| 风险投资基金组建的激励博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 李晓伟,刘则渊,刘凤朝.风险投资基金组建的激励博弈[J].科学管理研究,2005,23(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 李晓伟 刘则渊 刘凤朝 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中国海洋大学,管理学院,山东,青岛,266071
2. 大连理工大学,21世纪发展研究中心,辽宁,大连,116024 |
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| 摘 要： | 在探讨风险投资基金组建的必要性的基础上,采用博弈方法分析了政府资金引导报酬契约以及风险资本家声誉等激励问题,提出了我国发展风险投资基金的激励性对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资基金 风险资本家 激励 博弈 声誉 |
Game Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism during the Setup of Venture Fund |
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| LI Xiaowei,LIU Zeyuan,LIU Fengchao.Game Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism during the Setup of Venture Fund[J].Scientific Management Research,2005,23(6). |
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| Authors: | LI Xiaowei LIU Zeyuan LIU Fengchao |
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| Abstract: | Game theory is applied to analyze the necessity of venture fund and some incentive problems during the setup of venture fund.The support from authority policies,the promissory distribution of proceeds and the reputation of venture capitalist,would be helpful to reduce the moral hazard loss and ensure the efforts of venture capitalist consistent with the target of investor.And several countermeasures are suggested to promote the development of venture fund in China. |
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| Keywords: | venture fund venture capitalist incentive mechanism game theory reputation |
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