价格随机条件下信息不对称的看涨期权弹性契约

探寻市场价格和批发价格均随机波动时,在信息不对称的情况下是否存在供应链协调.将看涨期权与数量弹性契约相融合成一种新的契约看涨期权弹性契约,分别构建供应成本和制造成本信息不对称时应急供应链的看涨期权弹性契约模型,寻找最优定价及订货策略;并与完全信息情形对比,分析不完全对称的信息对供应链及链成员的最优决策和绩效的影响.研究结果表明:当突发事件引起商品未来价格上涨时,采用看涨期权弹性契约协调供应链,若供应链上的参与者单方拥有信息优势,就能通过隐瞒私人信息而获利,但没有信息优势的一方和供应链的整体利益会受到损害.同时也证明了看涨期权弹性契约比数量弹性契约协调供应链的效果要好.最后通过算例验证了这些结论.

Call option elastic contract with information asymmetry under stochastic prices

In this paper, we aim to explore whether the supply chain could coordinate under the condition of random fluctuation of both market price and wholesale price. First, we construct a new call option elastic contract model based on the combination of the call option contract and quantity elastic contract, and a call option elastic contract model for emergency supply chain is constructed respectively in view of the information asymmetry caused by suppliers’ hiding supply cost information and manufacturers’ hiding manufacturing cost information in order to look for optimal pricing and ordering decisions, and analyze the influence of asymmetric information on the optimal decision and performance of supply chain and supply chain members by comparing to the complete information case. And the results show that participants in the supply chain with unilateral information advantage can make profits by hiding private cost information when the call option elastic contract coordinates the supply chain based on rising future prices of commodities caused by emergencies, but it will bring damage to the other side of the supply chain as well as the whole supply chain. Meanwhile, we also get the conclusion that the new contract formed by the combination of call option contract and quantity elastic contract is better than the quantity elasticity contract in coordinating the supply chain. Finally, we verify these conclusions by examples.