphasis on the interplay between the perceived intellectual identity of Feyerabend, Feyerabend's own intellectual self-concept, and the peculiar features of the evolving Popperian research group.     

The methodological defense of realism scrutinized

I revisit an older defense of scientific realism, the methodological defense, a defense developed by both Popper and Feyerabend. The methodological defense of realism concerns the attitude of scientists, not philosophers of science. The methodological defense is as follows: a commitment to realism leads scientists to pursue the truth, which in turn is apt to put them in a better position to get at the truth. In contrast, anti-realists lack the tenacity required to develop a theory to its fullest. As a consequence, they are less likely to get at the truth.My aim is to show that the methodological defense is flawed. I argue that a commitment to realism does not always benefit science, and that there is reason to believe that a research community with both realists and anti-realists in it may be better suited to advancing science. A case study of the Copernican Revolution in astronomy supports this claim.     

Is Newton a ‘radical empiricist’ about method?

Recently, some Newton scholars have argued that Newton is an empiricist about metaphysics—that ideally, he wants to let advances in physical theory resolve either some or all metaphysical issues. But while proponents of this interpretation are using ‘metaphysics’ in a very broad sense, to include the ‘principles that enable our knowledge of natural phenomena’, attention has thus far been focused on Newton’s approach to ontological, not epistemological or methodological, issues. In this essay, I therefore consider whether Newton wants to let physical theory bear on the very ‘principles that enable our knowledge’. By examining two kinds of argument in the Principia, I contend that Newton can be considered a methodological empiricist in a substantial respect. I also argue, however, that he cannot be a ‘radical empiricist’—that he does not and cannot convert all methodological issues into empirical issues.     

Introduction to values and pluralism in the environmental sciences: From inferences to institutions

Philosophers of science continue to elaborate our understanding of the roles that values play in scientific reasoning, practice, and institutions. This special issue focuses on the environmental sciences, a mosaic of fields ranging from restoration ecology to forestry to climatology, unified by its attention to the relationships between humans and their habitats. It is a field that revolves around ameliorating environmental problems, aiming to support the provision of social goods and provide guidance to policymakers about how to regulate individuals and industries. Values abound in such judgments as setting the boundaries of an ecosystem, integrating the human dimensions of social-ecological systems, and collaborating with stakeholders. Since few in the field are likely to insist that these judgments can be made without reference to social values, environmental science can serve as fertile ground for exploring the ethical, social, and political terrain at the frontier of the science and values discourse.     

Forecasting in the presence of level shifts

This article addresses the problem of forecasting time series that are subject to level shifts. Processes with level shifts possess a nonlinear dependence structure. Using the stochastic permanent breaks (STOPBREAK) model, I model this nonlinearity in a direct and flexible way that avoids imposing a discrete regime structure. I apply this model to the rate of price inflation in the United States, which I show is subject to level shifts. These shifts significantly affect the accuracy of out‐of‐sample forecasts, causing models that assume covariance stationarity to be substantially biased. Models that do not assume covariance stationarity, such as the random walk, are unbiased but lack precision in periods without shifts. I show that the STOPBREAK model outperforms several alternative models in an out‐of‐sample inflation forecasting experiment. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inductive reasoning in the context of discovery: Analogy as an experimental stratagem in the history and philosophy of science

Building on Norton's “material theory of induction,” this paper shows through careful historical analysis that analogy can act as a methodological principle or stratagem, providing experimentalists with a useful framework to assess data and devise novel experiments. Although this particular case study focuses on late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century experiments on the properties and composition of acids, the results of this investigation may be extended and applied to other research programs. A stage in-between what Steinle calls “exploratory experimentation” and robust theory, I argue that analogy encouraged research to substantiate why the likenesses should outweigh the differences (or vice versa) when evaluating results and designing experiments.     

