Narratives of Charles Darwin Down Under

Despite the fact that Charles Darwin spent several months in Australia in the final year of his Beagle voyage that circumnavigated the globe, most studies that deal with Darwin's life or his discovery of evolution spend little time discussing his Australian period, if it is mentioned at all. His time there is largely deemed to have produced little of significance in comparison to his visits to other places such as the Galápagos Islands, which has long been mythologized as providing the key sources of observable data that ultimately led Darwin to develop his evolutionary speculations. In recent years, however, Darwin's period in Australia has received more attention, most notably a series of studies detailing the observations and connections Darwin made while in New South Wales, Tasmania, and King George Sound. While much of this literature has provided an important corrective to previous Darwin scholarship that had largely ignored Darwin's period in Australia, it has also worked to perpetuate a romantic and heroic view of scientific discovery by suggesting that Darwin's key “evolutionary revelation” was made not in the Galápagos Islands but in the Blue Mountains, a claim that has been recently made in print and online. This paper therefore examines the historical literature on Darwin Down Under, focussing in particular on this recent romantic turn that seeks to situate Australia as the key site of inspiration for Darwin's theory of evolution.     

Scientific patronage in the age of Darwin: The curious case of William Boyd Dawkins

This essay examines the curious relationship between Charles Darwin and the palaeontologist William Boyd Dawkins (1837–1929). Dawkins was a beneficiary of Darwin's patronage and styled himself as a Darwinian to Darwin and the public, yet viciously attacked Darwin and his theory in anonymous reviews. This has confused historians who have misunderstood the exact nature of Dawkins's attitude towards evolution and his relationship to Darwin. The present study explains both the reasons for Dawkins's contradictory statements and his relationship with Darwin. I introduce Batesian mimicry as a conceptual framework to make sense of Dawkins's actions, suggesting that Dawkins mimicked a Darwinian persona in order to secure advancement in the world of Victorian science. Dawkins's pro-Darwinian stance, therefore, was a façade, an act of mimicry. I argue that Dawkins exploited Darwin for his patronage – which took the form of advice, support from Darwin's well-placed friends, and monetary assistance – while safely expressing his dissent from Darwinian orthodoxy in the form of anonymous reviews. This is, therefore, a case study in how scientific authority and power could be gained and maintained in Victorian science by professing allegiance to Darwin and Darwinism.     

From natural history to political economy: the enlightened mission of Domenico Vandelli in late eighteenth-century Portugal

This article presents the main features of the work of Domenico Vandelli (1735–1816), an Italian-born man of science who lived a large part of his life in Portugal. Vandelli’s scientific interests as a naturalist paved the way to his activities as a reformer and adviser on economic and financial issues. The topics covered in his writings are similar to those discussed by Linnaeus, with whom Vandelli corresponded. They clearly reveal that the scientific preparation indispensable for a better knowledge of natural resources was also a fundamental condition for correctly addressing problems of efficiency in their economic allocation. The key argument put forward in this article is that the relationship between natural history and the agenda for economic reform and development deserves to be further analysed. It is indeed a central element in the emergence of political economy as an autonomous scientific discourse during the last decades of the eighteenth century.     

Newtonianism in early Enlightenment Germany, c. 1720 to 1750: metaphysics and the critique of dogmatic philosophy

The acceptance of Newton’s ideas and Newtonianism in the early German Enlightenment is usually described as hesitant and slow. Two reasons help to explain this phenomenon. One is that those who might have adopted Newtonian arguments were critics of Wolffianism. These critics, however, drew on indigenous currents of thought, pre-dating the reception of Newton in Germany and independent of Newtonian science. The other reason is that the controversies between Wolffians and their critics focused on metaphysics. Newton’s reputation, however, was that of a mathematician, and one point, on which Wolffians and their opponents agreed, was that mathematics was of no use in the solution of metaphysical questions. The appeal to Newton as an authority in metaphysics, it was argued, was the fault of Newton’s over-zealous disciples in Britain, who tried to transform him from a mathematician into the author of a general philosophical system. It is often argued that the Berlin Academy after 1743 included a Newtonian group, but even there the reception of Newtonianism was selective. Philosophers such as Leonhard Euler were also reluctant to be labelled ‘Newtonians’, because this implied a dogmatic belief in Newton’s ideas. Only after the mid-eighteenth century is ‘Newtonianism’ increasingly accepted in the sense of a philosophical system.     

The role of probability arguments in the history of science

The paper examines Wesley Salmon’s claim that the primary role of plausibility arguments in the history of science is to impose constraints on the prior probability of hypotheses (in the language of Bayesian confirmation theory). A detailed look at Copernicanism and Darwinism and, more briefly, Rutherford’s discovery of the atomic nucleus reveals a further and arguably more important role of plausibility arguments. It resides in the consideration of likelihoods, which state how likely a given hypothesis makes a given piece of evidence. In each case the likelihoods raise the probability of one of the competing hypotheses and diminish the credibility of its rival, and this may happen either on the basis of ‘old’ or ‘new’ evidence.     

