关于R&D联合开发决策过程中的博弈分析

根据博弈理论和决策理论 ,分别在有限次重复博弈和无限次重复博弈条件下定量分析了R&D联合开发活动中各行为主体的决策过程 ,其结果与许多文献提出的定性结论相一致 .由于在实践中 ,R&D联合开发活动重复博弈的可能性及其次数都是未知的 ,为此还研究了不确定条件下成功实现R&D联合开发的必要条件 ,结果显示只有当R&D联合开发活动重复博弈的概率超过某一特定值时 ,合作才能产生

Analysis of game for decision -making procedure in joint R&D

The decision-making procedure of behavioral entities i n joint R&D was analyzed quantitatively in finitely and infinitely repeated game s respectively based both on the game theory and the decision-making theory. Th e decision-making results are consistent with those in qualitative analysis in a great amount of literature. Since the possibility and the number in joint R&D are uncertain in practice, the necessary condition to implement joint R&D was a lso studied. The result shows that the cooperation will turn up only when the po ssibility of joint R&D exceeds a certain value.