The Left Vienna Circle, Part 2. The Left Vienna Circle, disciplinary history, and feminist philosophy of science

This paper analyzes the claim that the Left Vienna Circle (LVC) offers a theoretical and historical precedent for a politically engaged philosophy of science today. I describe the model for a political philosophy of science advanced by LVC historians. They offer this model as a moderate, properly philosophical approach to political philosophy of science that is rooted in the analytic tradition. This disciplinary-historical framing leads to weaknesses in LVC scholars’ conception of the history of the LVC and its contemporary relevance. In this light, I examine the claim that there are productive enrichments to be gained from the engagement of feminist philosophy of science with the LVC, finding this claim ill-formulated. The case of LVC historiography and feminist philosophy of science presents a revealing study in the uses and ethics of disciplinary history, showing how feminist and other perspectives are misconceived and marginalized by forms of disciplinary self-narrativizing.     

The National Science Foundation and philosophy of science's withdrawal from social concerns

At some point during the 1950s, mainstream American philosophy of science began increasingly to avoid questions about the role of non-cognitive values in science and, accordingly, increasingly to avoid active engagement with social, political and moral concerns. Such questions and engagement eventually ceased to be part of the mainstream. Here we show that the eventual dominance of ‘value-free’ philosophy of science can be attributed, at least in part, to the policies of the U.S. National Science Foundation's “History and Philosophy of Science” sub-program. In turn, the sub-program's policies were set by logical empiricists who espoused value-free philosophy of science; these philosophers' actions, we also point out, fit a broad pattern, one in which analytic philosophers used institutional control to marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. We go on to draw on existing knowledge of this pattern to suggest two further, similar, contributors to the withdrawal from value-laden philosophy of science, namely decisions by the editors of Philosophy of Science and by the editors of The Journal of Philosophy. Political climate was, we argue, at most an indirect contributor to the withdrawal and was neither a factor that decided whether it occurred nor one that was sufficient to bring it about. Moreover, we argue that the actions at the National Science Foundation went beyond what was required by its senior administrators and are better viewed as part of what drove, rather than as what was being driven by, the adoption of logical empiricism by the philosophy of science community.     

Styles for philosophers of science

In this paper I discuss the bearing of Hacking’s ideas about Scientific Styles on traditional debates in the philosophy of science concerning rationality and realism. I argue that a kind of deflationary position with regard to realism debates is a natural consequence of Hacking’s claim that styles are self-authenticating. I then go on to argue, using an example of van Fraassen’s, that Hacking should allow a methodological role for realism debates and hence they are not idle, as he has claimed, although their resolution may not be important.     

Quantum reality: A pragmaticized neo-Kantian approach

Despite remarkable efforts, it remains notoriously difficult to equip quantum theory with a coherent ontology. Hence, Healey (2017, 12) has recently suggested that “quantum theory has no physical ontology and states no facts about physical objects or events”, and Fuchs et al. (2014, 752) similarly hold that “quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world”. While intriguing, these positions either raise the question of how talk of ‘physical reality’ can even remain meaningful, or they must ultimately embrace a hidden variables-view, in tension with their original project. I here offer a neo-Kantian alternative. In particular, I will show how constitutive elements in the sense of Reichenbach (1920) and Friedman (1999, 2001) can be identified within quantum theory, through considerations of symmetries that allow the constitution of a ‘quantum reality’, without invoking any notion of a radically mind-independent reality. The resulting conception will inherit elements from pragmatist and ‘QBist’ approaches, but also differ from them in crucial respects. Furthermore, going beyond the Friedmanian program, I will show how non-fundamental and approximate symmetries can be relevant for identifying constitutive principles.     

Accountability and values in radically collaborative research

This paper discusses a crisis of accountability that arises when scientific collaborations are massively epistemically distributed. We argue that social models of epistemic collaboration, which are social analogs to what Patrick Suppes called a “model of the experiment,” must play a role in creating accountability in these contexts. We also argue that these social models must accommodate the fact that the various agents in a collaborative project often have ineliminable, messy, and conflicting interests and values; any story about accountability in a massively distributed collaboration must therefore involve models of such interests and values and their methodological and epistemic effects.