Kant and the nature of matter: Mechanics,chemistry, and the life sciences

Kant believed that the ultimate processes that regulate the behavior of material bodies can be characterized exclusively in terms of mechanics. In 1790, turning his attention to the life sciences, he raised a potential problem for his mechanically-based account, namely that many of the operations described in the life sciences seemed to operate teleologically. He argued that the life sciences do indeed require us to think in teleological terms, but that this is a fact about us, not about the processes themselves. Nevertheless, even were we to concede his account of the life sciences, this would not secure the credentials of mechanics as a general theory of matter. Hardly any material properties studied in the second half of the eighteenth century were, or could have been, conceived in mechanical terms. Kant's concern with teleology is tangential to the problems facing a general matter theory grounded in mechanics, for the most pressing issues have nothing to do with teleology. They derive rather from a lack of any connection between mechanical forces and material properties. This is evident in chemistry, which Kant dismisses as being unscientific on the grounds that it cannot be formulated in mechanical terms.