| 初始排污权拍卖的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 肖江文,罗云峰,赵勇,岳超源.初始排污权拍卖的博弈分析[J].华中科技大学学报(自然科学版),2001,29(9):37-39. |
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| 作者姓名： | 肖江文 罗云峰 赵勇 岳超源 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中科技大学系统工程研究所 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目 (60 0 74 0 3 3 ) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于一级密封价格拍卖方式，建立了排污权交易制度中初始排污权分配的不完全信息静态博弈模型，对模型进行了分析，认为况标拍卖方式是初始排污权的一种合理的分配方式，并得到投标人越多，政府管理机构所得收益越高的结论。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境保护 排污权交易制度 初始排污权 一级密封价格拍卖 博弈模型 竞标拍卖 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-8616(2001)09-0037-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年4月4日 |
Game Analysis on Selling Initial Permits by Auction |
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| Xiao Jiangwen,Luo Yunfeng,Zhao Yong,Yue Chaoyuan,Dr..Game Analysis on Selling Initial Permits by Auction[J].JOURNAL OF HUAZHONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.NATURE SCIENCE,2001,29(9):37-39. |
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| Authors: | Xiao Jiangwen Luo Yunfeng Zhao Yong Yue Chaoyuan Dr |
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| Institution: | Xiao Jiangwen Luo Yunfeng Zhao Yong Yue Chaoyuan Dr., Institute of Systems Eng.,HUST,Wuhan 430074,China. |
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| Abstract: | A static game model with incomplete information based on the first price sealed auction is established, which is used for selling initial permits by auction in the tradable emission permits system. The solution to Bayesian Nash equilibrium is discussed. Auction is proved to be a reasonable instrument for distributing initial permits. And it is concluded that the more firms participate in auction, the more benefits the government can get. |
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| Keywords: | environmental protection tradable emission permits initial permits first-price sealed auction game |
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