极小特权数组上的理想多秘密共享方案

如何构造针对一般存取结构的理想的多秘密共享方案是一个比较困难的问题.本文首先解决了Spiez等最近提出的一个公开问题[Finite Fields and Their Application,2011,17:329–342],即在特权数组存在的前提下,设计求得任意长度的特权数组的算法.进一步,我们利用特权数组理论,以Pang等和Yang等的方案为例,分析了大多现有的基于Shamir门限体制的多秘密共享方案均不是完善的.最后,基于特权数组的算法,本文提出了一个多秘密共享方案,我们证明了该方案是理想的,并且方案的存取结构中的授权集比门限方案的更加丰富.     

Pluralism and anarchism in quantum physics: Paul Feyerabend's writings on quantum physics in relation to his general philosophy of science

This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend's philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics.In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend's perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend's arguments for theoretical pluralism and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics.However, as Feyerabend gained insight into the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr's work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards ‘anarchism’ in philosophy of science.     

Scientific realism bit by bit: part I. Kitcher on reference

In this paper, I consider Kitcher’s (1993) account of reference for the expressions of past science. Kitcher’s case study is of Joseph Priestley and his expression ‘dephlogisticated air’. There is a strong intuitive case that ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred to oxygen, but it was underpinned by very mistaken phlogiston theory, so concluding either that dephlogisticated air referred straightforwardly or that it failed to refer both have unpalatable consequences. Kitcher argues that the reference of such terms is best considered relative to each token—some tokens refer, and others do not. His account thus relies crucially on how this distinction between tokens can be made good—a puzzle I call the discrimination problem. I argue that the discrimination problem cannot be solved. On any reading of Kitcher’s defence of the distinction, the grounds provided are either insufficient or illegitimate. On the first reading, Kitcher violates the principle of humanity by making Priestley’s referential success a matter of the mental contents of modern speakers. The second reading sidesteps the problem of beliefs by appealing to mind-independent facts, but I argue that these are insufficient to achieve reference because of the indeterminacy introduced by the qua problem. On the third and final reading, Priestley’s success is given by what he would say in counterfactual circumstances. I argue that even if there are facts about what Priestley would say, and there is reason for doubt, there is no motivation to think that such facts determine how Priestley referred in the actual world.     

Another parting of the ways: Intersubjectivity and the objectivity of science

Michael Friedman defines the scientific enterprise as an ongoing project with a dynamics of reason that persists through scientific revolutions: The coherence and continuity of science owes to a communicative rationality that is operative at all times. It assures us of our shared objective world by transforming subjective points of view into intersubjectively binding agreements. Though it takes a very broad approach epistemologically, this conception of science may yet be too narrow in respect to notions of objectivity. It excludes a prominent mode of knowledge production that might be called technoscientific. This exclusion becomes particularly evident in Friedman’s discussion of Heidegger as a critic of Cassirer and Carnap and as a critic of objectivity as “universal validity” of scientific propositions. If one tends to Heidegger’s own account of objectivity, one encounters a non-propositional notion of truth. Science is seen as a technology that brings forth phenomena and processes. Accordingly, even where modern physics appears to be concerned primarily with the formulation of theories and the testing of hypotheses, it uses mathematical and representational techniques to conceive and create the modern world. And more powerfully than intersubjective agreement, technologies assure us of the unity and objectivity of our simultaneously social as well as natural world. There may be good reasons to hold fast to the close affiliation of communicative rationality, science, and enlightenment. However, to the extent that it turns a blind eye to technoscientific knowledge production and the technological character of science, a philosophy of technoscience needs to develop an alternative perspective on questions of objectivity, explanation, inference, or validation.     

