应用信号博弈选择供应商的策略研究

第三方认证选择对供应商起着重要的作用。分析了采用第三方认证来选择供应商时在买方与供应商之间会出现的博弈现象。建立信号博弈模型，求出并分析分离均衡解和混同均衡解。提出通过供应商发出的获得第三方认证程度的信号，有利于买方选择。买方应鼓励高效率的供应商积极获取权威认证。对于低效率伪装成高效率的供应商，设计认证成本使其得不偿失，主动放弃。

Research on Supplier Selection Policy Based on Signaling Game

Third party certification plays an important role in supplier selection, the signaling game model is established after analyzing the game between buyer and supplier concerning third party certification. Pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium were worked out and analyzed. It was advantageous for buyer to encourage supplier to pass third party certification, through which buyer could receive signal sent by supplier. For supplier who cheated in the game, he should pay much more than fair due to higher cost of passing third party certification, and hence give up ctively.