考虑再制造回收率的两阶段双渠道闭环供应链协调契约设计

针对由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的二级供应链结构，考虑将整个销售期划分为两个销售阶段并通过混合双渠道销售产品，提出了有效的协调契约.制造商与零售商之间存在以制造商为主导的斯塔克伯格博弈行为，运用博弈理论建立决策模型，并引入改进的收益共享契约，以解决渠道冲突问题.结果表明，制造商在保持传统渠道的同时，开辟电子渠道将导致传统零售商抬高市场价格，影响产品的整体市场需求，导致总体利润降低，且在特定策略下回收率水平较低时会引起渠道冲突.设计的批发价格与收益共享契约组合的改进契约实现了双渠道供应链的协调，并使得开辟电子渠道后供应链各成员利润达到帕累托改进，从而有效解决了渠道冲突问题.

A Coordinative Contract of the Dual-Channel Closed Loop Supply Chain with Two-Sale Periods Considering Rate of Recovery

A coordinative contract based on a two-stage supply chain pricing model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer was studied. The model divided the entire sale period into two-sale periods and sells the product through a dual channel. There exists the Stackelberg game behavior which is dominated by the manufacturer among the supply chain members. The game theory was used to establish the decision-making model and an improved revenue-sharing contract was introduced to solve the channel conflict. The results showed that the e-channel can lead the retailer to raise the market price when manufacturer maintain traditional channels， which may adversely affect the overall market demands causing the decrease of overall profits. The channel conflict may ensue when the rate of recovery is lower under specific strategies. In order to solve the conflict of the mixed dual channel， an improved contract of wholesale price and revenue sharing contract was designed， which not only achieves the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain， but also helps the supply chain members to get Pareto improvement in their profits.