Historical antecedents to the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend

Paul Feyerabend has been considered a very radical philosopher of science for proposing that we may advance hypotheses contrary to well-confirmed experimental results, that observations make theoretical assumptions, that all methodological rules have exceptions, that ordinary citizens may challenge the judgment of experts, and that human happiness should be a key value for science. As radical as these theses may sound, they all have historical antecedents. In defending the Copernican view, Galileo exemplified the first two; Mill, Aristotle and Machiavelli all argued for pluralism; Aristotle gave commonsense reasons for why ordinary citizens may be able to judge the work of experts; and a combination of Plato's and Aristotle's views can offer strong support for the connection between science and happiness.     

Value management and model pluralism in climate science

Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed “epistemic inequality”: this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality. We argue that value management can be seriously considered as soon as the value-free ideal and inductive risk arguments commonly used to frame the discussions of value influence in climate science are replaced by alternative social accounts of objectivity. We consider objectivity in Longino's sense as well as strong objectivity in Harding's sense to be relevant options here, because they offer concrete proposals that can guide scientific practice in evaluating and designing so-called multi-model ensembles and, in fine, improve their capacity to quantify and express uncertainty in climate projections.     

Aided and unaided decision making: Improving intuitive judgement

Intuitive judgement forms the basis of decision making both by experts, in professional settings, and by people in everyday life. Psychologists have studied the rationality of intuitive judgements. In this paper three approaches to decision making will be discussed: unqualified rationalism, qualified rationalism and irrationalism. The first approach holds that man is essentially rational, the second that serious cognitive biases exist, and the third that thinking is strongly influenced by non-cognitive sources of distortion, i.e. emotions and motives. Evidence on judgement is reviewed and found to support the last two approaches. Various ways of improving judgements, as suggested by the three basic viewpoints, are then presented.     

Do Experts’ SKU Forecasts Improve after Feedback?

We analyze the behavior of experts who quote forecasts for monthly SKU‐level sales data, where we compare data before and after the moment that experts received different kinds of feedback on their behavior. We have data for 21 experts located in as many countries who make SKU‐level forecasts for a variety of pharmaceutical products for October 2006 to September 2007. We study the behavior of the experts by comparing their forecasts with those from an automated statistical program, and we report the forecast accuracy over these 12 months. In September 2007 these experts were given feedback on their behavior and they received training at the headquarters office, where specific attention was given to the ins and outs of the statistical program. Next, we study the behavior of the experts for the 3 months after the training session, i.e. October 2007 to December 2007. Our main conclusion is that in the second period the experts’ forecasts deviated less from the statistical forecasts and that their accuracy improved substantially. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The emergence of objectivity: Fleck,Foucault, Kuhn and Hacking

The analytical notions of ‘thought style’, ‘paradigm’, ‘episteme’ and ‘style of reasoning’ are some of the most popular frameworks in the history and philosophy of science. Although their proponents, Ludwik Fleck, Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Ian Hacking, are all part of the same philosophical tradition that closely connects history and philosophy, the extent to which they share similar assumptions and objectives is still under debate. In the first part of the paper, I shall argue that, despite the fact that these four thinkers disagree on certain assumptions, their frameworks have the same explanatory goal – to understand how objectivity is possible. I shall present this goal as a necessary element of a common project -- that of historicising Kant's a priori. In the second part of the paper, I shall make an instrumental use of the insights of these four thinkers to form a new model for studying objectivity. I shall also propose a layered diagram that allows the differences between the frameworks to be mapped, while acknowledging their similarities. This diagram will show that the frameworks of style of reasoning and episteme illuminate conditions of possibility that lie at a deeper level than those considered by thought styles and paradigms.     

Unified science as political philosophy: positivism, pluralism and liberalism

Logical positivism is widely associated with an illiberal technocratic view of politics. This view is a caricature. Some members of the left Vienna circle were explicit in their criticism of this conception of politics. In particular, Neurath’s work attempted to link the internal epistemological pluralism and tolerance of logical empiricism with political pluralism and the rejection of a technocratic politics. This paper examines the role that unified science played in Neurath’s defence of political and social pluralism. Neurath’s project of unified science addressed problems that lie at the centre of recent debates around liberalism concerning the possibility of social co-operation in conditions of pluralism. His response is distinctive in calling upon an empiricist tradition that differs from Kantian proceduralist approaches that have predominated in recent liberalism. While Neurath’s position has problems, it deserves reconsideration, especially in so far as it questions the Kantian assumption that a thin language of abstract rights provides the best basis for the cosmopolital lingua franca required by conditions of social pluralism. An investigation of the role that unified science plays in Neurath’s politics also gives reasons for revising common misconceptions about the nature of the unity of science programme itself.     

