非对称信息条件下供应链收入共享契约协调

研究了非对称信息条件下供应链收入共享契约协调问题,建立了新的收入共享契约协调模型.在模型中,主方供应商具有批发价格和收入共享比例决策权,从方零售商具有隐匿边际成本信息和订货量决策权.探讨了零售商边际成本信息隐匿情况下的供应商最优收入共享策略,并将其同对称信息情况进行对比分析.最后进行了数值仿真.研究表明,为了设计一个激励零售商的最优收入共享策略,供应商将对零售商私有成本信息的不可观测性付出代价,导致利润降低,而零售商却可以从中获益.

Coordinating Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contract Under Asymmetric Information

The problem how to coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information is studied,with a new model developed relevantly.In this model,the supplier as the leader has the decision-making right for wholesale price and revenue-sharing proportion,while the retailer as the follower has just the right to conceal the information on marginal cost and determine the ordering quantity.Discusses the supplier's optimal revenue-sharing strategy in case the retailer conceals the marginal cost,with a comparative analysis made under symmetrical information at the same time.A numerical simulation is done and the result shows that the supplier's optimal revenue-sharing strategy to spur retailer will pay a price for the unobservability of retailer's private information and reduce his/her profit,while the retailer can gain from that.