| 基于委托代理理论的企业年金运营研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李天成.基于委托代理理论的企业年金运营研究[J].天津理工大学学报,2005,21(4):86-88. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李天成 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津港保税区,规划建设管理局,天津,300456 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托代理是企业年金运营中体现的主要风险之一，由于企业年金运营中涉及的当事人多而复杂，因此解决委托代理问题已经成为企业年金运营健康发展，从而保护企业年金会员及其受益人利益，最终实现养老保障根本目的的刻不容缓的工作，本文阐述中国企业年金运营中的委托代理关系，构建企业年金委托代理理论模型，从中获得相关启示。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业年金 委托代理 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-095X（2005）04-0086-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-08-15 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年8月15日 |
Study of occupational pension operation based on principal-agent problem |
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| LI Tian-cheng.Study of occupational pension operation based on principal-agent problem[J].Journal of Tianjin University of Technology,2005,21(4):86-88. |
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| Authors: | LI Tian-cheng |
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| Abstract: | Principal-agent problem is one of the main risks in the operation of occupational pension schemes. Because there are many persons and entities involved in the operation of occupational pension, the settlement of the principal-agent problem is vital to protect the interest of the members of the pension and the beneficiaries. The paper investigates the model of the principal-agent relationship of the scheme, then present some advice on the settlement of the principal-agent problem. |
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| Keywords: | occupational pension principal-agent inspiring mechanism |
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