The irreducibility of value-freedom to theory assessment

The current ideal of value-freedom holds non-cognitive values to be illegitimate in theory appraisal but legitimate in earlier stages of the research process, for example, when affecting the selection of topics or the generation of hypotheses. Respective decisions are often considered as part of a context of discovery and as irrelevant for the justification and assessment of theories. I will argue that this premise of an epistemic independence of theory appraisal, though often taken for granted, is false. Due to the possibility of value-laden blind spots, decisions in discovery can have an indirect impact on theory assessment that the value-free ideal cannot deal with. This argument is illustrated by a case study from women's health research, namely the assessment of hormone replacement therapy as a prevention of coronary heart diseases. In consequence, the epistemic trustworthiness of science is promoted more by a pluralism of non-cognitive values than by their exclusion; and a normative philosophy of science needs to enlarge its focus to include the context of discovery as well as the social conditions of science.     

Values and uncertainties in climate prediction,revisited

Philosophers continue to debate both the actual and the ideal roles of values in science. Recently, Eric Winsberg has offered a novel, model-based challenge to those who argue that the internal workings of science can and should be kept free from the influence of social values. He contends that model-based assignments of probability to hypotheses about future climate change are unavoidably influenced by social values. I raise two objections to Winsberg’s argument, neither of which can wholly undermine its conclusion but each of which suggests that his argument exaggerates the influence of social values on estimates of uncertainty in climate prediction. I then show how a more traditional challenge to the value-free ideal seems tailor-made for the climate context.     

One hundred years of Weyl’s (unfinished) unified field theory

In 1918, H. Weyl proposed a unified theory of gravity and electromagnetism based on a generalization of Riemannian geometry. In spite of its elegance and beauty, a serious objection was raised by Einstein, who argued that Weyl’s theory was not suitable as a physical theory . According to Einstein, the theory led to the prediction of a “second clock effect”, which has not been observed by experiments as yet. We briefly revisit this point and argue that a preliminary discussion on the very notion of proper time is needed in order to consider Einstein’s critical point of view. We also point out that Weyl theory is basically incomplete in its original version and its completion may lead to a rich and interesting new approach to gravity.     

Climates as commodities: Jean Pierre Purry and the modelling of the best climate on Earth

The paper looks at how an early eighteenth-century climatological model of the ‘best climate’ on Earth became a platform for political, economic, and demographic action of extraordinary significance for the colonization of new commodity environments. It analyzes the science used by an early modern business adventurer to model ‘climate’ as an economic tool informing imperial governance and exploitation of local resources. Jean Pierre Purry’s construction of ‘model climate’ portrayed North Carolina’s township at Yamassee River as an ideal environment geared toward mercantilist principles of trade but also as a model community based on skilled labor and optimal climatic capital. His climatological analysis was a purposeful act of policy making based on a science of colonial expansion similar to more recent calls at economic modelling of future climate impact.     

Research on scientific journals: Implications for editors and authors

A review of editorial policies of leading journals and of research relevant to scientific journals revealed conflicts between‘science’and‘scientists’. Owing to these conflicts, papers are often weak on objectivity and replicability. Furthermore, papers often fall short on importance, competence, intelligibility, or efficiency. Suggestions were made for editorial policies such as: (1) structured guidelines for referees, (2) open peer review, (3) blind reviews, and (4) full disclosure of data and method. Of major importance, an author's‘Note to Referees’(describing the hypotheses and design, but not the results) was suggested to improve the objectivity of the ratings of importance and competence. Also, recommendations are made to authors for improving contributions to science (such as the use of multiple hypotheses) and for promoting their careers (such as using complex methods and obtuse writing).     

