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地方煤矿安全生产政府管制的失灵与优化
引用本文:徐金燕.地方煤矿安全生产政府管制的失灵与优化[J].华北科技学院学报,2010,7(1):44-49.
作者姓名:徐金燕
作者单位:湖南科技大学,管理学院,湖南,湘潭,411201
基金项目:湖南省资源性企业基地项目资助基金课题论文(JDKT0901)
摘    要:地方煤矿安全事故频发成为构建和谐社会和实现经济社会可持续发展的瓶颈,而政府管制不力是矿难事故发生的深层次原因。本文基于公共选择的“经济人”假设理论,从中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业和煤矿工人四个利益主体的利益博弈角度来探讨政府管制失灵的根本原因,并提出优化我国地方煤矿安全生产的政府管制的对策建议。

关 键 词:煤矿安全生产  政府管制失灵  博弈

The Failure of Government Regulation of Local Coal Mine Production Safety and Optimization
XU Jinyan.The Failure of Government Regulation of Local Coal Mine Production Safety and Optimization[J].Journal of North China Institute of Science and Technology,2010,7(1):44-49.
Authors:XU Jinyan
Institution:School of Management;Hunan University of Science and Technology;Xiangtan Jinyan 411201
Abstract:Frequent local coal mine safety accidents have become the bottleneck of China' s construction of harmonious society and the realization of sustainable social and ecnomic progress. The invalidation in our governmental regulation is the deep-seated reason of coal mine safety accidents. Based on public choice" economic man" hypothesis, from the central government, local governments, coal companies and mine workers in the interests of the four subjects of interest to explore the root causes of government failure in terms of game, and puts forward advices of optimizing government reagulations on China' s Coal Mine Safety production.
Keywords:safe coal production  failure of government regulation  game  
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