互助担保:连带责任、互助保证金与成员努力程度

构建了针对现行互助担保模式的简单模型，分析了在互助担保中连带责任以及互助保证金对成员企业努力程度的影响.为了进一步激励成员企业的努力程度，提出增加监督惩罚机制和次序担保贷款机制，并通过建立动态激励模型验证了这些机制的有效性.研究结果如下:在现行的互助担保机制下，连带责任越大成员企业努力程度越低，且保证金越多成员企业努力程度越低，而引入监督惩罚机制以及次序贷款机制能够一定程度避免成员企业低努力程度行为的发生.

Mutual Guarantee: Joint Liability， Mutual Margin and Peer Effort

A basic model was designed for the current mutual guarantee mode， which analyzed the effect of joint liability and mutual margin on the effort level of member enterprises. In order to encourage the efforts of member enterprises， it was proposed to strengthen the supervision and punishment mechanism and the sequential lending mechanism， and the effectiveness of these mechanisms was verified by establishing a dynamic incentive model. The results showed that under the existing mutual guarantee mechanism， the greater the joint liability and margin are， the lower the effort of the member enterprises will be. The supervision and punishment mechanism and the sequential lending mechanism can prevent member enterprises from taking low effort actions.