| Supply Chain Coordination with Sales Effort Effects and Impact of Loss Aversion on Effort Decision |
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| 作者姓名： | 索寒生 王京春 金以慧 |
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| 作者单位： | DepartmentofAutomation,TsinghuaUniversity,Beijing100084,China |
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| 基金项目： | Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No. 60174046) |
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| 摘 要： | A new supply contract based on sharing the sales profits as well as the cost of effort was developed to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort effects. The contract coordinates the supplier‘s actions with voluntary compliance; the contract is symmetric in the sense that both the supplier‘s and retailer‘s profits are linearly correlated and is more easily implemented in some situations. The impact of the retailer‘s loss aversion on his effort is investigated based on the contract. After characterizing the retailer‘s optimal solutions, this paper demonstrates that contrary to intuition, loss aversion weakens incentives for retailer‘s sales effort and the retailer‘s optimal effort decreases as the loss aversion increases.
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| 关 键 词： | 供给链 销售工作 市场决策 市场风险 |
| 收稿时间： | 27 June 2003 |
Supply Chain Coordination with Sales Effort Effects and Impact of Loss Aversion on Effort Decision |
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| Hansheng Suo,
½, Jingchun Wang, ຬ&#x;,Yihui Jin,
î&#x;.Supply Chain Coordination with Sales Effort Effects and Impact of Loss Aversion on Effort Decision[J].Tsinghua Science and Technology,2005,10(1):102-107. |
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| Authors: | Hansheng Suo
½ Jingchun Wang ຬ&#x; Yihui Jin
î&#x; |
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| Institution: | Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China |
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| Abstract: | A new supply contract based on sharing the sales profits as well as the cost of effort was developed to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort effects. The contract coordinates the supplier's actions with voluntary compliance; the contract is symmetric in the sense that both the supplier's and retailer's profits are linearly correlated and is more easily implemented in some situations. The impact of the retailer's loss aversion on his effort is investigated based on the contract. After characterizing the retailer's optimal solutions, this paper demonstrates that contrary to intuition, loss aversion weakens incentives for retailer's sales effort and the retailer's optimal effort decreases as the loss aversion increases. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain coordination sales effort loss aversion |
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