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博弈视野中大学生诚信缺失的逻辑分析
引用本文:贺寿南,尹秀娇.博弈视野中大学生诚信缺失的逻辑分析[J].衡阳师专学报,2010(2):27-29.
作者姓名:贺寿南  尹秀娇
作者单位:[1]衡阳师范学院人文社会科学系,湖南衡阳421008 [2]衡阳师范学院经济与法律系,湖南衡阳421008
基金项目:基金项目:国家社科基金项目“经济逻辑研究”(06BZX050);衡阳师范学院科学基金项目“博弈逻辑中的归纳推理研究”(09803).
摘    要:作为自我约束的诚信制度,是在非合作博弈框架下,参与人自我优化选择的结果。诚信形成需要以下条件:(1)主体之间具有共同的利益。唯有如此,双方才有机会和动力去信任对方并相信对方能为自己带来长期和最大的利益。(2)诚信关系的建立需要主体双方互动。没有人会选择诚信,反映了个体的理性行为产生的集体的不合理性行为,体现了个体理性与集体理性的冲突。构建信息完全的诚信重复博弈模型和引入约束条件与事后惩罚成本是解决诚信缺失问题的重要途径。

关 键 词:诚信缺失  非合作博弈  重复博弈  约束条件  事后惩罚

Logical Analysis on Absence of Honesty of College Student in Game
HE Shou-nan,YIN Xiu-jiao.Logical Analysis on Absence of Honesty of College Student in Game[J].Journal of Hengyang Normal University,2010(2):27-29.
Authors:HE Shou-nan  YIN Xiu-jiao
Institution:1. Department of Humanities and Social Science; 2. Economy and Law Department, Hengyang Normal University, Hengyang Hunan 421008, China)
Abstract:The honor codes, as self-restraint, is the outcome of participants self-optimizing selection in the non-cooperative game framework. Faith formation requires the following conditions: (1) Subjects have common interest. Only in this way can both sides have a chance and motivation to trust each other and believe in long-term benefits. (2) The establishment of integrity need interact. The fact that none choose, integrity reflects collective irrational behavior generated by the individual rational behavior and embodies conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality. Constructing repeated integrity games model of complete information and introducing constraint conditions and the cost of subsequent punishment are important ways to solve the problem above.
Keywords:absence of honesty  non-cooperative game  repeated game  constraint conditions  subsequent punishment
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