Newton’s notion and practice of unification

In this paper I deal with a neglected topic with respect to unification in Newton’s Principia. I will clarify Newton’s notion (as can be found in Newton’s utterances on unification) and practice of unification (its actual occurrence in his scientific work). In order to do so, I will use the recent theories on unification as tools of analysis (Kitcher, Salmon and Schurz). I will argue, after showing that neither Kitcher’s nor Schurz’s account aptly capture Newton’s notion and practice of unification, that Salmon’s later work is a good starting point for analysing this notion and its practice in the Principia. Finally, I will supplement Salmon’s account in order to answer the question at stake.     

Savant Officials in the Prussian Mining Administration

Summary

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Prussian State supported savants who combined learned inquiry into nature with technical work. Members of the physical and mathematical classes of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences were involved in State projects such as surveying for the construction of canals, chemical analysis of Silesian iron, production of porcelain and of beet sugar. Some of these men were truly ‘hybrid’ experts living both in the worlds of State-directed manufacture and academic natural inquiry. Among these savant experts there was a particular sub-group that is at the centre of this paper: mining officials who were also recognized as mineralogists, geologists and chemists. The paper describes and analyses the training and the varied technical and scientific activities of these ‘savant officials’. At the centre of attention are the travels of inspection of the mineralogist and mining official Carl Abraham Gerhard (1738–1821) in the late 1760s. I argue that Gerhard's travels of inspection were at the same time geological travels and that savant officials like Gerhard made a significant contribution to the fledgling science of geology.     

Between Kepler and Newton: Hooke’s ‘principles of congruity and incongruity’ and the naturalization of mathematics

ABSTRACT

Robert Hooke’s development of the theory of matter-as-vibration provides coherence to a career in natural philosophy which is commonly perceived as scattered and haphazard. It also highlights aspects of his work for which he is rarely credited: besides the creative speculative imagination and practical-instrumental ingenuity for which he is known, it displays lucid and consistent theoretical thought and mathematical skills. Most generally and importantly, however, Hooke’s ‘Principles?…?of Congruity and Incongruity of bodies’ represent a uniquely powerful approach to the most pressing challenge of the New Science: legitimizing the application of mathematics to the study of nature. This challenge required reshaping the mathematical practices and procedures; an epistemological framework supporting these practices; and a metaphysics which could make sense of this epistemology. Hooke’s ‘Uniform Geometrical or Mechanical Method’ was a bold attempt to answer the three challenges together, by interweaving mathematics through physics into metaphysics and epistemology. Mathematics, in his rendition, was neither an abstract and ideal structure (as it was for Kepler), nor a wholly-flexible, artificial human tool (as it was for Newton). It drew its power from being contingent on the particularities of the material world.     

Do experts' adjustments on model‐based SKU‐level forecasts improve forecast quality?

Model‐based SKU‐level forecasts are often adjusted by experts. In this paper we propose a statistical methodology to test whether these expert forecasts improve on model forecasts. Application of the methodology to a very large database concerning experts in 35 countries who adjust SKU‐level forecasts for pharmaceutical products in seven distinct categories leads to the general conclusion that expert forecasts are equally good at best, but are more often worse than model‐based forecasts. We explore whether this is due to experts putting too much weight on their contribution, and this indeed turns out to be the case. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lebesgue’s criticism of Carl Neumann’s method in potential theory

In the 1870s, Carl Neumann proposed the so-called method of the arithmetic mean for solving the Dirichlet problem on convex domains. Neumann’s approach was considered at the time to be a reliable existence proof, following Weierstrass’s criticism of the Dirichlet principle. However, in 1937 H. Lebesgue pointed out a serious gap in Neumann’s proof. Curiously, the erroneous argument once again involved confusion between the notions of infimum and minimum. The objective of this paper is to show that Lebesgue’s sharp criticism of Neumann’s proof was only partially justified.