对两个自认证公钥签名方案的安全性分析

通过对新近Lin等人提出的自认证公钥签名方案和王等人提出的自认证公钥签密方案进行了安全性分析,指出这两个方案都是不安全的.原因是这两个方案都能够受到替换公钥攻击,使得攻击者能够对任意选择的消息成功伪造签名.然而,在当前的自认证公钥签名方案的安全性证明中都没有考虑到替换公钥攻击,从而得到一个启示：由于自认证公钥签名自身的特点,那么在自认证公钥签名的安全性模型中必须进一步考虑是否能抵抗替换公钥攻击,从而确保方案的真正安全性.

Security Analysis of Two Self-certified Public Key Signature Schemes

In this paper,we analysis the two self-certified public key signature schemes recently proposed by Lin et al.and Wang et al.respectively.Unfortunately,the above two schemes are insecure,because they can suffer from the attack from the replacement public key so that any one can forge a valid signature on any message.Moreover,in all the self-certified public key signature schemes available nowadays,none of them consider the attack from the replacement public key.Thus,we get the enlightenment： because of the autologous feature of the self-certified public key signature scheme,the attack from the replacement public key must be taken into consideration in the security model of the self-certified public key signature scheme to guarantee the real security.