首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

电子商务中信用模式选择的博弈分析
引用本文:魏明侠.电子商务中信用模式选择的博弈分析[J].科学技术与工程,2005,5(7):411-414.
作者姓名:魏明侠
作者单位:河南工业大学工商管理系,郑州,450052
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(70302006)资助
摘    要:电子商务是一种新的经营理念和商务模式,信用是制约电子商务进一步发展的主要瓶颈。在电子商务中交易者选择何种信用模式是虚拟市场中交易双方相互博弈的结果。完全信息下的静态博弈和动态博弈结果表明:电子商务交易者的双方交易决策是相互影响的,交易一方对另一方的交易行为都会做出积极的反应,买方的选择往往决定卖方的选择;动态博弈时,卖方选择何种信用模式的临界点是卖方诚实信用模式的短期收入与社会平均投资利润率的比值。

关 键 词:电子商务  博弈  纳什均衡  完全信息
文章编号:1671-1815(2005)07-0411-05
修稿时间:2004年11月29

A Game Analysis on The Choice of Trust Mode in Electronic Commerce
WEI Mingxia.A Game Analysis on The Choice of Trust Mode in Electronic Commerce[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2005,5(7):411-414.
Authors:WEI Mingxia
Abstract:Electronic commerce is a new type of business in the information society. The main bottleneck to its development is trust. thas yet to be secn which trust mode traders will choose in this virtual market. Ina static game, with compete information, traders choices will interact with each other, the buyers choice are decided by the sellers action and each side act positively. In dynamic game, sellers will choose the trust mode which provides them a long-run income that at lease as large as the short-thrm in come of cheating trust mode. The choice of which trust modes the sellers take will choose on the ratio between the short-run income of trust mode and the average profits of social capital investment.
Keywords:electronic commerce game Nash equilibrium complete in formation
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《科学技术与工程》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《科学技术与工程》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号