Epistemic divergence and the publicity of scientific methods

Epistemic divergence occurs when different investigators give different answers to the same question using evidence-collecting methods that are not public. Without following the principle that scientific methods must be public, scientific communities risk epistemic divergence. I explicate the notion of public method and argue that, to avoid the risk of epistemic divergence, scientific communities should (and do) apply only methods that are public.     

Subjectivity and emotion in scientific research

A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion with subjectivity. The proposed method is a naturalistic and externalist one, calling for empirical investigation into the intersubjective processes by which scientists’ emotional dispositions become refined and attuned to specific objects of attention. The proposal is developed through a critical discussion of Michael Polanyi’s theory of scientific passions, as well as plant geneticist Barbara McClintock’s celebrated “feeling for the organism.”     

Bias and values in scientific research

When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all ‘extra-scientific’ influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically deficient due to the influence of preferences on its outcomes. I present examples from biomedical research and offer an analysis in terms of social epistemology.     

Value-entanglement and the integrity of scientific research

Throughout much of the 20th century, philosophers of science maintained a position known as the value-free ideal, which holds that non-epistemic (e.g., moral, social, political, or economic) values should not influence the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. In the last few decades, many philosophers of science have rejected this position by arguing that non-epistemic values can and should play an important role in scientific judgment and decision-making in a variety of contexts, including the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. Rejecting the value-free ideal creates some new and vexing problems, however. One of these is that relinquishing this philosophical doctrine may undermine the integrity of scientific research if practicing scientists decide to allow non-epistemic values to impact their judgment and decision-making. A number of prominent philosophers of science have sought to show how one can reject the value-free ideal without compromising the integrity of scientific research. In this paper, we examine and critique their views and offer our own proposal for protecting and promoting scientific integrity. We argue that the literature on research ethics and its focus on adherence to norms, rules, policies, and procedures that together promote the aims of science can provide a promising foundation for building an account of scientific integrity. These norms, rules, policies, and procedures provide a level of specificity that is lacking in most philosophical discussions of science and values, and they suggest an important set of tasks for those working in science and values—namely, assessing, justifying, and prioritizing them. Thus, we argue that bringing together the literature on research ethics with the literature on science and values will enrich both areas and generate a more sophisticated and detailed account of scientific integrity.     

The methodological strategies of agroecological research and the values with which they are linked

The characteristic features of some of the methodological strategies adopted in scientific research in agroecology are discussed. They reflect that agroecology, as an approach to scientific research, is inextricably entangled with the other strands of agroecology (farming practice, social movement, political project); and that adopting agroecological strategies, and upholding the values of environmental sustainability, food sovereignty, social justice and democratic participation, mutually reinforce each other. After outlining the kinds of questions that agroecological research addresses so that it can produce knowledge that informs agroecological farming practices and the long term aspiration of agroecological movements to create an alternative agricultural/food system, and then making summary remarks about methodological strategies in general, three characteristic features of some agroecological strategies are introduced and discussed. The paper concludes with comments on the value of agroecological research.     

Repertoires: A post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific change and collaborative research

We propose a framework to describe, analyze, and explain the conditions under which scientific communities organize themselves to do research, particularly within large-scale, multidisciplinary projects. The framework centers on the notion of a research repertoire, which encompasses well-aligned assemblages of the skills, behaviors, and material, social, and epistemic components that a group may use to practice certain kinds of science, and whose enactment affects the methods and results of research. This account provides an alternative to the idea of Kuhnian paradigms for understanding scientific change in the following ways: (1) it does not frame change as primarily generated and shaped by theoretical developments, but rather takes account of administrative, material, technological, and institutional innovations that contribute to change and explicitly questions whether and how such innovations accompany, underpin, and/or undercut theoretical shifts; (2) it thus allows for tracking of the organization, continuity, and coherence in research practices which Kuhn characterized as ‘normal science’ without relying on the occurrence of paradigmatic shifts and revolutions to be able to identify relevant components; and (3) it requires particular attention be paid to the performative aspects of science, whose study Kuhn pioneered but which he did not extensively conceptualize. We provide a detailed characterization of repertoires and discuss their relationship with communities, disciplines, and other forms of collaborative activities within science, building on an analysis of historical episodes and contemporary developments in the life sciences, as well as cases drawn from social and historical studies of physics, psychology, and medicine.     

A Bayesian reconstruction of the methodology of scientific research programmes

The paper is concerned with explaining some of the principal theoretical developments in elementary particle physics and discussing the associated methodological problems both in respect of heuristics and appraisal. Particular reference is made to relativistic quantum field theory, renormalization, Feynman diagram techniques, the analytic S-matrix and the Chew — Frautschi bootstrap.     

