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非对称信息下供应链信用期契约的博弈研究
引用本文:白世贞,王丹红.非对称信息下供应链信用期契约的博弈研究[J].科学技术与工程,2008,8(24).
作者姓名:白世贞  王丹红
作者单位:哈尔滨商业大学,物流学院,哈尔滨,150076
基金项目:国家自然科学基金  
摘    要:供应链上每个实体具有独立的决策权,所以由此引发的非对称信息下的激励问题是导致系统低效的主要原因。以一个两阶段的供应链系统为背景,应用博弈理论对供应链的合作进行了具体的分析。然后通过信用期契约的设计,激励零售商申报其真实地零售成本类型,在提高整个供应链整体效率的同时各成员也实现了双赢。

关 键 词:不对称信息  供应链  信用期  博弈

Research on Credit Period under the Asymmetrical Information
BAI Shi-Zhen,WANG Dan-Hong.Research on Credit Period under the Asymmetrical Information[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2008,8(24).
Authors:BAI Shi-Zhen  WANG Dan-Hong
Institution:BAI Shi-Zhen,WANG Dan-Hong(School of Logistics,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin 150076,P.R.China)
Abstract:In reality,each entity has independent decision right in the supply chain.So,under asymmetric information incentive for each entity is the main reason for the inefficient in the system.Based on the system of two-echelon supply chain,cooperation of the supply chain is illustrated by game theory.Then,the supplier encourage retailer to declare its real type of selling cost by designing a credit period contract.At the same time of supply chain improves its whole efficiency individual member reaches win-win.
Keywords:asymmetric information supply chain credit period game  
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