| 零售商公平偏好与信息分享策略下供应链的决策模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 王文宾,张梦. 零售商公平偏好与信息分享策略下供应链的决策模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2021, 30(3): 552-561. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.03.014 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王文宾 张梦 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国矿业大学 经济管理学院 供应链与服务科学研究中心，江苏 徐州 221116 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目（71971210，71701200，71102164）；四川省教育厅人文社科重点研究基地四川省电子商务与现代物流研究中心重点项目（DSWL19-5）；四川循环经济研究中心重点规划资助项目（XHJJ-1902） |
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| 摘 要： | 考虑到零售商的公平偏好行为影响供应链成员企业的决策,分别在零售商公平中性和公平偏好情形下建立供应链动态博弈模型.其中,模型考虑了零售商预测市场需求信息并决定是否向制造商分享信息,旨在探讨零售商的公平偏好行为和信息分享策略对制造商和零售商决策的影响.研究表明:随着零售商公平偏好程度的增加,批发价降低,但零售价不变,零售商...
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| 关 键 词： | 公平偏好 信息分享 信息分享补偿机制 信息精确度 供应链 |
Decision-Making Model of a Supply Chain Considering Fairness Preference and Information Sharing of the Retailer |
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| WANG Wenbin,ZHANG Meng. Decision-Making Model of a Supply Chain Considering Fairness Preference and Information Sharing of the Retailer[J]. Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications, 2021, 30(3): 552-561. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.03.014 |
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| Authors: | WANG Wenbin ZHANG Meng |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management； Center for Supply Chain and Service Science，China University of Mining and Technology，Xuzhou 221116，Jiangsu，China |
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| Abstract: | Considering the fact that the fairness preference of the retailer affects the decision-making of enterprises in supply chain, a dynamic game model of supply chain is established under the fairness neutrality condition and fairness preference condition. In the model, the retailer predicts market demand information and decides whether or not to share the information with the manufacturer. An analysis of the impact of the fairness preference behavior and the information sharing strategy of the retailer demonstrates that as the fairness preference increases, the wholesale price increases, but the retail price stay unchanged, the utility of the retailer increases, and the utility of the manufacturer decreases. Moreover, information sharing enables the manufacturer to make more accurate decisions and obtain a higher utility. The improvement of information accuracy compensates for the manufacturer’s utility loss caused by the fairness preference of the retailer. However, information sharing reduces the utility of the retailer. Therefore, the retailer will not share information with the manufacturer voluntarily. Furthermore, within a reasonable proportional range of allocation coefficient, the information sharing compensation mechanism enables the retailer with fairness preference to share information voluntarily. |
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| Keywords: | fairness preference information sharing information sharing compensation mechanism information accuracy supply chain |
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