Does democracy require value-neutral science? Analyzing the legitimacy of scientific information in the political sphere

Philosophers now commonly reject the value free ideal for science by arguing that non-epistemic values, including personal or social values, are permissible within the core of scientific research. However, little attention has been paid to the normative political consequences of this position. This paper explores these consequences and shows how political theory is fruitful for proceeding in a world without value-neutral science. I draw attention to an oft-overlooked argument employed by proponents of the value free ideal I dub the “political legitimacy argument.” This argument claims that the value-free ideal follows directly from the foundational principles of liberal democracy. If so, then the use of value-laden scientific information within democratic decision making would be illegitimate on purely political grounds. Despite highlighting this unaddressed and important argument, I show how it can be rejected. By appealing to deliberative democratic theory, I demonstrate scientific information can be value-laden and politically legitimate. The deliberative democratic account I develop is well suited for capturing the intuitions of many opponents of the value free ideal and points to a new set of questions for those interested in values in science.     

Did Unexpectedly Strong Economic Growth Cause the Oil Price Shock of 2003–2008?

Recently developed structural models of the global crude oil market imply that the surge in the real price of oil between mid 2003 and mid 2008 was driven by repeated positive shocks to the demand for all industrial commodities, reflecting unexpectedly high growth mainly in emerging Asia. We evaluate this proposition using an alternative data source and a different econometric methodology. Rather than inferring demand shocks from an econometric model, we utilize a direct measure of global demand shocks based on revisions of professional real gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecasts. We show that forecast surprises during 2003–2008 were associated primarily with unexpected growth in emerging economies (in conjunction with much smaller positive GDP‐weighted forecast surprises in the major industrialized economies), that markets were repeatedly surprised by the strength of this growth, that these surprises were associated with a hump‐shaped response of the real price of oil that reaches its peak after 12–16 months, and that news about global growth predict much of the surge in the real price of oil from mid 2003 until mid 2008 and much of its subsequent decline. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.