Experiencing deep and global currents at a ‘Prototypical Strait’, 1870s and 1980s

Deep ocean currents are not accessible to direct human perception. Their insertion into global structures of circulation is even more profoundly removed from individual sensorial experience. But oceanographers tend to use wider concepts of experience to include instruments, traditions of observation and theoretical models. Historians and philosophers of science, as well as STS scholars, have also redefined scientific experience as operational and collective transformations of parts of the world around us into fragments of larger bodies of knowledge. This paper pursues this definition to follow the instrumental and epistemological resources available to those “observing” deep-water circulation at the Strait of Gibraltar in two very distinct moments, ca. 1870 and ca. 1985, respectively through the works of scientists like William B. Carpenter and the transnational team involved in the Gibraltar Experiment. Detecting and mapping the Gibraltar undercurrent necessitated taking data of temperature and salinity as proxies for masses of water. Making it relevant to world ocean currents required the use of models and moving across scales. In both contexts, empires of global reach provided the globalizing motivations and infrastructures.     

‘Working in a new world’: Kuhn,constructivism, and mind-dependence

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn famously advanced the claim that scientists work in a different world after a scientific revolution. Kuhn's view has been at the center of a philosophical literature that has tried to make sense of his bold claim, by listing Kuhn's view in good company with other seemingly constructivist proposals. The purpose of this paper is to take some steps towards clarifying what sort of constructivism (if any) is in fact at stake in Kuhn's view. To this end, I distinguish between two main (albeit not exclusive) notions of mind-dependence: a semantic notion and an ontological one. I point out that Kuhn's view should be understood as subscribing to a form of semantic mind-dependence, and conclude that semantic mind-dependence does not land us into any worrisome ontological mind-dependence, pace any constructivist reading of Kuhn.     

‘Identify’ and ‘lock in’: molecular integration during synaptic target recognition

Synaptic target recognition is a complex molecular event. In a differentiating presynaptic terminal, relatively ‘rare’ molecules first detect the cell identity of the synaptic target. Subsequently, many ‘common’ molecules continue the process of synaptogenesis. We present a theoretical framework for understanding synaptic target recognition and discuss the features of its molecular components and their integration, drawing on the rapid progress made in recent studies.     

Duncan F. Gregory,William Walton and the development of British algebra: ‘algebraical geometry’, ‘geometrical algebra’, abstraction

This paper provides a detailed account of the period of the complex history of British algebra and geometry between the publication of George Peacock's Treatise on Algebra in 1830 and William Rowan Hamilton's paper on quaternions of 1843. During these years, Duncan Farquharson Gregory and William Walton published several contributions on ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal. These contributions enabled them not only to generalize Peacock's symbolical algebra on the basis of geometrical considerations, but also to initiate the attempts to question the status of Euclidean space as the arbiter of valid geometrical interpretations. At the same time, Gregory and Walton were bound by the limits of symbolical algebra that they themselves made explicit; their work was not and could not be the ‘abstract algebra’ and ‘abstract geometry’ of figures such as Hamilton and Cayley. The central argument of the paper is that an understanding of the contributions to ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ of the second generation of ‘scientific’ symbolical algebraists is essential for a satisfactory explanation of the radical transition from symbolical to abstract algebra that took place in British mathematics in the 1830s–1840s.     

Spectrin and calpain: a ‘target’ and a ‘sniper’ in the pathology of neuronal cells

It is well documented that activation of calpain, a calcium-sensitive cysteine protease, marks the pathology of naturally and experimentally occuring neurodegenerative conditions. Calpain-mediated proteolysis of major membrane-skeletal protein, αII-spectrin, results in the appearance of two unique and highly stable breakdown products, which is an early event in neural cell pathology. This review focuses on spectrin degradation by calpain within neurons induced by diverse conditions, emphasizing a current picture of multi-pattern neuronal death and a recent success in the development of spectrin-based biomarkers. The issue is presented in the context of the major structural and functional properties of the two proteins.Received 7 March 2005; received after revision 22 April 2005; accepted 13 May 2005     

