| 上游市场进入的企业兼并动态博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 化冰,陈宏民,潘晓军.上游市场进入的企业兼并动态博弈模型[J].上海交通大学学报,2003,37(4):600-603. |
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| 作者姓名： | 化冰 陈宏民 潘晓军 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 172 0 0 1) |
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| 摘 要： | 构造了上游双头垄断，下游多厂商的产业结构模型，研究了上游在位企业面临进入威胁时的兼并模式选择．发现兼并战略选择取决于下游企业的数量及上游市场进入成本；即使不考虑规模经济，一定条件下，横向兼并仍是企业的均衡战略．揭示了政府和企业兼并方式中的利益冲突关系．
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| 关 键 词： | 兼并 完全圈定 部分圈定 先置兼并 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467(2003)04-0600-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年2月14日 |
Dynamic Game Model of Upstream Firm's Merging While Facing Entry Threat |
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| HUA Bing,CHEN Hong min,PAN Xiao jun.Dynamic Game Model of Upstream Firm''''s Merging While Facing Entry Threat[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2003,37(4):600-603. |
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| Authors: | HUA Bing CHEN Hong min PAN Xiao jun |
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| Abstract: | This paper established a model of upstream duopoly with many downstream firms. It studied the selection of the merger mode by upstream incumbent while facing entry threat, which is dependent the quantity of downstream firms and entry cost. The conclusion is that even not considering scale economy, the horizontal merger is still an equilibrium strategy. It revealed the interest conflict in firm's merger between government and firms. |
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| Keywords: | merger complete foreclosure partial foreclosure pre emptive merger |
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