非对称信息条件下的成本控制策略

运用委托代理理论方法探讨了信息不对称条件下风险中性的企业主如何激励风险中性的生产者努力降低成本的问题·企业主根据自己的要求和生产者的自报数确定合约基数,将实际成本与该基数做比较后对生产者进行奖励或惩罚,以此为基础建立了生产者和企业主的目标函数,确定了生产者最优自报成本,并建立了非对称信息条件下的企业主期望效用最大化模型·最后,以奖励系数和惩罚系数作为决策变量,运用进化规划算法作了仿真计算·计算结果表明,企业主可以通过对奖励系数和惩罚系数的选择来达到控制成本从而最大化自己期望效用的目的·

Cost Control Strategy Under Asymmetric Information

The problem how a proprietor to stimulate producers to reduce product costs under asymmetric information is discussed on a basis of principal-agent theory. The proprietor shall determine a contractual basic cost according to his demand and how much the producers confirmed, and compare it with actual cost so as to offer incentive to or punish someone as producers. Based on such contractual procedure, some objective functions in terms of producer and proprietor are given to determine optimal cost as offered and confirmed by producers themselves. In addition, a model to maximize proprietor's expected utility is given under asymmetric information. Taking coefficients of incentive and punishment as decision variables, a simulation is conducted by way of the evolutionary programming algorithm, of which the results show that proprietor can control cost and maximize his profit through choosing properly the coefficients of incentive and punishment.