The evolution of domain arrangements in proteins and interaction networks

Proteins are composed of domains, which are conserved evolutionary units that often also correspond to functional units and can frequently be detected with reasonable reliability using computational methods. Most proteins consist of two or more domains, giving rise to a variety of combinations of domains. Another level of complexity arises because proteins themselves can form complexes with small molecules, nucleic acids and other proteins. The networks of both domain combinations and protein interactions can be conceptualised as graphs, and these graphs can be analysed conveniently by computational methods. In this review we summarise facts and hypotheses about the evolution of domains in multi-domain proteins and protein complexes, and the tools and data resources available to study them.Received 20 September 2004; received after revision 23 October 2004; accepted 1 November 2004     

The rhetorical strategy of William Paley’s Natural theology (1802): Part 1, William Paley’s Natural theology in context

This article reconstructs the historical and philosophical contexts of William Paley’s Natural theology (1802). In the wake of the French Revolution, widely believed to be the embodiment of an atheistic political credo, the refutation of the transmutational biological theories of Buffon and Erasmus Darwin was naturally high on Paley’s agenda. But he was also responding to challenges arising from his own moral philosophy, principally the psychological quandary of how men were to be kept in mind of the Creator. It is argued here that Natural theology was the culmination of a complex rhetorical scheme for instilling religious impressions that would increase both the virtue and happiness of mankind. Philosophy formed an integral part of this strategy, but it did not comprise the whole of it. Equally vital were those purely rhetorical aspects of the discourse which, according to Paley, were more concerned with creating ‘impression’. This facet of his writing is explored in part one of this two-part article. Turning to the argumentative side of the scheme, part two examines Paley’s responses to David Hume and Erasmus Darwin in the light of the wider strategy of inculcation at work throughout all his writings.     

The unfolding of the historical style in modern cosmology: Emergence,evolution, entrenchment

This paper traces the emergence, evolution and subsequent entrenchment of the historical style in the shifting scene of modern cosmological inquiry. It argues that the historical style in cosmology was forged in the early decades of the 20^th century and continued to evolve in the century that followed. Over time, the scene of cosmological inquiry has gradually become dominated and entirely constituted by historicist explanations. Practices such as forwards and backwards temporal extrapolation (thinking about the past evolutionary history of the universe with different initial conditions and other parameters) are now commonplace. The non-static geometrization of the cosmos in the early 20th century led to inquires thinking about the cosmos in evolutionary terms. Drawing on the historical approach of Gamow (and contrasting this with the ahistorical approach of Bondi), the paper then argues that the historical style became a major force as inquirers began scouring the universe for fossils and other relics as a new form of scientific practice—cosmic palaeontology. By the 1970s the historical style became the bedrock of the discipline and the presupposition of new lines of inquiry. By the end of the 20th century, the historical style was pushed to its very limits as temporal reasoning began to occur beyond a linear historical narrative. With the atemporal ‘ensemble’ type multiverse proposals, a certain type of ahistorical reasoning has been reintroduced to cosmological discourse, which, in a sense, represents a radical de-historicization of the historical style in cosmology. Some are now even attempting to explain the laws of physics in terms of their historicity.     

The tragedy of the canon; or,path dependence in the history and philosophy of science

We have previously argued that historical cases must be rendered canonical before they can plausibly serve as evidence for philosophical claims, where canonicity is established through a process of negotiation among historians and philosophers of science (Bolinska and Martin, 2020). Here, we extend this proposal by exploring how that negotiation might take place in practice. The working stock of historical examples that philosophers tend to employ has long been established informally, and, as a result, somewhat haphazardly. The composition of the historical canon of philosophy of science is therefore path dependent, and cases often become stock examples for reasons tangential to their appropriateness for the purposes at hand. We show how the lack of rigor around the canonization of case studies has muddied the waters in selected philosophical debates. This, in turn, lays the groundwork for proposing ways in which they can be improved.     

The autonomy of models and explanation: anomalous molecular rearrangements in early twentieth-century physical organic chemistry

During the 1930s and 1940s, American physical organic chemists employed electronic theories of reaction mechanisms to construct models offering explanations of organic reactions. But two molecular rearrangements presented enormous challenges to model construction. The Claisen and Cope rearrangements were predominantly inaccessible to experimental investigation and they confounded explanation in theoretical terms. Drawing on the idea that models can be autonomous agents in the production of scientific knowledge, I argue that one group of models in particular were functionally autonomous from the Hughes–Ingold theory. Cope and Hardy’s models of the Claisen and Cope rearrangements were resources for the exploration of the Hughes–Ingold theory that otherwise lacked explanatory power. By generating ‘how-possibly’ explanations, these models explained how these rearrangements could happen rather than why they did happen. Furthermore, although these models were apparently closely connected to theory in terms of their construction, I argue that partial autonomy issued in extra-logical factors concerning the attitudes of American chemists to the Hughes–Ingold theory. And in the absence of a complete theoretical hegemony, a degree of consensus was reached concerning modelling the Claisen rearrangement mechanism.