首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

中国证券交易所监管激励分析:政府与交易所监管权分配
引用本文:曹 潇,张弓长,林 波.中国证券交易所监管激励分析:政府与交易所监管权分配[J].河北科技大学学报,2008,29(1):83-86.
作者姓名:曹 潇  张弓长  林 波
作者单位:西北工业大学经济研究中心,陕西西安,710072
摘    要:中国证券交易所组织制度与所处环境决定了交易所以自我发展为目标,受制于政府约束的自我发展目标扭曲了交易所的监管激励制度,然而,交易所组织改制对其监管激励的强化不具现实意义,阶段性修正交易所监管激励的缺失应强调政府与交易所之间的监管权分配。

关 键 词:交易所  监管激励  监管权
文章编号:1008-1542(2008)01-0083-04
收稿时间:2007/9/4 0:00:00
修稿时间:2007年9月4日

Analysis on supervisory incentive of stock exchange in China:Distribution of supervisory power between the government and stock exchange
CAO Xiao,ZHANG Gong-chang and LIN Bo.Analysis on supervisory incentive of stock exchange in China:Distribution of supervisory power between the government and stock exchange[J].Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology,2008,29(1):83-86.
Authors:CAO Xiao  ZHANG Gong-chang and LIN Bo
Institution:Economical Research Center,North Western Polytechnical University, Xi''an Shaanxi 710072, China;Economical Research Center,North Western Polytechnical University, Xi''an Shaanxi 710072, China;Economical Research Center,North Western Polytechnical University, Xi''an Shaanxi 710072, China
Abstract:The organizational institution in stock exchange in China and the situation determined self-development as the goal of the stock exchange.Bound by the government,it distorted supervisory incentive in stock exchange.While consolidation on its supervisory incentive by reform on stock exchange organization can hardly be a real practice,amendment on supervisory incentive of stock exchange at the present time should focus its attention on distribution of supervisory power between the government and stock exchange.
Keywords:exchange  supervisory incentive  supervisory power
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《河北科技大学学报》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《河北科技大学学报》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号