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企业并购中讹诈收益的博弈分析
引用本文:任春燕,赵宝福.企业并购中讹诈收益的博弈分析[J].科学技术与工程,2007,7(7):1402-1405.
作者姓名:任春燕  赵宝福
作者单位:辽宁工程技术大学,工商管理学院,葫芦岛,125105
摘    要:企业并购是并购企业和目标企业管理者之间多个参与人的博弈过程,利用博弈思想来分析各自的决策行为以及在相应条件下,目标企业的管理层在面对并购者的并购企图时,为所有者的最优利润而采取的行动。尤其在恶意收购中,目标企业管理者为了增大股东的福利,往往向收购者提出讹诈收益,向其他的潜在者发出信号,以寻求骑士,进而分得更多的收购利益。

关 键 词:讹诈收益  博弈  救星  重购协议
收稿时间:2006-10-31

M & A Revenue Blackmail Game Analysis
REN Chun-yan,ZHAO Bao-fu.M & A Revenue Blackmail Game Analysis[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2007,7(7):1402-1405.
Authors:REN Chun-yan  ZHAO Bao-fu
Abstract:M & A is a merger between enterprises and enterprise managers and other targets in the gaming process.Using game theory to analyze their own decisions,as well as under what conditions,the goal of the M & A managers in the face of attempts,the best profits for the owners to take action.In acquisitions,the goal of increasing the welfare of managers to shareholders,who often pay blackmail to purchase receipts,sent a signal to other potential persons to seek refuge,which will lead to the acquisition of more interest.
Keywords:blackmail proceeds game savior re-purchase agreement
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