‘Soup’ vs. ‘Sparks’: Alexander Forbes and the Synaptic Transmission Controversy

During the twentieth century, a controversy raged over the role of electrical forces and chemical substances in synaptic transmission. Although the story of the ‘main’ participants is well documented, the story of ‘lesser’ known participants is seldom told. For example, Alexander Forbes, who was a prominent member of the axonologists, played an active role in the controversy and yet is seldom mentioned in standard accounts of the controversy. During the 1930s, Forbes incorporated chemical substances into his theory of synaptic transmission, advocating a complementarity model for the role of electrical forces and chemical substances. By focusing on Forbes and the axonologists, the controversy is simply more than a debate over ‘soup’ vs. ‘sparks’ but also involves the relative roles of electrical forces and chemical substances in synaptic transmission. The implications of this case study for the nature of scientific controversies are also discussed.     

Freiberg and the Frontier: Louis Janin,German Engineering,and ‘Civilisation’ in the American West

Mining companies after the Gold Rush depended heavily on foreign expertise, and yet historians of mining have glorified ‘German engineering’ in America. The application of German technology in America was fraught with difficulties, and most advances were micro- rather than macro-innovations, such as Philip Deidesheimer's famous square-set timbering on the Comstock Lode. The problem began at German mining schools, such as the Freiberg Mining Academy, where Americans like Louis and Henry Janin, while they acquired advanced training and adopted an engineering ethos, struggled to learn about Mexican and American mining. Having complemented their course of study to remedy this deficiency, the brothers returned to the US intending to modernize mining on the frontier. Louis attempted the ‘Freiberg Process’ of amalgamation on the Comstock Lode, but locally developed methods proved more feasible, and the experiment failed. He came to apply his training rather toward the micro-level problem of how to reprocess amalgamation waste heaps.     

Time-Symmetrised Quantum Theory,Counterfactuals and ‘Advanced Action’

Recent authors have raised objections to the counterfactual interpretation of the Aharonov–Bergmann–Lebowitz (ABL) rule of time-symmetrised quantum theory (TSQT). I distinguish between two different readings of the ABL rule, counterfactual and non-counterfactual, and confirm that TSQT advocate L. Vaidman is employing the counterfactual reading to which these authors object. Vaidman has responded to the objections by proposing a new kind of time-symmetrised counterfactual, which he has defined in two different ways. It is argued that neither definition succeeds in overcoming the objections, except in a limited special case previously noted by Cohen and Hiley. In addition, a connection is made between TSQT and Price’s concept of ‘advanced action’, which further supports the special case discussed.     

The ‘Darwin-Marx correspondence’: a correction and revision

The logical links between the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation and the practice of natural philosophy on the one hand, and the rejection of belief in demonic agency on the other, were made explicit in the seventeenth century by, among others, Balthasar Bekker (1634–98), whose ideas I argue to have been not without influence. In section 1, I present the accounts of three historians of the opposition to belief in witchcraft and of the decline of the witch-persecution, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Keith Thomas, and Brian Easlea. In section 2, I maintain that Bekker has been underestimated both by Trevor-Roper and by Easlea. In section 3, I investigate more generally some of the connections between the new natural philosophy and belief in supernatural interventions, cast doubt on the view that rejection of belief in witchcraft and the devil requires rejection of belief in creation, and thus supplement or qualify the accounts of Trevor-Roper, Thomas, and Easlea of why belief in witchcraft faded away.     

