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产业集群内企业合作创新行为的博弈分析
引用本文:刘磊,李梦奇,綦振法.产业集群内企业合作创新行为的博弈分析[J].山东理工大学学报,2008,22(5):73-76.
作者姓名:刘磊  李梦奇  綦振法
作者单位:山东理工大学管理学院,山东淄博255049
摘    要:通过不完全信息动态博弈分析了集群内企业间合作的必然性,进而构建双人合作博弈模型,分析双方的效用函数并对基本模型变形整理后,得出双方企业应理性选择加大科技投入进行合作来最大化自身收益函数,加大专有性资金的投入比例以提高企业对技术的专有性水平,减少磨合成本以降低损失,从而促进集群企业间合作创新关系良性循环,使企业在利益分配中占据更有利的地位。

关 键 词:产业集群  合作创新  合作博弈

The game analysis of the enterprises' cooperative innovation behaviors in industrial clusters
LIU Lei,LI Meng-qi,QI Zhen-fa.The game analysis of the enterprises'' cooperative innovation behaviors in industrial clusters[J].Journal of Shandong University of Technology:Science and Technology,2008,22(5):73-76.
Authors:LIU Lei  LI Meng-qi  QI Zhen-fa
Institution:LIU Lei,LI Meng-qi,QI Zhen-fa(School of Management,Sh,ong University of Technology,Zibo 255049,China)
Abstract:The inevitability of the cooperation between enterprises in clusters through incomplete information dynamic game is analyzed,and then a double-person cooperation game model is constructed.After analyzing the utility function and clear up the elementary model,we can get that the enterprises will select to increase the R&D investments to maximize their profit functions,and to increase the rate of the exclusive funds in order to enhance the technique exclusive level.The enterprises will also reduce the running...
Keywords:industrial cluster  cooperation innovation  cooperation game  
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