The uses and abuses of ‘consensus’ forecasts

Clemen's (1989) review of the forecast-combining literature amply illustrates both the interest in and the importance of this subject. This article stresses the tautological properties of various consensus measures that assure their success relative to most individual forecasts. It confirms the finding of earlier studies that for each specific macroeconomic variable roughly one-third of individual forecasters are more accurate than a consensus. However, each individual does relatively poorly for some variable while the consensus, in contrast, necessarily never fails relative to most individuals. These results, like most previous studies, describe consensus measures that are synthetic constructs derived from a pre-existing set of individual forecasts. Strictly speaking, this contemporaneous consensus is not available to individual forecasters when their forecasts are made. A prior consensus measure, which is in their information sets, was relatively much less accurate than the contemporaneous measure. Nevertheless, a small subset of individual forecasters were generally inferior to the known, prior consensus forecast.     

The literature and the science of ‘two cultures’ historiography

This paper discusses the historiography of the ‘two cultures’ controversy. C. P. Snow’s lament about the ‘two cultures’, literary and scientific, has inspired a wide range of comment—much of which begins by citing Snow and his thesis, before going on to discuss very different things. This paper focuses upon one strand of this commentary, the historical analysis of the controversy itself. A ‘historical’ analysis is defined here as one that resists the impulse to enter the argument on behalf of Snow or Leavis, to conceive of their argument in the terms that Snow defined, or to invoke their argument as a precursor to some contemporary issue. Instead, a historical interpretation registers distance between that day and this, takes the controversy itself as its object of study, and explores the tensions and associations that came to be packed into those now familiar terms. As the fiftieth anniversary of Snow’s Rede Lecture nears, this approach—rather than the repetition of clichés about the bridging of cultures—offers both analytical perspective on the controversy and interpretive possibilities for its examination.     

Weyl’s ‘agens theory’ of matter and the Zurich Fichte

This paper investigates Hermann Weyl’s reception of philosophical concepts stemming from the German Idealist Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In particular, Weyl’s ‘agens theory’ of matter, which he held around 1925, will be looked at. In the extant literature, the—admittedly also important—influence of Husserl on Weyl has mainly been addressed. Thus, apart from investigating some detailed Fichtean inheritances in Weyl’s concepts of causality, chance and continuity, the general difference which Weyl saw between the philosophies of Fichte and Husserl will also be discussed. For Weyl this is above all a difference between an active constructivism and a rather passive phenomenological seeing (Schau). Further, the paper shows in some detail the way Weyl was drawn into a certain reading of Fichte by his Zurich colleague, the philosopher Fritz Medicus. The methodological frame of the paper is that of Konstellationsforschung, a historical and systematic approach which proves to be particularly fruitful when investigating a (broadly speaking) German Idealist context and which allows special attention to be given to the acting subjects within the constellation under investigation. Conversely, Weyl’s agens theory suggests amendments to this methodology.     

Bananas and petrol: further evidence on the forecasting accuracy of the ABS ‘headline’ and ‘underlying’ rates of inflation

In the light of the still topical nature of ‘bananas and petrol’ being blamed for driving much of the inflationary pressures in Australia in recent times, the ‘headline’ and ‘underlying’ rates of inflation are scrutinised in terms of forecasting accuracy. A general structural time‐series modelling strategy is applied to estimate models for alternative types of Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures. From this, out‐of‐sample forecasts are generated from the various models. The underlying forecasts are subsequently adjusted to facilitate comparison. The Ashley, Granger and Schmalensee (1980) test is then performed to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the root mean square errors of the models. The results lend weight to the recent findings of Song (2005) that forecasting models using underlying rates are not systematically inferior to those based on the headline rate. In fact, strong evidence is found that underlying measures produce superior forecasts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forecasting with an econometric model: The ‘ragged edge’ problem

In practical econometric forecasting exercises, incomplete data on current and immediate past values of endogenous variables are available. This paper considers various approaches to this ‘ragged edge’ problem, including the common device of treating as ‘temporarily exogenous’ an endogenous variable whose value is known, by deleting it from the set of endogenous variables for whose forecast values the model is solved and suppressing the corresponding structural equation. It is seen that this forecast can be adjusted to coincide with the optimal forecast. The initial discussion concerns the textbook linear simultaneous equation model; extensions to non-linear dynamic models are described.     

Revisiting Galison’s ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’ in light of Neurath’s philosophical projects

In his article entitled ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’ and related work, Peter Galison explores the connections between the Vienna Circle and the Dessau Bauhaus. Historically, these groups were related, with members of each group familiar with the ideas of the other. Galison argues that their projects are related as well, through shared political views and methodological approach. The two main figures that connect the Vienna Circle to the Bauhaus—and the figures upon which Galison focuses—are Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath. Yet, in our view, the connections that Galison develops do not properly capture the common themes between the Bauhaus and Neurath’s philosophical projects. In this paper, we will examine a few of the historical connections between the Dessau Bauhaus and the Vienna Circle, as well as the philosophical connections that Galison draws between these two groups. By examining in greater depth Neurath’s philosophical commitments, we aim to demonstrate that some of these philosophical connections fail to resonate with Neurath’s projects. And, finally, we develop different connections between Neurath’s projects and the Bauhaus. In our view, these new connections between Neurath and the Dessau Bauhaus are both substantive and philosophically interesting.     

Rehabilitating theory: refusal of the ‘bottom-up’ construction of scientific phenomena

In this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) data/phenomena distinction, which in a similar way to Cartwright’s construal of the model of superconductivity (1995)—although in a different domain—argues for a ‘bottom-up’ construction of phenomena from data without the involvement of theory. I criticise Bogen and Woodward’s account by analysing their melting point of lead example in depth, which is usually cited in the literature to illustrate the data/phenomenon distinction. Yet, the main focus of this paper lies on Matthias Kaiser’s (1995) case study of the plate tectonic revolution, the most extensive case study that has been put forth to support the bottom-up construction of phenomena. On the basis of new historical evidence, which has been overlooked not only by Kaiser but also by the entire historical literature on the plate tectonic revolution, I demonstrate that phenomena are not constructed from the bottom-up but rather, admittedly counter-intuitively, from the top-down.     

Hermeneutical contributions to the history of science: Gadamer on ‘presentism’

This article examines how Hans G. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics can contribute to contemporary debates on the concept of ‘presentism’. In the field of the history of science, this term is usually employed in two ways. First, ‘presentism’ refers to the kind of historiography which judges the past to legitimate the present. Second, this concept designates the inevitable influence of the present in the interpretation of the past. In this paper, I argue that both dimensions of the relationship between the present and the past are explored by Hans G. Gadamer in Truth and Method and other texts. In the first place, Gadamer’s critique of historicism calls into question the anti-presentist ideal of studying the past for ‘its own sake’. In the second place, Gadamer’s thesis that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice poses the question of the inherent “present-centredness” of historical interpretations. By examining Gadamer’s hermeneutics, I seek to provide historians with new arguments and perspectives on the question of ‘presentism’.