The Instrument That Never Was: Inventing,Manufacturing, and Branding Réaumur's Thermometer During the Enlightenment

At the beginning of the 1730s René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur published two long memoirs on a new type of thermometer equipped with a specially calibrated scale — known ever since as the Réaumur scale. It became one of the most common ‘standardized’ thermometers in Europe until the late nineteenth century. What made this thermometer so successful? What was it specifically? I will first argue that the real Réaumur thermometer as an instrument was a fiction, a ghost — an idealized instrument. On paper, it was theoretically flawless. In reality, the standardized Réaumur thermometer was most likely never achieved. This article shows that its success was essentially due to a recontextualisation from theoretical natural philosophy — Réaumur's principle of uniformity — to: 1) the context of artisanal knowledge and practices and 2) the context of making and reporting in the Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences actual measurements done in the field (in Paris at the Observatory, in Provincial France, in the Colonies, and in the rest of Europe). Réaumur's thermometer was essentially a theoretical method to which was associated a particular scale. It was the instrument's reification for market consumption and fieldwork that gave this specific type of thermometer materiality and authority. Although most Réaumur thermometers ever made were strikingly different from one another, over time the thermomètre de Réaumur designation became a brand, a seal of approval born from customary artisanal practices and cultural habitudes.     

‘Language,Truth and Reason’ 30 years later

This paper traces the origins of the styles project, originally presented as ‘styles of scientific reasoning’. ‘Styles of scientific thinking & doing’ is a better label; the styles can also be called genres, or, ways of finding out. A. C. Crombie’s template of six fundamentally distinct ones was turned into a philosophical tool, but with a tinge of Paul Feyerabend’s anarchism. Ways of finding out are not defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, but can be recognized as distinct within a sweeping, anthropological, vision of the European sciences. The approach is unabashedly whiggish. The emergence of these styles is part of what Reviel Netz calls cognitive history, and is to be understood in an ecological way. How did a species like ours, on an Earth like this, develop a few quite general strategies for finding out about, and altering, its world? At a more analytical level, the project invokes Bernard Williams’ notion of truthfulness to explicate the idea that these styles are ‘self-authenticating’ and without foundations. The paper concludes with open questions. What role (for example) have these few fundamentally distinct genres of inquiry played in the formation of the anomalous Western idea of Nature apart from Man?     

The ‘Società degli Spettroscopisti Italiani’: birth and evolution

The anniversary of the death of Pietro Tacchini (1838–1905), one of the pioneers of solar physics in Italy, is commemorared by this account of his major creation, the Società degli Spettroscopisti Italiani (1871). Established to promote cooperation among solar spectroscopists engaged in the study of the solar chromosphere, it was the first scientific Society devoted to spectroscopy and its astronomical applications. Its journal, the Memorie, collected most of the important works on solar physics by Angelo Secchi SJ (1818–1878), Tacchini himself, and many other protagonists of the newly born astrophysics. A brief history of the Society and its development draws on many previously unexploited archival sources, in order to show its role in raising astrophysics to the status of a scientific discipline, in the context of the astronomical research of that time in Italy and abroad, especially in the USA.     

‘Public’ Science: Hydrogen Balloons and Lavoisier's Decomposition of Water

The balloon mania between 1783 and 1785 put an extraordinary strain on the Paris Academy of Sciences, threatening its status as the highest tribunal of European science. Faced with repeated royal directives and public frenzy, the Academy manoeuvred carefully to steer the research toward the hydrogen balloon and thereby to maintain its scientific superiority. Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier seized this moment when the promise of ‘the empire of airs’ brought science to the centre of public attention to push his theoretical reform for chemistry. He utilized the established protocol of the Academy and the resources of the Republic of Letters to broadly publicize his first decomposition of water in April 1784. Once he attained the publicity and the balloon fever began to cool, he staged a much more elaborate experiment for the experts in February 1785. Although this second, large-scale experiment cost much expense and effort, Lavoisier never published a full account. The differential care given to the two experiments can only be understood in their divergent rhetorical contexts. The written accounts in 1784 addressed the court of public opinion, while the exclusive performance in 1785 aimed at the court of experts to inaugurate the collaborative phase of the Chemical Revolution.