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存在成本差异的双寡头企业选址定价博弈
引用本文:刘艳春,高立群.存在成本差异的双寡头企业选址定价博弈[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2005,26(5):417-420.
作者姓名:刘艳春  高立群
作者单位:东北大学,信息科学与工程学院,辽宁,沈阳,110004;东北大学,信息科学与工程学院,辽宁,沈阳,110004
基金项目:辽宁省自然科学基金,辽宁省教育厅资助项目
摘    要:针对传统的Hotelling线段模型中假设双寡头企业的生产成本完全相同这一问题,应用两阶段博弈模型,提出了双寡头企业成本存在差异条件下的企业选址定价模型·结果表明:当双寡头企业同一质量的产品实现最大差异化时,虽然两企业都能获得利润,但具有成本优势的企业却能获得比成本劣势企业更多的超额利润;当双寡头企业同一质量的产品实现最小差异化时,具有成本优势的企业将占据市场,具有成本劣势的企业将远离成本优势的企业或退出市场·

关 键 词:Hotelling模型  动态博弈  成本差异  寡头垄断  纳什均衡
文章编号:1005-3026(2005)05-0417-04
修稿时间:2004年9月24日

Locating-Pricing Game of Duopoly Enterprises at Different Costs
LIU Yan-chun,GAO Li-qun.Locating-Pricing Game of Duopoly Enterprises at Different Costs[J].Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science),2005,26(5):417-420.
Authors:LIU Yan-chun  GAO Li-qun
Institution:(1) School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
Abstract:Aiming at the problem that the traditional Hotelling segmentation model was assumed that the production costs of duopoly enterprises are completely the same, with the two-phase gaming model applied to it. A locating-pricing model is proposed for both enterprises at different costs. The results show that when the difference the products of the same quality supplied by the duopoly enterprises is maximized, the enterprise which is superior in cost to the other one will gain more excess profit though both can gain profit. However, when the difference is minimized, the enterprise superior in cost will be dominant on market and the inferior one has to fall far behind the former even retreat from the market.
Keywords:Hotelling model  dynamic game  cost differentiation  oligopoly  Nash equilibrium
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