Metabolic iteration, evolution and cognition in cellular proliferation

A model for cellular proliferation is described according to which proliferation ensues when metabolism evolves towards commitment to DNA synthesis, and inhibition of proliferation occurs when enzymic interactions are iterated within a few metabolic pathways, another limiting factor being the supply of metabolites. The model successfully describes cellular growth and division as a 'cognitive process' based on interaction within enzymic elements and the genome, and affords an explanation in these terms of some empirical phenomena which have previously been understood only as isolated observations.     

Metabolic iteration,evolution and cognition in cellular proliferation

Summary A model for cellular proliferation is described according to which proliferation ensues when metabolism evolves towards commitment to DNA synthesis, and inhibition of proliferation occurs when enzymic interactions are iterated within a few metabolic pathways, another limiting factor being the supply of metabolites. The model successfully describes cellular growth and division as a cognitive process based on interaction within enzymic elements and the genome, and affords an explanation in these terms of some empirical phenomena which have previously been understood only as isolated observations.     

Growing knowledge: Epistemic objects in agricultural extension work

We introduce a novel form of experimental knowledge that is the result of institutionally structured communication practices between farmers and university- and local community-based agronomists (agricultural extension specialists). This form of knowledge is exemplified in these communities’ uses of the concept of grower standard. Grower standard is a widely used but seldom discussed benchmark concept underpinning protocols used within agricultural experiments. It is not a one-size-fits-all standard but the product of local and active interactions between farmers and agricultural extension specialists. Grower standard is in some ways similar to more familiar epistemic objects discussed in philosophy of experiment, such as controls or background conditions. However, we argue that grower standard is epistemically novel, due to how knowledge arising from it is coproduced by farmers and agricultural extension specialists. Further, in the United States, this knowledge coproduction is institutionally structured by federal legislature dating back to the 19th century. We use our analysis of grower standard to focus a discussion of the positionality of the coproducers as well as the epistemic products of this form of knowledge coproduction, and we explore the role extension work plays in shaping agricultural science more broadly.     

Public scientific testimony in the scientific image

In this paper, I draw on philosophy of science to address a challenge for science communication. Empirical research indicates that some people who trust a meteorologist's report that they are in the path of a storm do not trust a climate scientist's report that we are on a path to global warming. Such selective skepticism about climate science exemplifies a more general challenge:

The Challenge of Selective UptakeLaypersons who generally accept public scientific testimony nevertheless fail to accept public scientific testimony concerning select, equally well warranted, scientific hypotheses.

A prominent response arising from the novel interdisciplinary science of science communication is a principle called Consensus Reporting. According to this principle, science reporters should, whenever feasible, report the scientific consensus or lack thereof for a reported scientific view.However, philosophy of science may offer a different perspective on the issue. This perspective is critical insofar as it indicates some inadequacies of Consensus Reporting. But it is also constructive insofar as it guides the development of an alternative principle, Justification Reporting, according to which science reporters should, whenever feasible, report aspects of the nature and strength of scientific justification or lack thereof for a reported scientific view. A central difference between these proposals is that Consensus Reporting appeals to the authority of the scientists whereas Justification Reporting appeals to the authority of scientific justification. As such, Justification Reporting reflects the image of science.The paper considers the philosophical and empirical motivation for Justification Reporting and its limitations. This includes prospects and problems for implementing it in a way that addresses The Challenge of Selective Uptake. From a methodological point of view, the paper illustrates how empirically informed philosophy of science may help address challenges for science communication.     

Bayesian personalism,the methodology of scientific research programmes,and Duhem's problem

The detailed analysis of a particular quasi-historical numerical example is used to illustrate the way in which a Bayesian personalist approach to scientific inference resolves the Duhemian problem of which of a conjunction of hypotheses to reject when they jointly yield a prediction which is refuted. Numbers intended to be approximately historically accurate for my example show, in agreement with the views of Lakatos, that a refutation need have astonishingly little effect on a scientist's confidence in the ‘hard core’ of a successful research programme even when a comparable confirmation would greatly enhance that confidence (an initial confidence of 0.9 fell by a fraction of a percent in the refutation case and rose to only a fraction of a percent short of unity in the comparable confirmation case). Timeo Danaos et dona ferentis.     

Transfer and templates in scientific modelling

The notion of template has been advocated by Paul Humphreys and others as an illuminating unit of analysis in the philosophy of scientific modelling. Templates are supposed to have the dual functions of representing target systems and of facilitating quantitative manipulation. A resulting worry is that wide-ranging cross-disciplinary use of templates might compromise their representational function and reduce them to mere formalisms. In this paper, we argue that templates are valuable units of analysis in reconstructing cross-disciplinary modelling. Central to our discussion are the ways in which Lotka-Volterra models are used to analyse processes of technology diffusion. We illuminate both the similarities and differences between contributions to this case of cross-disciplinary modelling by reconstructing them as transfer of a template, without reducing the template to a mere formalism or a computational model. This requires differentiating the interpretation of templates from that of the models based on them. This differentiation allows us to claim that the LV models of technology diffusion that we review are the result of template transfer - conformist in some contributions, creative in others.