城市快速轨道交通合理票价的博弈分析

为了制定城市快速轨道交通的合理票价，运用Logit模型及经济学的博弈论，研究了城市快速轨道交通与常规公共交通之间的动态竞争过程，讨论了在此竞争背景下，城市快速轨道交通如何通过合理票价的制定，实现其客票收入的最大化。结果表明，在完全市场竞争机制下，城市快速轨道交通票价的调整必将引起常规公共交通票价相应调整。所以应放弃最优票价，转而寻求相对满意度最大时的合理票价，能够保证竞争中城市快速轨道交通客票收入的同时，常规公共交通票价的调整不会损害已方利益。

Game-theory of reasonable ticket price for urban railway transport

In order to determine the reasonable ticket price of the urban railway transport, using Logit model and the game-theory of the competition behavior in economics, the dynamic competing of urban railway transport with routine public transit was studied, and how to determine urban railway transit ticket price to obtain maximum profit was analyzed. The results indicate that under the competition mechanism of complete market, the adjustment of the urban railway ticket price will cause the corresponding adjustment of routine public transit. So the optimum admission fee should be given up to seek the reasonable ticket price that can guarantee the income fare of the urban railway, at the same time, the passenger ticket of routine public transit is adjusted and will not be harmful to the interests of one'own side in the competition.3 tabs, 5 figs, 7 refs.